Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Portis called 911 because Boyce was “going crazy” and had a gun. The operator said, “He has a gun?” Portis responded, “I think so.” The operator said, “Come on,” Portis said, “Yes!” twice. To “Did you see one?” Portis replied, “Yes!” The operator cautioned about perjury. Portis responded, “I’m positive.” After describing Boyce, Portis stated that she didn’t know whether Boyce had left. Officers responded. After determining Boyce was not in the apartment, they interviewed Portis and went to their car to complete a report. They saw Boyce return and call Portis’s name. Boyce ran from the officers. Officer Cummings chased him and saw Boyce reach toward his midsection, retrieve a handgun, and toss it into a yard. After catching Boyce, officers found a handgun in the area where Boyce threw a gun and found matching bullets in Boyce’s pocket. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1), Boyce sent a letter requesting that Portis recant her statement, providing the story he wanted her to use. They also spoke about “our story” by phone while he was in jail. Portis did not testify; the government played a recording of her 911 call. After his conviction, the district court concluded that Boyce had three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses that mandated a minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and sentenced him to 210 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Boyce’s civil rights had been restored. The court upheld admission of the 911 call under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because they were made while under the stress of a domestic battery and related to it.View "United States v. Boyce" on Justia Law

Johnson pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, and the sentencing memorandum requested an enhancement for committing a sex offense on the basis that Johnson sexually assaulted his former girlfriend, S.W. Unexpectedly for both the prosecution and defense counsel, S.W. appeared at his sentencing hearing and stated she wanted to testify. The judge exercised his authority to call S.W. to the stand. She testified that although she did not want Johnson to perform oral sex on her on the date in question, he did so but did not use force. The judge relied on S.W.’s testimony and imposed a U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) enhancement for committing a sex offense while in failure to register status. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The crimes of criminal sexual assault and abuse in Illinois require the use or threat of force in such a situation. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Riney was found in the vicinity of a shooting, immediately after the incident occurred, and matched the general description of the shooter. When he exited his car and walked away from the officers, they saw what they believed to be a gun in his waistband. A gun was found during a pat-down. Riney was convicted of possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Riney had many felony convictions for violent crimes, though from many years earlier, to qualify as an armed career criminal under both 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and U.S. Sentencing Guideline 4B1.4. The district court sentenced Riney to 204 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both his conviction and sentence, rejecting claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence and in applying a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice to the offense level in its sentencing guideline calculation. View "United States v. Riney" on Justia Law

Agent Lombardi received a tip from a confidential informant that he had seen “Cap” in possession of cocaine. The CI, who was familiar with cocaine distribution and had previously provided information that resulted in an arrest, provided the address at which he had seen “Cap.” Lombardi searched the name “Cap” in a law enforcement database. Todd Sutton was listed as a match for that alias. Lombardi obtained a booking photo of Sutton and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that “Cap” was Sutton. Lombardi drove the CI past the address. The CI confirmed the location and stated that the tenant was Foster, whom the CI believed to be Sutton’s girlfriend. A law enforcement database confirmed that Foster was the tenant; Lombardi later discovered that she was Sutton’s cousin. Lombardi took the CI before a judge; the CI signed a “John Doe” affidavit in support of a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents found: 63 grams of crack cocaine in a bedroom closet; male clothing and shoes in the same closet; a digital scale with white powder residue and other items frequently used to cook crack cocaine in the kitchen; a handwritten letter on the kitchen table referring to “Cap”; and a computer, on which agents viewed a video showing Sutton in the apartment. Only Sutton and Foster had keys to the apartment; she rarely entered the bedroom where the cocaine was found. Sutton pleaded guilty, retaining the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Williams pleaded guilty to misusing social security numbers, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7), making a false statement to an IRS agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court used the guidelines in effect at sentencing to calculate his imprisonment range, sentencing him to 56 months’ imprisonment, in addition to 24 months imposed for aggravated identity theft. Because of an upward adjustment for involving more than 10 victims, his guidelines range was higher than it would have been if calculated under the guidelines in effect when Williams committed his crimes. The defense did not raise the issue at sentencing. While his case was on appeal the Supreme Court held that applying the guidelines in effect at sentencing violates the ex post facto clause if it raises the defendant’s imprisonment range. Because the trial judge did not say that he would have given the same sentence if the range had been lower, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Officers arrived at Helman’s residence to execute warrants for his arrest. They hoped for a peaceful surrender. Helman exited the home and spoke with officers. In response to questions as to whether he was armed, Helman lifted his shirt to show a semi-automatic handgun. Helman handed the officers papers and returned to his house. The officers informed other members of the state police that Helman was carrying a loaded firearm. A six-hour stalemate followed, after which Helman walked into his yard carrying water and a cup. The Emergency Response Team moved in to prevent him from retreating back into his home and activated a flash bang device to distract Helmanhim. According to the officers, Helman turned, and, seeing the ERT, attempted to draw his handgun. Officers shot Helman multiple times. Helman claims that he did not reach for his weapon until after that device went off and shots were fired. Helman pled guilty in state court to resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon. Helman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Helman’s version of the facts would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and, under the facts found in that conviction, the response of the officers was reasonable. View "Helman v. Smeltzley" on Justia Law

Convicted of robbing three banks, Johnson was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. At trial Prince told the jury that he and Johnson had planned and executed the robberies together. Williams testified that Prince asked her to give him a ride one day and was accompanied by a stranger. She drove them several places, lastly a grocery store. Prince and the stranger entered the store and robbed the branch bank inside. Williams picked a photo of Johnson from an array of six photos. On appeal, Johnson argued that the judge should not have allowed Williams and the agent who conducted the array to testify about the identification because the Seventh Circuit has suggested that police show photographs sequentially rather than in an array. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, noting that Johnson did not attempt to show that all photo spreads are unnecessary and suggestive, or make it impossible for counsel to use the tools of the adversary process to explore an identification’s reliability. All six photos met Williams’s description and the array was not suggestive. The court also imposed a fine on Johnson’s attorney for omitting, from his brief, the court’s reasons for declining to exclude the identification. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Trying to avoid a traffic stop, Alexander lost control of his car and landed in a snow bank. Opening the door, Officer Honzel smelled “fresh raw cannabis.” Honzel called in a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted to the car’s center console. A search revealed six grams of marijuana divided into plastic bags, $365 in cash, a digital scale, cell phones, and a loaded gun, beneath the front passenger seat. Honzel testified that a cell phone displayed a text message inquiring about drugs. Another $470 in cash was found on Alexander’s person. Alexander was charged with possessing marijuana for distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a gun in connection with a drug crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). Alexander claimed that he did not know the marijuana and gun were in the car, which he did not own. He did not testify or present evidence to support the claim. The government presented no fingerprint or DNA evidence to establish that Alexander had touched the gun or the drug-related items. Alexander’s lawyer argued that Honzel’s account was not trustworthy and that the text message was not recovered. The prosecutor responded that Honzel had no incentive to falsely implicate Alexander and attempted to bolster the officer’s credibility. Alexander’s lawyer did not object to the remarks. Convicted, Alexander was sentenced to a term of 390 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prosecutor’s remarks strayed into improper vouching, but the errors were not serious and did not deprive Alexander of a fair trial or cause his convictions.View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In November, 2005, Rooni and others went hunting. They shot three deer, which they took to a DNR post in a gas station for registration. While DNR employees tagged the deer, Rooni went inside. DNR agent Biser arrived and asked Rooni how many deer he had. Rooni did not respond. Biser proclaimed, loudly, that Rooni did not like the DNR. Rooni said “no, just people like you.” Biser left the station and leaned against the trailer while speaking to DNR employees. Rooni came out and attempted to walk around Biser. He had to pass closely because of slush on the ground. Biser extended his leg to block Rooni’s way. Rooni stopped and said, “let me get through,” and “brushed” between Biser and the trailer. Biser allegedly spit food at Rooni. As the encounter escalated, Rooni told his son to call the police. Biser told Rooni he was under arrest. While handcuffing Rooni, Biser allegedly jerked him back and made the cuffs too tight. While in the jail, Rooni did not seek medical attention. He had discoloration under his skin, painful hands and swollen fingers. Charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing an officer were dismissed. In April 2006, Rooni was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the handcuffing claim, citing qualified immunity. The court remanded Rooni’s arrest claim; taking his reasonable allegations as true, neither probable cause nor “arguable” probable cause supported an arrest.View "Rooni v. Biser" on Justia Law

Wells purchased a nine‐millimeter Ruger pistol. Jackson, who had multiple felony convictions, took the pistol from Wells’ home. Jackson’s possession of the gun was illegal, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A few weeks later, Jackson sold the weapon to Dircks, whom Jackson knew to be an illegal user of crack cocaine and heroin. A grand jury charged Wells, Dircks, Jackson, and a fourth individual with various weapons offenses. On the morning that his trial was to begin, Jackson pleaded guilty to the felon‐in‐possession charge without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the court found Jackson’s final, adjusted offense level to be 17, including a four‐level enhancement under Guidelines section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for transferring the firearm “with knowledge, intent or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” resulting in an advisory sentencing range of 51 to 63 months in prison. Without the section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, the range would have been 33 to 41 months. The district court imposed a within‐Guidelines sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jackson’s argument that the enhancement was improper in that it essentially penalized him a second time for conduct that was otherwise encompassed within his conviction.View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law