Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Executing an arrest warrant for Wilson, officers talked to people who had seen Wilson enter a particular house. The officers were invited inside to talk with the owner, Rawls, who gave them permission to look around to confirm that Wilson was not there. In the kitchen they smelled the burnt marijuana. Richards sat at the table. An officer saw what he thought was a rock of crack cocaine on a plate, and a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and plastic baggies on the table. An officer had to use pepper spray to subdue Richards. When officers handcuffed Richards and lifted him to his feet, a handgun fell from his waistband. A knife was sticking out of his pocket. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the house. In the unlocked bedroom that Richards used when visiting Rawls, an open briefcase on the bed appeared to contain cocaine. An officer read Rawls his Miranda rights. Rawls was never handcuffed or detained. Rawls told the officers that he understood his rights and willingly signed consent to search after one request. Although Rawls was 86 years old, neither officer observed signs of confusion. Richards was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a place for using and distributing controlled substances, U.S.C. 856(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied motions to suppress and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. Richards" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adkins of attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 90 months. In a separate case, Adkins pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. In consolidated appeals, he challenged evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, allegedly improper statements by the government, and the sentence in the heroin-handgun case. The Seventh Circuit rejected those claims, but vacated his sentence for child pornography, finding a condition of supervised release unconstitutionally vague. The condition stated that “defendant shall not view or listen to any pornography or sexually stimulating material or sexually oriented material or patronize locations where such material is available.” Read literally, the condition might preclude Adkins from using a computer or entering a library, regardless of what he views, because both are “locations” where “sexually stimulating material … is available.” He might not be able to ride the bus, enter a grocery store, watch television, open a magazine or newspaper, read a classic book, or even go out in public, given the ubiquity of advertisements that use potentially sexually oriented or sexually stimulating images. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at a house Vela had rented and recovered 101 marijuana plants. A co-conspirator was at the house with a loaded gun. At Vela’s home, officers recovered 112 grams of cocaine, a loaded gun, and 390 grams of marijuana. He was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841(a)); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and, in a second indictment, conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants and possession with intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants. Vela entered guilty pleas to both counts of the first indictment; the government dismissed the second indictment. Vela agreed that his role in the grow house conspiracy would be relevant for sentencing purposes. The plea agreement called for a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintenance of premises for manufacturing controlled substances under the 2011 U.S.S.G. Manual, 2D1.1(b)(12), which did not become effective until four months after Vela’s arrest. The district court used the new Guidelines, rather than those in effect at the time of the offense, calculating a range of 97 to 121 months. Without the enhancement, the range would have been 78 to 97 months. Vela also faced a statutory mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of five years on the firearm offense, 18 U.S.C. 3561. The court sentenced Vela to 138 months. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. A defendant’s decision to waive his right to appeal as part of a plea agreement is not rendered involuntary by a subsequent change in the law. View "United States v. Vela" on Justia Law

Jordan was released from federal prison in 2011 and began serving a three-year term of supervised release with conditions that Jordan could not leave the judicial district without permission, associate with a felon or person engaged in criminal activity, or commit a crime. He was required to report within 72 hours any arrest or questioning by law enforcement. In 2012 a probation officer sought to revoke Jordan’s supervised release. Jordan had been arrested in Texas for possession of 30 pounds of marijuana. The petition alleged that Jordan left the district without permission; associated with a felon; committed a new offense; and failed to report his arrest within 72 hours. Jordan admitted three violations, but disputed that he had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. Jordan’s lawyer objected to introduction of the police report without the testimony of the arresting officer. The district court overruled the objections without explanation, found that Jordan had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute, and sentenced Jordan to 24 months in prison, without finding that the police report was reliable or making the “interest of justice” finding required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) if a defendant is denied the right to question any adverse witness in a revocation hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that failure to make the finding was not harmless error. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Two convicted sex offenders challenged aspects of Wisconsin’s statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring as violating the constitutional prohibition against enacting ex post facto laws. The law was enacted after the plaintiffs committed and were convicted of sex offenses that made them subject to it, but before they’d finished serving their sentences. The district judge ruled that the $100 annual registration fee that the monitoring act imposes on convicted sex offenders is a fine, which is a form of punishment and cannot constitutionally be imposed on persons who committed their sex crimes before the fee provision was enacted, but upheld the other provisions of the act. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the annual registration fee but affirmed dismissal of other challenges to the statutory scheme on grounds of standing. View "Doe v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

Stenson was convicted of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The district court imposed a two‐level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement, finding that Stenson willfully committed perjury when he testified on his own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. Stenson did not just deny that he possessed the firearm, he repeatedly denied even seeing a firearm and testified that it was his cell phone, not a firearm, that the police officers saw in his possession. The court found Stenson’s testimony incredible in light of the other evidence and that this testimony was material and not the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. View "United States v. Stenson" on Justia Law

Fields sued two Illinois prosecutors, charging them with due process violations (42 U.S.C. 1983), malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. He claimed that they coerced witnesses to give testimony that the defendants knew to be false, resulting in Fields’ conviction of two murders and his imprisonment for 17 years until he was acquitted in a retrial. He later received a certificate of innocence. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed dismissal of the federal claims on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The state law claims remained and the district court reinstated one federal claim, which related to a prosecutor’s investigatory work and was not, therefore, subject to absolute immunity. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to one defendant and reversed as to the other. View "Fields v. Wharrie" on Justia Law

Foley was convicted of three counts of producing child pornography, one count of distributing child pornography, one count of taking a child across state lines for the purpose of a sex act, and one count of possessing child pornography. Foley appealed, arguing that government’s evidence failed to satisfy the commerce element of those charges (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)) and that the district court improperly admitted evidence of a prior sexual assault under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, causing unfair prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Foley’s storage devices (hard drives manufactured in China and in Thailand) could be considered by a jury as material used in “production” sufficient to satisfy the commerce element. The disputed testimony was relevant to Foley’s propensity to commit sexual crimes against children, and to his intent and motive; given the overwhelming evidence of the sexual assault, there was little risk of prejudice. View "United States v. Foley" on Justia Law

From 2002–2003, Cheek sold marijuana and crack cocaine to a drug dealer, Eason. While Cheek was in prison in 2004, his associate supplied the drugs. After his release, Cheek went back to selling drugs. He was incarcerated again in 2008, but informed Eason and others that he would resume selling drugs. Law enforcement persuaded Eason to perform controlled buys and record his interactions with Cheek. With court authorization, law enforcement intercepted more than 20,000 phone and text conversations from Cheek. Cheek was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana from 2001 to 2011; intending to distribute more than 28 grams of crack cocaine in August, 2010; intending to distribute marijuana on March 23, 2011; and using a telephone on February 11 and 23, 2011, to facilitate the drug conspiracy. Before trial, the government indicated, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851, intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on seven prior felony drug convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of 576 months, rejecting challenges to testimony about the meaning of drug code words. The court also rejected challenges to the sentence: that the court failed to comply with section 851(b); violated constitutional rights, by enhancing Cheek’s sentence beyond the 480-month statutory maximum, because the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheek was convicted of the prior felonies supporting the enhancement; that the court erred in imposing the obstruction of justice enhancement and failed to meaningfully consider mitigation arguments. View "United States v. Cheek" on Justia Law

Drain sold a rifle, stolen from an FBI vehicle and engraved “Law Enforcement Use Only,” to a government informant. Police went to Drain’s home to arrest him on charges of dealing cocaine. They observed drug paraphernalia, obtained a warrant, and recovered a loaded pistol with an obliterated serial number. Drain’s fingerprints were on bullets in the gun. The officers found injured, malnourished pit bulls in squalid conditions at the residence. Drain confessed that he had fired the stolen rifle, but insisted that he was hiding it for an acquaintance. Drain denied that he possessed any guns, but changed his story and said he was holding the pistol for an acquaintance. After the fingerprint analysis, Drain admitted loading the pistol and bragged that his fingerprints probably are on every gun in Indiana. He pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The probation officer calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 33 to 41 months. Drain’s score did not reflect three juvenile offenses, six of 10 adult convictions, a pending drug case, or 17 unadjudicated arrests, so the officer suggested that an upward departure under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3(a)(1). At allocution, the judge questioned him about his extensive criminal history at age 33 and about the role of drugs in his life. The judge imposed a sentence of 57 months. Drain’s lawyer stated that he did not needadditional explanation of the reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not violate Drain’s due process rights by considering his arrest history as part the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).View "United States v. Drain" on Justia Law