Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011 Whitlow pled guilty to two counts of distribution of five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), crimes he committed before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372. The district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment, rejecting a request that he be sentenced under the Act. After the Supreme Court issued its 2012 opinion, Dorsey v. United States, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing under the Act. On remand, the government opposed action by the court to credit Whitlow’s time in pretrial custody and noted that this was Whitlow’s eighth felony drug conviction and that he also had a robbery conviction, justifying a career offender sentence. The district court declined to address the BOP’s error concerning pretrial custody, commented indirectly on defense arguments concerning incremental sentencing and career offender status, and expressly granted an 18-month reduction from the bottom of the guidelines range for exceptional efforts at rehabilitation. The court sentenced Whitlow to 170 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded, noting that the government conceded that the district court may have misapprehended its sentencing discretion to adjust the sentence for pretrial custody. View "United States v. Whitlow" on Justia Law

Nash pleaded no contest to sexual assault of a child. He and his attorney signed and filed a form, acknowledging the 20-day period for filing a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief, which allows a defendant to challenge trial counsel’s performance with new appointed counsel before pursing direct appeal. After several months, Nash sought relief pro se. The circuit court denied the motion, informing Nash of the procedure for reinstating post-conviction and appeal rights. Instead of following that procedure, Nash appealed, arguing ineffective assistance. The court of appeals declined to appoint counsel and affirmed denial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Nash sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance. The district court denied Nash’s petition, concluding that he had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to present it in state court. Nash did not appeal, but nine months later unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Later, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel can excuse procedural default if counsel caused the default by abandoning the petitioner without notice. The district court denied a second motion, explaining that Nash caused his own procedural default by failing to adequately present his claims in his pro se attack. Before Nash appealed, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can also excuse procedural default if state law requires raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in collateral proceedings rather than by direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the state court advised Nash how he could correct counsel’s procedural error, but he did not do so.View "Nash v. Hepp" on Justia Law

DEA agents arrested Washington at the home of a suspected drug dealer they had been investigating and seized approximately 1.765 kilograms of cocaine from the residence. Washington admitted that he was attempting to purchase cocaine. He pled guilty to a single count of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and, with a sentencing guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment, was sentenced to 97 months. The judge said only that he had “considered all the factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)” and noted that Washington had been “involved in a serious crime, a serious crime in the sense of what it is doing to so many people in our society, not only the dealing of the drugs, but also the using of them.” The court also imposed a $500 fine. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, finding the “truncated explanation” insufficient. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

After selling guns to a confidential informant, the defendant was prosecuted as a felon in possession of firearms. The purchases provided evidence of guilt, although the $1200 that the defendant had received from the confidential informant in payment for the guns was never recovered. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 16 months in prison followed by 24 months of supervised release with a condition that he repay the buy money to the government at a minimum rate of $50 per month. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the imposition of the condition View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Valdez pled guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and admitted responsibility for 700 grams of heroin. Given the amount of heroin he acknowledged, he faced a statutory minimum of five years in prison and a statutory maximum of 40 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(i). In applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court held him accountable for more than three kilograms and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 140 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the drug quantity finding violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the finding was based on unreliable evidence, and that the court failed to address an argument he made in mitigation against undue reliance on drug quantity.View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Under surveillance, Cureton sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant who used recorded bills. A marked bill was found in Cureton’s wallet during a warrant search of Cureton’s home. Cureton’s fingerprints were found on a bag containing pistols and on the scale found at the location a controlled buy. Cureton had also used a gun to steal $9,500 from one of his customers, who reported the robbery. Knowing that the police had visited his home in his absence, Cureton instructed his roommate to bring $9,000 in cash to a park. The roommate failed to do so and Cureton kidnapped her, assaulted her, held a gun to her to her head, and demanded that she call relatives to obtain cash. Her relatives contacted police. Cureton was convicted of attempted extortion and interstate communication of a ransom request, and three counts of drug distribution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, in light of overwhelming evidence, any error in admitting evidence that Cureton had obtained the cash by robbing drug customers at gunpoint was harmless. The court vacated one of two 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) convictions for using a firearm in connection with a violent felony; both were based on the same conduct—Cureton pointing a gun at his roommate and demanding she make calls to obtain money. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Spencer pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court concluded that he is an armed career criminal and sentenced him to the 15-year minimum term, 18 U.S.C. 924€. He denied that one of his three prior convictions, for a methamphetamine crime, met the statutory standard for a “serious drug offense,” which, for state convictions means one “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in … (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law”. Spencer argued that Wis. Stat. 961.41(1)(e)(1), which prohibits the manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine, does not carry “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more.” The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement, interpreting statutory ambiguity in favor of lenity. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Jones acknowledged participating in the armed robbery of the Guaranty Bank in Milwaukee as a getaway driver, but the government agreed to drop that charge and the charge in a second bank robbery, and to prosecute him only on a third bank robbery charge in exchange for testimony against Brown for the Guaranty Bank robbery. Brown was convicted of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2 & 2113(a) and (d), and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Brown appealed, arguing that the court allowed the government to introduce expert testimony as lay testimony, that the jury instructions reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof, and that improper closing argument statements by the prosecution denied him a fair trial. Jones, who pled guilty to reduced charges, appealed only his sentence. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and affirmed. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Chavarria, born in Mexico, became a legal permanent U.S. resident in 1982. In 2009, Chavarria pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine. One year later, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, imposing a duty on defense attorneys to inform noncitizen clients of deportation risks stemming from plea agreements, and held that legal advice, or the lack thereof, involving the prospect of deportation resulting from guilty pleas can support a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chavarria filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel stated that “the attorney had checked with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement … and they said they were not interested” in deporting him. Chavarria was deported before counsel was appointed. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that Padilla could be applied retroactively. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit decided, in Chaidez v. U.S., that Padilla was a new rule and not retroactive. The district court vacated its ruling and dismissed. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaidez, foreclosing Chavarria’s argument that Padilla was retroactive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Chaidez distinguished between providing no advice (actionable under Padilla) and providing bad advice (actionable under pre‐Padilla law). View "Chavarria v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1981, a drug dealer (TJ) was shot to death in his Chicago home; the gunmen stole a necklace and ring with the initials “TJ” written in diamonds. Witnesses did not know the gunmen and provided general descriptions. On the day of the crime, they viewed mug shots but did not identify TJ’s murderer. During police interviews, Wright stated that on the day of the murder he was trying to coordinate a drug deal with TJ, that he took two men (one was Coleman) to TJ’s house on the night of the murder and that Coleman had tried to sell him TJ’s jewelry. About two weeks after the murder, witnesses separately viewed a lineup that included Coleman and six others. Two identified Coleman. A third witness did not make any identification. The witnesses later viewed another lineup and identified Barnes as the other perpetrator. Coleman and Barnes were tried together, with separate counsel. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Coleman’s first habeas petition, stating that the facts could potentially demonstrate actual innocence. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Coleman had not satisfied the actual innocence standard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Coleman’s evidence that two eyewitnesses were unable to place him at the scene of the crime was not enough to overcome the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified Coleman as the perpetrator and another who implicated Coleman in the murder. View "Coleman v. Hardy" on Justia Law