Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Woodridge enacted an ordinance that imposes a $30.00 booking fee on any person subject to a custodial arrest and collects the fee without any hearing. It does not offer an opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek reimbursement. Markadonatos was charged with retail theft. He was booked and Woodridge collected its fee. A court sentenced Markadonatos to supervision, which he successfully completed. He therefore received an adjudication of “not guilty” on his record. He sued, on behalf of himself and all arrestees who have been charged the fee, arguing that the lack of a procedure to challenge the fee violated their procedural and substantive due process rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the procedural due process argument failed based on balancing the private interest in the $30; the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards; and the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Markadonatos lacked standing under a substantive due process claim; he was arrested for cause and was adjudicated not guilty only after completing a term of supervision after admitting the factual basis for the charges. View "Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge" on Justia Law

An asbestos survey showed that the Kankakee building contained 2,200 linear feet of asbestos‐containing insulation around pipes. The owner hired Origin Fire Protection, to modify its sprinkler system. O’Malley, who operated Origin, offered to properly remove the pipe insulation for a cash payment ($12,000) and dispose of it in a lawful landfill. O’Malley provided no written contract for the removal work, but provided a written contract for the sprinkler system. O’Malley and Origin were not licensed to remove asbestos. O’Malley hired untrained workers, who stripped dry asbestos insulation off the pipes using a circular saw and other equipment provided by O’Malley. The workers were given paint suits, simple dust masks, and respirators with missing filters. They stopped working after inhaling dust that made them sick. Asbestos insulation was packed into garbage bags and taken to abandoned properties and a store dumpster. The Illinois EPA discovered the dumping; Superfund contractors began cleanup. O’Malley attempted to mislead federal agents. O’Malley was convicted of removing, transporting, and dumping asbestos‐containing insulation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government did not prove the appropriate mens rea for Clean Air Act violations. O’Malley argued that the government was required to prove that he knew that the asbestos in the building was a regulated type of asbestos. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Currie pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and possessing a firearm following a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a prison term of 121 months, at the low end of the range advised by the Sentencing Guidelines and just above what the court and the parties believed to be the statutory minimum of 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the district court erroneously denied a motion to suppress evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court ordered a limited remand for determination of whether the district court would be inclined to sentence Currie differently knowing that Currie is subject to the lower statutory minimum term of five years and that its choice of sentence was premised on its mistaken understanding that the new, lower mandatory minimums specified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 did not apply. View "United States v. Currie" on Justia Law

Acevedo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The drug quantity was at least a kilogram, and the district court imposed the statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment after concluding that Acevedo was ineligible for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Application of the safety valve would have lowered the Guidelines range. Acevedo had been caught lying during safety valve debriefings, denying involvement in trafficking and that he dealt with customers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he was entitled to the benefit of the safety valve because, despite his lies, he told the entire truth before sentencing. The court noted that the district court did not believe that Acevedo ever told the entire truth, and that finding was supported by the record. View "United States v. Acevedo-Fitz" on Justia Law

Flores, an alien who returned to the U.S. without permission following removal, was charged with illegal reentry and other crimes arising from his armed drug dealing. Flores, who maintained that U.S. law did not apply to him and that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, refused to consider a guilty plea. He was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to concurrent 96-month sentences on all counts but one. His conviction, for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, led to a consecutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment, which was compulsory because of Flores’s earlier conviction of the same crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel furnished ineffective assistance by telling the jury that Flores indeed had distributed cocaine after reentering the U.S. without permission, while arguing that the prosecution did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the weapons-related charges. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Based on his participation in a mortgage fraud scheme, Rucker was convicted of one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and payment of $73,488.95 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rucker’s claim that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to impeach a testifying co-defendant with evidence of that co-defendant’s 2000 conviction for theft concerning a program receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), for which she received a sentence of five years’ probation. The conviction, more than 10 years old, had little probative value, given that the witness had admitted pleading guilty to 11 counts and that her plea agreement contemplated that the government would move for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 in exchange for her truthful testimony. View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit a robbery affecting interstate commerce, a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and to carrying firearms in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), based on a plan that, armed with guns, the conspirators would rob a truck used by marijuana traffickers to transport cash from Illinois to California, buy marijuana, and haul it back to the Chicago area. The conspirators lost the truck in traffic and were unable to complete the robbery. The district judge sentenced the defendant to 30 months for the conspiracy plus 60 months on the firearms count, the statutory minimum and required to run consecutively to the conspiracy sentence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Another conspirator, guilty of the same offenses, received an identical sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the judge’s addition of two levels to the base offense level for conspiring to subject the robbery victims to physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(a), 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Conversations recorded by a government informant had revealed that plan. The court also upheld refusal to reduce the base offense level by three levels because the conspiracy did not come to fruition as a substantive crime, U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(b)(2). The conspirators were “dangerous people,” so there was little doubt that they would have attacked the truck, “with mayhem a likely result.” View "United States v. Dosen" on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.” View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges relating to his operation of a commodity pool that he used as the vehicle for a Ponzi scheme. The government conceded that the judge erred in adding an abuse of trust enhancement in a fraud cause. While conceding the error in the calculation of the guidelines range, the government argued that it was not plain error because defendant did not argue in the district court that it was an error. The government argued that any error in adding the 2-level abuse of trust enhancement was offset by the judge's failure to include a 2-level vulnerable-victim enhancement. Concluding that the judge should have considered the vulnerable-victim enhancement, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rushton" on Justia Law

After receiving complaints of drug trafficking, police arranged an undercover controlled purchase of crack cocaine from a lower level apartment in Rockford. Days later, they obtained a warrant to search the “lower apartment.” The police knew that hours earlier, a shooting occurred at the residence and that aggressive pit bulls lived on the premises. After knocking and receiving no response, investigators forced their way into a foyer with two open doors: one led to the first floor apartment, the other led to ascending stairs. A dog ran from officers and up a few steps, before turning and charging the officer, who shot and killed the dog and proceeded up the stairs to perform a protective sweep. As he ran through the upper kitchen, he saw large chunks of an off-white substance on the counter with scales. In the bedroom he discovered Starnes. The officer detained and escorted him downstairs. While other officers were seeking a warrant for the upper apartment, other detectives searched the lower apartment and seized semi-automatic rifles, ammunition magazines, a loaded hand gun, and drug paraphernalia. After executing a warrant on the second floor, they seized Starnes’ photo identification cards, 290 grams of cocaine, 72.5 grams of cocaine base, $36,186 in cash, and more drug paraphernalia. The court declined to suppress evidence from the second floor; Starnes entered a conditional plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Starnes" on Justia Law