Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Riding as a prisoner in the back of a patrol van, Fluker was injured when the van stopped short to avoid a collision and he tumbled off his seat. Roy and his wife filed suit, alleging various injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) by filing a grievance, and alternatively, because the Flukers’ suit could not succeed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fluker v. Kankakee Cnty." on Justia Law

Doss organized an identity theft ring, was indicted for, and pleaded guilty to, possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3); possessing, with intent to defraud, 15 or more counterfeit and unauthorized access devices, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3); and aggravated identity theft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 78 months’ imprisonment on the first two counts and further sentenced him to a mandatory, consecutive two-year sentence on count three. The Seventh Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court committed plain error in imposing a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(B), for “trafficking of any … unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device,” which resulted in an increased sentencing range on the grouped counts. Application Note 2 to section 2B1.6 precluded that increase for trafficking in unauthorized access devices because, under the facts presented here, that trafficking constituted a “transfer[] … of a means of identification.” View "United States v. Doss" on Justia Law

Inmate Verser began a hunger strike in response to perceived unwarranted prison discipline against him. Prison protocols involve moving a hunger striker to a separate cell after he misses three meals. Verser alleges that two prison officials deposited him in an isolated cell and held him down while two others punched him in the stomach in retaliation for his hunger strike and his previous grievance against another officer. The defendants deny that any assault occurred. Verser filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The judge sent Verser back to the prison rather than keep him in the courthouse to await the verdict. When the jury then announced its verdict in favor of the defendants, no immediate effort was made to notify Verser. After the verdict, a juror made a statement: This was very hard for us. Many of us—the majority feel that the defendants all had a part to play in what happened to Mr. Verser, but, because there was a lack of evidence, we could not find the defendants guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Verser‘s total exclusion from the proceedings prevented him from exercising his right to poll the jury (FRCP 48(c)) and a poll might have made a difference.View "Verser v. Corr. Officer Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Seventh Circuit reversed Loughry’ss convictions for child pornography offenses because the district court erred in admitting certain “hard core” child pornography videos found on Loughry’s computer. Following re-trial, Loughry was again convicted of 16 child pornography offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in sending to the jury room a binder containing properly admitted evidence of child pornography collected from Loughry’s residence. Loughry claimed that the evidence was too prejudicial for jurors to examine during deliberations. There may be some special circumstances in which a court would abuse its discretion by failing to exclude properly admitted evidence from the jury room based on prejudice, but Loughry’s case does not qualify. The challenged exhibit was not unfairly prejudicial because the images and videos from his collection were highly probative of his identity as the internet user “Mayorroger” who advertised and distributed child pornography on a site called “the Cache.” View "United States v. Loughry" on Justia Law

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Hanson v. Beth" on Justia Law

In November 2010, law enforcement intercepted six railcars that crossed from Mexico into the U.S. and discovered that the railcars contained large amounts of marijuana, which had been packed into bricks. The marijuana bricks were encased in colored clay shells and hidden inside bags called “super sacks.” The officials followed the railcars to their final destination, a warehouse in Chicago Heights, and conducted surveillance of the warehouse to identify the intended recipients. A jury found Gonzalez, who assisted in unloading the cargo, guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kg or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, but acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kg of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court subsequently entered a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that Gonzalez knew, or at least strongly suspected that the super sacks contained illegal drugs and yet continued to participate in the operation.View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Seidling admitted to knowingly mailing documents containing false information about service of process or publication of notice to small claims courts in Wisconsin and hiding the filings of the actions from named defendants. Seidling argued that the elements of the mail fraud statute could not be met because he never intended the false statements and misrepresentations to be communicated to the victims. The combined total intended loss amount was calculated as $370,220. None of the defendants suffered immediate pecuniary harm, but many experienced challenges in reopening the lawsuits, getting them dismissed, clearing their credit, and removing the fraudulent lawsuits from the system. The district court found him guilty of 50 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no convergence between the victims’ losses and the fraudulent statements. Although his false statements and misrepresentations were not made directly to the victims, they still satisfied the requisite materiality element of mail fraud. The court noted Seidling’s history of fraudulent behavior, his lack of remorse, and the extensive details of his scheme, and held that the district court did not err in denying a reduction in sentencing for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Seidling" on Justia Law

White, Ford, and Helton were involved in a mortgage fraud scheme through White’s company, EHNS. EHNS offered a “mortgage bailout” program, telling homeowners that they could avoid foreclosure by transferring their homes to EHNS for one year, that EHNS investors would pay the mortgage, that the owners could continue to live in their homes, and that they could reassume their mortgages at the program’s conclusion. EHNS investors actually took title outright. White would pressure appraisers to assess the properties at amounts higher than actual value. EHNS would strip actual and manufactured equity by transaction fees. Clients almost never were able to buy back their homes. Lenders foreclosed on many of the properties. Through fraudulent mortgage loan applications, White obtained financing for straw purchasers. Ford was the closing agent, supposed to act as the lender’s representative, but actually fabricating official documents. Helton was the attorney and “represented” homeowners at White’s behest, pocketing legal fees paid out of the equity proceeds and orchestrating a cover‐up by representing the homeowners in subsequent bankruptcy filings. All were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; Helton was also convicted of bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, challenges to joinder of the defendants and to jury instructions, and a Brady claim. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

As part of an immunity agreement, a confidential informant agreed to pose as an individual looking to buy drugs and met with Quiroz, whom he had known for several years, and three other men: Mendez, Figueroa, and Garcia. The CI wore a wire and secretly recorded conversations about purchasing “ice,” a slang term for methamphetamine, and other drugs. Garcia was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and attempted distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred when it allowed expert testimony about the meaning of “code” phrases and admitted evidence of his prior ecstasy transactions and that the prosecution’s statement, “and he does those things” during rebuttal arguments unfairly prejudiced the jury.View "United States v. Garcia-Avila" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m., Officer Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling faster than the posted 35 mph limit, and confirmed by radar that Jones was traveling at 53 mph. Snyder observed Jones swerving in his lane. He turned on his emergency lights. When Jones stopped his car, Snyder approached and observed that Jones had alcohol on his breath, red, watery eyes, and slurred speech. Jones stated that he had consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m. Officers used a portable breath test to determine Jones’s blood alcohol content was 0.096%. During a field sobriety test, Jones could not keep his hands at his sides and swayed. Snyder read the Indiana Implied Consent Notice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that Jones had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and, that while Jones had a choice to submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to refusing to consent to the chemical test. Ultimately Jones sued, claiming that officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the claims as vague, listing “a series of irrelevant facts untethered to any legal claims.” The only critical fact was that the officers had probable cause .View "Jones v. City of Elkhart" on Justia Law