Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Martha Castro saw a man dressed in black leaning over her husband on the ground outside their home. Martha’s nephew, Varela, ran outside. Varela struck the man, who fired a gun before running into the alley. Castro died from a gunshot wound. Castros’ neighbor, Medina, looked outside when he heard gunfire and saw what happened. Nearby, Santana turned into the alley, where the man in black approached her, gun drawn, and took her car and purse. Police looked for a black male in his early twenties, about five foot seven. Seven months later, Medina identified a picture in a police book as “looking like” the man in black, but asked for a more recent photo. An officer returned with an array of five black-and-white photographs. Medina picked McDowell, as the man he saw standing over Castro. Within days, Santana and Varela identified McDowell’s picture. The three viewed a lineup and identified McDowell. There was no physical evidence connecting McDowell to the crime; McDowell’s close friend testified as an alibi. Convicted and sentenced to 103 years, McDowell exhausted direct appeals and state post-trial remedies, and sought a federal writ of habeas corpus arguing that the processes used to identify him were flawed. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, finding that he procedurally defaulted the claims by failing to adequately present them before each level of the Illinois courts. View "McDowell v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Washington was arrested as a suspect in a double homicide. While charges were pending, he filed a civil suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Officer Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight while he was transported. The district court judge conducted voir dire. Juror Evans answered questions concerning his family background without incident. Asked whether he had ever been involved with the civil or criminal justice system, Evans responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon examination, Evans said he did not understand the question. The judge broke the question down and Evans admitted he had been arrested and requested a sidebar. He explained that he had a DUI pending and had suffered head injuries in the accident, but did not have difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Evans spoke slowly and frequently closed his eyes. Washington unsuccessfully challenged Evans for cause. At trial, Washington interrupted several times. He fired his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. The judge asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with jurors who had seen him argue with his attorney. Washington consented to continue with the original jury. He later returned to allowing representation by counsel, who had not left. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkinson. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington waived his challenge to Juror Evans. View "Washington v. Parkinson" on Justia Law

Chicago police obtained a warrant and searched a two-bedroom apartment leased by Tucker’s mother. Tucker's mother and his niece were present. Officer Edwards found a rifle and documents bearing Tucker’s name under a mattress in a bedroom. Officers found eight clear baggies of heroin inside a potato chip bag and ammunition. Another officer apprehended Tucker a few blocks away and stated that officers had found the gun. Tucker responded that the rifle was not his and that he was holding it for someone. His mother testified that Tucker did not have keys to the apartment, was not listed on the lease, and did not keep possessions there, but only visited. His niece corroborated the testimony, adding that a neighbor brought Tucker’s mail to the apartment. Edwards testified that an officer asked Tucker’s mother which bedroom was Tucker’s, and that she pointed to the bedroom where the rifle was found. Tucker was convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment longer than a year, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession and that Tucker was denied a fair trial because the court indicated it would admit evidence of six prior felonies if he testified. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Caira, a published medical researcher, began producing synthetic drugs, including more than 70,000 pills of MDMA (ecstasy). He was indicted and met with U.S. attorneys to discuss a plea bargain. An attorney subsequently contacted the FBI with information that one of her clients (Ruiz) had information about a plot to kill members of the team prosecuting Caira: AUSA Gillers and DEA Agent Bagley. Ruiz told FBI investigators that he had been recruited by Mann to murder the two in exchange for cocaine and lessons on making synthetic drugs. The FBI arrested Mann, who agreed to cooperate. Mann met Caira at a restaurant, wearing a wire. Although the wire malfunctioned, Caira was arrested. Agents seized Caira’s cell phone and found text messages between Caira and Mann. Caira was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder of a U.S. official (18 U.S.C. 1117) and solicitation of a violent felony (18 U.S.C. 373). The government’s case rested primarily on testimony from Mann and Ruiz and the text messages. Caira’s defense was that the plot was Mann’s idea and that Caira never intended that anyone be hurt. He testified at trial. The parties collaborated on jury instructions. The jury found Caira guilty and he was sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself was violated and that he was prejudiced by improper jury instructions.View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law

Henderson was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion in excluding an out‐of‐court statement of an unavailable declarant regarding the gun that Henderson was charged with possessing. The gun was found between the driver’s seat and seatback of a van in which Henderson and Rogers were travelling. Rosado, the owner of the van, told the prosecution that Rogers had told him that he just found the gun, brought it into the van, and was going to take it to the residence that he and Rosado shared. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err in determining that Henderson failed to point to corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated that Rogers’ hearsay statement was trustworthy. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Since about 2009, Velazco and codefendants coordinated the Chicago distribution of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana for a Mexican drug-trafficking organization. Velazco also assisted with collection and transportation of U.S. currency, primarily as a courier, acting on instructions from higher-ranked members of the organization. After Velazco pled guilty to conspiring to possess five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846; possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possessing five kilograms or more of cocaine and one or more kilograms of heroin with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and using a telephone in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846, the Presentence Report stated that he was personally responsible for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine and 8.5 kilograms of heroin. Velazco’s base offense level was 38, as the amount was equivalent to 46,400 kilograms of marijuana. He was granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer indicated that he was fully active in the conspiracy. The district court denied Velazco’s request for a minor role reduction, finding that the most significant factor in assessing culpability for a drug conspiracy is quantity, and sentenced him to 135 months, the lowest sentence in the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sandoval-Velazco" on Justia Law

Starko pleaded guilty to two counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). He had produced videos of a five-year-old girl. Starko was a friend of the girl’s mother and was living in their home. Investigation revealed that he had also touched the genitals of the child’s seven-year-old sister and his own daughter. A psychiatrist concluded that Starko was competent, but noted “a diagnosis of major depressive episode, recurrent, polysubstance dependence in a controlled environment, and schizotypal personality disorder.” The presentence report calculated a guidelines range as 360 months. Rejecting defense counsel’s argument that: “you can sentence him to 20 years, and that punishes the man for the deed, but it also takes into account the fact that at least part of this is explained by his history, characteristics, and mental illness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 360-month sentence.View "United States v. Starko" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. The judge found that he had three prior convictions of “violent” felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant argued that the Wisconsin arson statute under which he was previously convicted does not punish only a “violent” felony within the meaning of the ACC A. The statute provides that “whoever, by means of fire, intentionally damages any property of another without the person’s consent, if the property is not a building and has a value of $100 or more, is guilty of a Class I felony,” and carries a maximum sentence of 3½ years. According to the presentence report the defendant stole a car from a parking lot and torched it in a field to erase his fingerprints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circumstances of the offense are not relevant, because in deciding whether a conviction represents a “violent felony,” courts look only at the statutory elements of the offense. The ACCA defines “violent felony” as any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” View "United States v. Misleveck" on Justia Law

In 2008 Huart pled guilty to possessing child pornography, and was sentenced to 65 months. In 2011, he was transferred to a private halfway house that contracts with the Bureau of Prisons. Rules provided to Huart included one that “[d]uring intake, all belongings will be searched and inventoried. Any new items brought into the facility or removed from the facility will be reported to staff so the inventory can be adjusted.” Huart was not permitted to possess a cell phone. Rules governing inmates who were allowed to have cell phones specified that “ANY STAFF may request at ANY TIME to view the contents of [an inmate’s] cell phone with or without reason.” Huart signed “Conditions of Residential Community Programs,” which stated that he was subject to frequent searches of his living area by staff. An employee conducting a random search of Huart’s room found a cell phone on his bed. A house director discovered 214 images, including child pornography. Huart admitted to possessing the phone and the images. The FBI obtained a search warrant, but thel phone was passcode protected and had to be sent to FBI Headquarters. Agents did not unlock the phone until February 14, 2012; the warrant specified that the search was to be conducted before December 15, 2011. The district court denied motions to suppress, finding that Huart did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search of his phone was conducted properly under the warrant. Huart pleaded guilty, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Huart" on Justia Law