Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Hamilton claimed that Lorincz, dying of Parkinson’s disease, hired her to help him at home. She was a friend of Lorincz’s daughter, a former physician who was serving jail time. After Hamilton had worked 88 hours, Lorincz gave her a check for $10,000. Hamilton told Lorincz’s other adult children, by phone, that their father was dying and had given her a $10,000 check. Knowing that Hamilton had a criminal conviction, they told the police that Hamilton was taking advantage of their impaired father and went to their father’s house. Although Lorincz told the police that he wanted Hamilton to have the money and wanted the police to leave, they remained for about two hours and learned that Hamilton had been a psychologist, but her license had been revoked after her felony conviction for a $435,000 Medicaid fraud, and that Lorincz already had professional home health aides when Hamilton had “rushed” to his side. Hamilton had a history of bizarre lawsuits against government officials. Hamilton claims that the police would not allow her to leave while they were there and, when they left, required her to leave without the check, although she wanted to stay. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging police misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law

Deported following a 1996 conviction for attempted first degree murder and armed violence, Lara, a citizen of Mexico, returned to the U.S. and was arrested for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. After a second illegal return, he was convicted of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2) and sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Lara argued that the district judge should have disqualified himself from hearing Lara’s motion to dismiss the indictment or erred in failing to dismiss the indictment because Lara was erroneously denied an opportunity to seek discretionary relief from deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(c) in his first deportation proceeding in 1997–1998. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. The judge was not disqualified from ruling on Lara’s motion based on the judge’s service as INS District Counsel when Lara was first deported. The court did not reach the question of whether precedents interpreting 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) foreclose Lara’s collateral attack on his underlying deportation order because counsel conceded the issue. View "United States v. Lara-Unzueta" on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted in Illinois state court of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. His trial counsel, Swano, had not filed a discovery motion and did not know that one of the eyewitnesses had testified before a grand jury. Swano received a transcript of the grand jury testimony after the witness left the stand, and entered into a stipulation that the witness had not told the grand jury that Bailey was at the murder scene. Illinois state courts rejected Bailey’s claim that Swano’s performance was constitutionally deficient. A federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bailey did not show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have differed but for Swano’s error. View "Bailey v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Crundwell, Comptroller of Dixon, Illinois since 1983, pleaded guilty to embezzling about $53 million from the city between 1990 and 2012. She used the money to support more than 400 quarter horses and a lavish lifestyle, which she had previously claimed to be the fruit of the horses’ success. During the last six years of her scheme, the embezzlement averaged 28% of the city’s budget. In exchange for her plea, the prosecutor limited the charge to a single count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The crime’s impact on the population of Dixon played a major role in the district court’s decision to sentence her to 235 months’ imprisonment, substantially above the Guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court pronounced a substantively reasonable sentence after giving Crundwell full opportunity to present evidence and arguments. The judge considered deterrence and addressed every one of her arguments. That he thought less of her cooperation than Crundwell herself did, and gave a lower weight to her age than she requested does not undermine the sentence’s validity. View "United States v. Crundwell" on Justia Law

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Anobah was an Illinois-licensed loan officer, employed by AFFC, and acted as a loan officer for at least two fraudulent schemes. Developers Brown and Adams recruited Mason to act as a nominee buyer of a property and referred Mason to Anobah for preparation of a fraudulent loan application. The application contained numerous material falsehoods concerning Mason’s employment, assets, and income, and intent to occupy the property. Anobah, Brown, and others created fraudulent supporting documents. AFFC issued two loans in the amount of $760,000 for the property and ultimately lost about $290,000 on those loans. In the course of the scheme, AFFC wired funds from an account in Alabama to a bank in Chicago, providing the basis for a wire fraud charge. Anobah played a similar role in other loan applications for other properties and ultimately pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court sentenced him to 36 months of imprisonment, five months below the low end of the calculated guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of guidelines enhancements for abuse of a position of trust and for use of sophisticated means in committing the fraud. View "United States v. Anobah" on Justia Law

Serino was employed as a soccer coach at Oakland City University in Indiana. In September 2008, the university’s Vice President informed Serino that he was suspended from his position then contacted Hensley, Chief of the Oakland City Police Department, and told him to come to the university athletic center to speak to Serino. Hensley complied. He confronted Serino and told him that he was trespassing. Serino refused to leave and Hensley then arrested him. Serino was arraigned on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement. The state ultimately dismissed both charges. In 2012 Serino sued Hensley and Oakland City, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution, with Indiana tort claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding the section 1983 and state‐law false arrest claims time‐barred; that the section 1983 malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable as a constitutional claim; and that his state‐law claims for malicious prosecution and IIED were barred by the defendants’ immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Serino v. Hensley" on Justia Law