Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a), and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Sawyer admits that he forced at least seven girls whom he knew to be minors to work as prostitutes for his benefit. He argued that his conviction should be vacated because the jury was instructed improperly on one element of the offense. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and affirmed. By agreeing to the instructions at trial, Sawyer waived his argument. Even if he had not waived the point, the instructions were correct in explaining that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sawyer’s conduct affected interstate commerce to prove guilt but that Sawyer need not have known or intended that his conduct would have an effect on interstate commerce. Sawyer stipulated that his conduct had such an effect. The court rejected an argument that the jury should have been instructed to acquit if the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually knew or intended that his conduct affected interstate commerce. The statutory term “knowingly” does not modify “in or affecting interstate commerce,” which merely established a basis for congressional jurisdiction. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

The Berkowitz family has a history of IRS problems. Yair began participating in his father’s schemes in 1999, acquiring the information of dead people and federal prisoners to prepare fraudulent tax returns. Between 2003 and 2009, 58 individuals received refund checks in a conspiracy that involved more than 3,000 false state and federal tax returns. Yair received tax returns from Marvin in Israel, mailed the returns from various U.S. postal codes to avoid IRS suspicion, and controlled accounts where proceeds were deposited. When refund checks issued, Yair traveled to pick them up and made payments to co‐conspirators. In 2006, IRS agents told Yair that money he received from Marvin was obtained by fraud. Yair denied knowledge of the scheme. He began to reduce his direct involvement, but continued to receive money from the scheme and met with an undercover IRS agent about expanding the fraud. The scheme was uncovered. Yair, Marvin, and others were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS, wire fraud, and mail fraud. Yair pleaded guilty only to wire fraud based on a 2006 PayPal transfer of $250. At sentencing, the district court followed the Presentence Report’s recommendation and ordered Yair to pay more than $4 million in restitution along with his prison sentence; his liability was joint and several with his co‐defendants. The Seventh Circuit found the award appropriate and affirmed.View "Unted States v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

In 2001 a burglar set fire to Frankton High School, causing millions of dollars in damages. According to the plaintiff, an officer coerced one of the suspects and others to accuse the plaintiff. The plaintiff was convicted of arson, burglary, and theft. He obtained post-conviction relief and was released from prison in 2006, after proving that a key witness had lied. In 2007 a retrial was scheduled. On advice of counsel, plaintiff deferred filing a civil rights suit pending retrial, but the trial kept getting rescheduled until charges were dismissed in 2010. In 2011, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming malicious prosecution, due process, violations, and other torts, by Indiana police officers, the town that employed them, and the sheriff. The district judge dismissed the claim as untimely and held that Indiana law provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution, barring recourse to section 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Indiana law does not provide an adequate remedy. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants intimidated him into delaying filing a civil suit until the criminal proceeding ended. If that is true, the limitations period did not start to run until then, so that his November 2011 filing was within the limitations period. View "Julian v. Hanna" on Justia Law

Thompson pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 540 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Thompson then moved to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging that the government breached agreements with him (and others who cooperated on his behalf) to recommend that he serve between 108 and 135 months in prison, and that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance at the time he pleaded guilty, at sentencing, and on appeal. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Thompson never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he mention any deals in his opportunities to address the district court directly. Thompson did not show prejudice as a result of any alleged failings on the part of counsel. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis was driving his tractor‐trailer on I-70 through Illinois toward St. Louis. The sleeping compartment had a hidden compartment in which Davis was hiding $304,980 in cash. Davis passed an unmarked police vehicle containing officers assigned to a DEA drug interdiction task force. The officers followed him until they observed Davis following another truck too closely and initiated a traffic stop. Preparing to issue a warning, the officers examined Davis’s log‐book and became suspicious because Davis had gone without work for long periods, but had expensive aftermarket parts on his truck. The officers then learned that Davis’s truck had previously been used in criminal activity. After Davis orally consented to a search, an officer handed Davis a written consent form to read and sign. Davis used his remote to unlock the truck for the officers, who began searching. Davis became agitated, but responded to the officers’ question of whether they still had consent, by scrawling something on the form and handing it over. After discovering the hidden cash, the officers found that Davis had scrawled “under protest.” Drug-sniffing dogs alerted to the cash. Davis was released, but the government sought forfeiture of the truck and money. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Davis consented to the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding the search consensual. View "Davis v. $304,980.00 in U. S. Currency" on Justia Law

Soto entered the U.S. in 1978 as an infant and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991 at age 13. She was convicted of theft in 2002, of passing a worthless check in 2003, and of possessing methamphetamine in 2005, a felony under Kansas law. In 2005, immigration authorities initiated removal on grounds of commission of an aggravated felony, of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), and (a)(2)(B)(i). At the time, the circuits were split on whether a drug possession conviction that was a state law felony but that would be a federal misdemeanor should be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration. In 2006 the Seventh Circuit held that such convictions were not aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. Soto claims that an immigration officer and a legal aid organization stated that she had no chance of avoiding removal, so she signed a stipulation with an admission of the factual allegations, waiver of any right to seek relief from removal, and an acknowledgment that she signed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Three weeks after removal, Soto returned to the U.S. illegally to live with her four U.S.‐born children and their U.S.‐citizen father, whom she married in 2009. In 2010 authorities discovered Soto and reinstated the 2005 order of removal using an expedited process. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, filed from Mexico. The Tenth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 order. Soto moved to reopen the 2005 removal order, arguing that the 90‐day deadline did not apply or was equitably tolled. The IJ and BIA rejected her arguments. The Seventh Circuit held that that her illegal reentry after her 2005 removal permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order.View "Cordova-Soto v. Holder" on Justia Law

Brown was the office manager and accountant for Indiana small businesses owned by the Walker family from 1989 until 2009. The family discovered that Brown was embezzling by using company credit cards and checks to pay for personal items and expenses. Brown stole hundreds of thousands of dollars, putting the businesses in financial straits and destroying their credit. Brown was charged with more than 150 counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and tax fraud and pleaded guilty to a single count of each crime. The advisory guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment, but the district judge imposed a sentence of 60 months. Weeks later, without warning, the judge filed an amended judgment and attached a written “statement of reasons” to “supplement” his statements in open court. The judge recalculated the guidelines range, adding upward adjustments based on the amount embezzled, the duration of the scheme, and the vulnerability of one victims so that the range was 41 to 51 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not violate Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 32(h), which requires “reasonable notice” when the court is “contemplating” a departure from the guidelines; “departures” are obsolete. In addition, the statement was filed after Brown appealed, so the court lacked jurisdiction to substantively alter the sentence. Brown’s sentence did not change; in light of the court’s oral pronouncements, that sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1989, Spiller, age 12, was found delinquent for attempted criminal sexual assault. He was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm in 1995. In 2005, while on parole, Spiller was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer. He was convicted of possession of heroin in 2006 and of possession of a controlled substance stemming from two arrests in 2007. In 2011, he was charged with two counts of distributing more than 28 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and selling a loaded firearm to a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). The government sought increased punishment under 21 U.S.C. 851(a) based on the prior drug convictions. Spiller pleaded guilty. The presentence report applied the career offender Guideline 4B1.1, which, with the 851 recidivism enhancement, resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. Spiller’s counsel argued that the 851 enhancement unreasonably inflated the range, resulting in an unwarranted sentencing disparity. The district court sentenced Spiller to 240 months’ imprisonment. The district court stated that “I am not saying [the 851 enhancement] does not impact [the sentence], but the sentence ... is below the Guidelines, it is what I think is called for in this case … given all of the criteria of 3553 and all of the circumstances.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Spiller" on Justia Law

Womack, convicted of distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. On remand the district court imposed the same sentence; the Seventh Circuit again vacated. On second remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Womack qualified as a Career Offender based on prior felony convictions, so U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(b)(2) established his offense level at 34. His criminal history category was a 6, so the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments in favor of “progressive sentencing” and that Womack’s prior conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm was not a crime of violence. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law

Johns was indicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Count One alleged possession of a .20 caliber shotgun in July, Count Two alleged a .45 caliber rifle in September, and Count Three alleged a loaded .38 caliber revolver in November. Johns admitted that he sold the guns to a confidential informant. A presentence report stated that Johns and the CI were members of a motorcycle club; that each knew the other’s criminal history; that Johns knew the CI intended to resell the guns; and that Johns told the CI that he had another gun and intended to retaliate for the murder of another club member and that he could get crack to sell to the CI. The automatic rifle had been stolen. The report recommended a base level of 20 and two enhancement levels because the offense involved three firearms, plus two levels for the stolen rifle, plus four levels for trafficking, plus four levels for transfer with knowledge that it would be used in connection with another felony, minus three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The total offense level, 29, yielded a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. The report noted that Johns had eight children from six relationships and owed $46,189 in child support. The district court imposed a sentence of 160 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the court erred by imposing a four‐level “other felony offense” enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).View "United States v. John" on Justia Law