Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At age 15 Jimenez was convicted of a murder he did not commit. He spent 16 years in prison before he was exonerated. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against the City of Chicago and former Chicago detective, Bogucki, for violating his constitutional right to due process of law and for malicious prosecution. Bogucki tainted an identification by showing the witness a picture of Jiminez in advance. A jury awarded him $25 million in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a Batson claim because the defendants did not show that a biased juror was seated or any harm. The court properly instructed the jury concerning Jiminez’s Brady claim and was not required to provide the entire transcript of the original trial. View "Jimenez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 a prisoner alleges that officials of an Illinois jail willfully failed to prevent other inmates from assaulting him. The district judge conducted a telephonic “merit‐review hearing” with the plaintiff shortly after the complaint was docketed and dismissed for failure to state a claim. There is no transcript of the hearing, and no explanation of why the judge thought the guards’ knowledge of the assault material. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the “inquisitorial” procedure employed by the judge has no basis in American law other than in proceedings before some administrative agencies, and was conducted without any safeguards. The judge may dismiss a frivolous complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), (b)(1), but, if the validity of a claim depends on the accuracy of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, as in this case, and their accuracy cannot be resolved without an oral hearing, those matters must be resolved in conformity with the procedures that govern trials. A judge may clarify an unclear pro se complaint by interviewing the plaintiff, but must not turn the interview into a judicial cross‐examination designed to elicit admissions. View "Williams v. Wahner" on Justia Law

The Zuno brothers were charged as members of a conspiracy to possess cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846. Ismael also was charged in 19 cocaine distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); Jose, was charged with 19 counts of cocaine distribution and two counts for use of a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Both had prior felony drug convictions, so the prosecution filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851, triggering for each the potential of a ten‐year mandatory minimum term of incarceration. Both pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and Ismael also pleaded guilty to the 19 distribution counts. Jose’s plea was entered under a plea agreement that included provisions resulting in the dismissal of all other charges against him and the prior conviction information; he was sentenced to an 80‐month term. Ismael’s guilty plea was entered without an agreement; he was sentenced to a term of 120 months. In calculating the sentences, the district judge determined that both were organizers or leaders of a drug organization that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), resulting in a four‐level increase in their base offense levels. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Zuno" on Justia Law

Police responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting a group of 25 people acting loudly and displaying hand guns in a parking lot, but actually found a smaller group of individuals, none of whom appeared to be acting inappropriately. The officers approached the group, which had begun to disperse slowly. For no apparent reason, an officer singled out Williams and performed a frisk. Williams began to resist and tried to escape, but was ultimately restrained. Officers searched his body and found a handgun and several ‘ecstasy’ pills. The district judge denied a motion to suppress and Williams pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, reserving his right to appeal. The district judge applied two sentencing enhancements, which significantly increased William’s offense level and applicable range of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction, finding that the search was unlawful. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fallon purchased a one‐way train ticket from Chicago to Seattle, causing DEA Agent Romano to suspect that Fallon might be a drug courier. Romano approached Fallon, who provided identification with an out-of-date address and stated that he was unemployed and was going to visit a friend. Fallon refused to provide a current address; Romano noticed that Fallon was sweating and trembling. Fallon allowed a search of his duffle, but declined to permit agents to open a locked brief case, stating that it contained $50,000 and that he intended to purchase a house. Romano directed Fallon to exit the train. While waiting for a drug‐detection dog, Romano pried the briefcase open, and observed that it contained currency. Fallon then claimed that the currency belonged to a third person to be used for investment. The dog alerted to the briefcase, which contained $100,120. The government initiated civil forfeiture and the owner of the Funds, Marrocco, filed a claim. Marrocco, who was not charged with any crime connected, moved to quash the seizure, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court held that the agents lacked probable cause to open the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. Ultimately, the district court entered summary judgment, holding that the currency was either the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction, or was intended to facilitate such a transaction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Marrocco’s testimony, recounting his employment history and relatively expense‐free living, created a dispute of material fact regarding whether the Funds could have been Marrocco’s legally-acquired life savings. There was also expert evidence challenging whether the dog’s alert demonstrates that the Funds recently were in contact with illegal drugs. View "Marrocco v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand, One Hundred Twenty Dollars." on Justia Law

Bolton was convicted of first degree murder for a 1994 shooting. On appeal, Bolton argued insufficient evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to join a stipulation between the state and a co‐defendant concerning an exculpatory pre‐trial statement; and that his 50-year sentence was excessive. The Illinois appellate court affirmed. Bolton did not appeal, but filed a state post‐conviction petition, claiming that the state fraudulently withheld photographs of the lineup and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial on that basis. The court rejected Bolton’s Brady claim because there was no reasonable probability that the photographs would have altered the outcome of the trial, characterizing the evidence against Bolton as “overwhelming,” and rejected Bolton’s Strickland challenge as waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. After unsuccessful appeals, Bolton filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming newly discovered evidence in support of his constitutional claims; prosecutorial misconduct in withholding photographic evidence of the lineup that was favorable to the defense; and that counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that Bolton did not preserve the claim that he was denied due process because the lineup was suggestive. View "Bolton v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Hernandez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Hernandez was responsible for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine and sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record showed that Hernandez knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The court conducted a thorough plea colloquy, ensuring that Hernandez was provided an interpreter at every stage, and advised Hernandez of his rights. The court ensured that he understood his rights and that he was fully aware of the nature of the charges, the consequences of his plea, and the possible punishment. There is no indication that the district court judge thought he had to impose a higher mandatory minimum sentence as a result of finding Hernandez responsible for a larger amount of cocaine than the charging document attributed to him.b View "Unted States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

While executing a search warrant, police found illegal drugs and a firearm in Scott’s home. Scott was indicted for two drug offenses and two firearms offenses. The affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant described two controlled drug buys in which detectives used a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Reynolds. On each occasion, after meeting the CI, Reynolds drove alone to Scott’s house and returned to the CI with the requested heroin. The affidavit contained one sentence describing an audio recording of a conversation between Scott and Reynolds, in Scott’s driveway, during the first controlled buy. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Scott pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence apart from the driveway conversation to establish probable cause for the search warrant so that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether Scott had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway conversation. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1981, Hooper was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, but ordered a new penalty trial. That trial ended in another capital sentence, which was affirmed. State court collateral review left the convictions in place, but the Governor commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson decision unreasonably to Hooper’s situation in concluding that the evidence did not make out a prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection. The venire drawn for Hooper’s trial had 63 members; seven were black. Two of the seven were removed on challenges for cause. The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the remaining five. The decisions of the trial judge, who was subsequently convicted of accepting bribes, are entitled to no deference. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a fruitful Batson hearing may not be possible 32 years after the trial and that a new trial, 33 years after the crime, may be challenging. View "Hooper v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Eads, age 26, was charged with possession and distribution of child pornography and tampering with a potential witness. The district court cautioned him, but he chose to represent himself and stipulated that the images constituted child pornography, but claimed that he was being framed and that the images belonged to someone else. Over Eads’s objection, the district court allowed the government to introduce photographs and short video clips of the child pornography discovered on Eads’s home computer to show he knowingly possessed and distributed these images and telephone calls Eads made to his wife urging her to recant her earlier statements. Eads was convicted and the district court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the court adequately cautioned Eads about proceeding pro se, that the images were not unfairly prejudicial because the additional evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, and that there was sufficient evidence ofEads’s attempts to corruptly persuade his wife to testify falsely. View "United States v. Eads" on Justia Law