Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999 Carroll was convicted in Illinois of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to 28 years in prison. He obtained post-conviction relief and was resentenced, to 26 years. Neither the judge at sentencing nor the official copy of the judgment mentioned supervised release. Carroll learned that a three-year term of supervised release was required by statute, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d). He filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, asking the court to order him excused from having to serve supervised release, arguing that to impose punishment in excess of the sentence delivered by a judge violates clearly established federal law. Later Carroll indicated that what he really wanted was to have his prison term reduced to 23 years so that the aggregate time in prison and on supervised release would be 26 years. The district judge held that Carroll must serve 26 years in prison and three years on supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; any error was merely a departure from a customary but not a mandatory procedure. If ordered to resentence Carroll, the Illinois court would impose an identical sentence except that it would list the statutory conditions and duration of mandatory supervised release. Failure to mention supervised release in Carroll’s sentence did not deprive him of life, liberty, or property. View "Carroll v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 2008-2009 Scalzo was a bank officer at two institutions. He originated and approved loans for unqualified borrowers without adequate financial information or collateral. He forged borrowers’ signatures, redirected funds from the loans to his own personal use without the knowledge of the borrowers, and took funds from some fraudulent loans to pay off balances on previous fraudulent loans, to conceal the original fraud. Scalzo pled guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956. The Information listed as part of the scheme six bank loans and three Credit Union loans. Scalzo objected to inclusion of two Credit Union loans in the restitution order. The sentencing range was the same with or without these loans, so the court deferred ruling on restitution and sentenced Scalzo to 35 months of imprisonment. The government filed its additional brief a week later. Having received no additional briefing from Scalzo for 82 days, the court relied on the PSR, the plea agreement and the government’s additional submissions; found that Scalzo arranged the Credit Union loans to conceal the bank fraud; noted that the Credit Union loans were listed as part of the fraudulent scheme detailed in the Information to which Scalzo pled guilty and that the Credit Union lost a substantial amount of money; and ordered him to pay restitution of $679,737.23. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Scalzo" on Justia Law

Davis, a nurse and assistant professor of nursing at Chicago State University, ran several public health programs aimed at improving the health care of the African-American community. As program director for the Chicago Chapter of the National Black Nurses Association (CCBNA), Davis solicited and oversaw public and private grants, contracts, and funds awarded to CCBNA. Between December 2005 and March 2009, Davis solicited and obtained contracts and grants totaling approximately $1,062,000 from Illinois state agencies. Davis diverted approximately $377,000 by writing checks to herself, friends, and family members; concealing conflicts of interest; hiring unqualified family members and other acquaintances for positions in projects; forging co-signatures; and falsifying information. Davis pleaded guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. In the plea agreement, the parties concurred that based on the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. 3553, Davis could be sentenced to, and the government would recommend, no higher than a below-guidelines sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment. The advisory guidelines range was 57–71 months. Davis waived the right to appeal the reasonableness of the sentence but reserved the right to challenge any procedural error at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the district court erred procedurally by failing to adequately take into account her mental health in considering mitigating factors. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

On the way into a Milwaukee store, Banks’s associate Warren asked him to hold a revolver. Banks put it in his waistband. Once inside, Warren negotiated the sale of the guns for $1,000 to an undercover ATF agent who was posing as a store employee. Warren took the revolver from Banks and handed it to the buyer. Banks and Warren then offered to sell crack cocaine. The agent said he had money only for the guns but that he would purchase the crack the next day. Banks and Warren returned and sold the agent one ounce of what turned out to be fake crack cocaine. Banks pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to three years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentencing report correctly calculated that Banks had an offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of III after a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. Although the judge could have been clearer, the transcript indicated that he considered Banks’s mitigation argument but found it was out-weighed by the seriousness of the offense and Banks’s criminal history. The sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Vance, Marshall, and Bluford were charged with two 2007 Chicago bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and related crimes, such as conspiring to rob the banks. Vance also was charged with killing a person during the commission of a bank robbery. Marshall and Bluford, but not Vance, pleaded guilty. Marshall testified at Vance’s trial. The jury convicted Vance, and the judge sentenced him to consecutive terms of seven and 25 years, plus life in prison for the killing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges concerning alleged “propensity” evidence, testimony about DNA evidence, testimony by a teller who identified Vance, and the sentence. View "United States v. Vance" on Justia Law

Rucker, Alvarez, and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and other narcotics offenses. Rucker pled guilty attempting to possess, with the intent to distribute, two kilograms of cocaine. Rucker disputed the additional quantity of narcotics that should be attributed to him as relevant conduct. At a hearing the government presented testimony from Alvarez, who had pleaded guilty. Alvarez recounted past narcotics transactions with Rucker; by his estimate, Rucker had purchased two or three kilograms of cocaine from him every 2-3 months since 2007 or 2008. Rucker was present in court at the time. The parties later stipulated that an additional three and one-half to five kilograms of cocaine should be attributed to Rucker as relevant conduct, raising the advisory sentencing range from 63-78 months to a term of 78-97 months. The court imposed a term of 87 months. Days later, Rucker encountered Alvarez in a holding cell. Unlike Alvarez, Rucker was not yet in restraints. Other inmates later testified that Rucker made a remark that referred to a cooperating witness. A security camera recorded Rucker walking across the room to Alvarez (whom he outweighed by 80 pounds) and slamming Alvarez’s head against a concrete wall. Alvarez collapsed and began to convulse; blood ran from his head. Rucker told a guard that Alvarez had fallen and was having a seizure. Alvarez recovered. Rucker was convicted of witness retaliation, 18 U.S.C. 1513(b); the court imposed a sentence of 240 months, the statutory maximum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentence and a claim of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Moore went out to steal a car, armed with a loaded semiautomatic pistol. He had been offered $5,000 for a high-end automobile. Seeing Heliotis getting into a BMW, Moore approached the open driver’s window, and, according to Heliotis, pressed his gun to her temple and told her to get out. She did not immediately comply. Moore repeated his demand and, according to Heliotis, threatened to shoot and kill her. Moore opened the car door; Heliotis ran. Moore sped off in the BMW. Heliotis flagged down police, and a radio alert was issued. Officers spotted the car and gave chase. After colliding with other vehicles, Moore abandoned the car and tried to run. He was apprehended and taken back to the scene of the carjacking, where Heliotis identified him. In the abandoned BMW, police found Moore’s gun and copies of his birth certificate and Social Security card. After being advised of his rights, Moore admitted having stolen Heliotis’s BMW while armed, but stated that he never pointed the gun at her and never intended to harm her. Moore was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the predicate crime of violence: taking a motor vehicle by force or intimidation with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, 18 U.S.C. 2119. The Seventh Circuit vacated the firearm conviction, expressing concern that the jury's inability to render a verdict on the first count indicated that it was not prepared to render a verdict on Count Two. The court’s decision to solicit a partial verdict contributed to the premature verdict. The court upheld Moore’s additional conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

McDowell alleges that, after work, he met friends at a bar. They stayed until the bar’s 4:00 a.m. closing time. They exited the front door and were confronted by other individuals, including an off-duty police officer. The groups came to blows. McDowell claims that he attempted to break up the fight, retreated to his car, saw his adversaries attempt to vandalize it, and told his companions to call the police. Rodriguez was dispatched to the scene and found McDowell running around parked cars, trying to evade at least three men who were chasing him. Rodriguez approached McDowell with his Taser drawn and ordered everyone to get on the ground. The chase stopped and everyone lay down, except Morandi, one of McDowell’s antagonists. While McDowell lay prone 10 feet in front of Rodriguez, looking up at him with his hands behind his head, Morandi walked towards McDowell from about 15-20 feet away. Rodriguez did not issue a second warning nor did he point his Taser. Morandi kept coming and kicked McDowell in the face. The impact broke his jaw, which required surgery. McDowell alleges that Rodriguez still failed to handcuff Morandi and did not request an ambulance. McDowell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging substantive due process violations and Illinois common law willful and wanton conduct. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rodriguez’s conduct, even according to McDowell’s depiction, was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as a constitutional tort or to vitiate his state-law immunity.View "McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing" on Justia Law

Vargas and Salinas were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841 and 846), and two counts each of using telephones in furtherance of the conspiracy (21 U.S.C. 843(b)).Vargas pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, and was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment. Salinas went to trial and was convicted on three counts and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim by Vargas that the district court erroneously imposed a three‐level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, unduly lengthening his sentence. The court also rejected an argument by Salinas that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to uphold his conviction and that an erroneous "ostrich" jury instruction prejudiced his case. View "United States v. Varga" on Justia Law

Harris was charged with identity theft. During voir dire the judge introduced himself and explained the process to the potential juror pool. After the deputy swore the jury in, the judge stated: To protect people’s privacy, we try to refer to jurors by numbers now. Now, there is nothing more difficult than an Irishman that grew up in coal mining country to refer to people by numbers, and I’m going to try. So I’ll talk to Juror Number 1, Juror Number 2, and the like. And I’m going to try not to forget and talk to you like you were otherwise a human being. But we do this just to protect your privacy, which is a very important consideration in the modern world. There was no objection. Harris was convicted. During the appeal, the government obtained leave to supplement the record to include affidavits from the Jury Administrator, the Deputy Clerk, and the prosecutor, all effectively stating that the jury was not anonymous and the jurors knew the parties had their identifying information. The government included a blank juror questionnaire form used during the voir dire, with spaces for prospective jurors’ names, addresses, and other identifying information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that Harris did not show that the parties were kept from knowing the potential jurors’ names View "United States v. Susan Harris" on Justia Law