Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Evansville police received a tip that Hodge had sent text messages containing sexually explicit images of Hodge and a child. Under questioning, Hodge identified himself in the images. Police seized a computer and data storage equipment from his home and found many images of the child, whom Hodge identified as his nine-year-old niece, engaged in sexual and sadistic acts with Hodge and Hodge’s wife. Hodge was indicted on seven counts of production of sexually explicit material involving a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), two counts of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and two counts of distribution, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1). Hodge’s wife and another were also indicted. Hodge entered a guilty plea. During his sentencing hearing, Hodge offered testimony in mitigation from psychiatrist Cady. The district court discussed some of Cady’s findings in explaining the sentence, but neglected to mention other findings, most notably contentions that Hodge’s history of sexual and psychological abuse as a child contributed to his decision to commit his offenses and that Hodge was unlikely to reoffend. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence of 1380 months’ imprisonment, stating that Hodge’s arguments would reduce sentencing to a “checklist.” View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

The FBI obtained court orders for wiretaps on two of Atkins’s phones and began recording his telephone conversations. Agents intercepted several calls between Atkins and Claybrooks, concerning the details of various cocaine transactions. A grand jury indicted Claybrooks for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from Atkins, who testified that he began supplying Claybrooks with cocaine in 2001,that he distributed between 20 and 30 kilograms of cocaine to Claybrooks during their relationship, that Claybrooks supplied him with kilograms of cocaine on three or four occasions, and that Claybrooks occasionally brokered cocaine sales between Atkins and Claybrooks’s customers. Claybrooks was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit rejected a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court did not make a determination regarding the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. View "United States v. Claybrooks" on Justia Law

The inmate filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using excessive force on multiple occasions. The trial court dismissed. He sought an order that he be given the trial transcript for free, to aid him in his appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, reasoning that he is not entitled to a transcript without charge as an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis. Regardless of poverty, he has three strikes (suits without merit) and has not shown that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, as described in 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Maus v. Baker" on Justia Law

After being rejected for a mortgage because Hall had a bankruptcy and their joint income was too low, Hall and Phillips applied with Bowling, a mortgage broker, under the “stated income loan program.” Bowling prepared an application that omitted Hall’s name, attributed double their combined income to Phillips, and falsely claimed that Phillips was a manager. Phillips signed the application and employment verification form. Fremont extended credit. They could not make the payments; the lender foreclosed. Bowling repeated this process often. He pleaded guilty to bank fraud and, to lower his sentence, assisted in prosecution of his clients. Phillips and Hall were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1014. The district court prohibited them from eliciting testimony that Bowling assured them that the program was lawful and from arguing mistake of fact in signing the documents. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed, but granted rehearing en banc to clarify elements of the crime and their application to charges of mortgage fraud and reversed. The judge excluded evidence that, if believed, might have convinced a jury that any false statements made by the defendants were not known by them to be false and might also have rebutted an inference of intent to influence the bank. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

ATF agent Foreman investigated Wiseman’s purchase of eight handguns at Indiana outdoor‐gear retail stores. Wiseman told Foreman that she purchased the guns for Ghiassi, who was prohibited from possessing firearms because he had prior felony convictions for stalking and taking another person’s vehicle without consent; he was also the subject of a protective order. Wiseman stated that Ghiassi wanted to sell an AK‐47 assault rifle. Foreman arranged an undercover purchase, using Wiseman as an intermediary. After Ghiassi turned the weapon over to Foreman, a search of Ghiassi’s vehicle produced multiple weapons that had been purchased by Wiseman. Ghiassi admitted that Wiseman had illegally purchased weapons for him, but did not acknowledge any particular number of weapons. Foreman also reviewed surveillance footage in which Ghiassi could be seen at the firearms counter looking over guns with Wiseman. Ghiassi pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in finding Ghiassi responsible for eight or more firearms and deprived him of due process by relying, in substantial part, on his co‐defendant’s testimony at her sentencing to make that finding. View "United States v. Ghiassi" on Justia Law

Wiza was staking out a parking lot, to arrest Johnson for an attack at a bar and as a suspect in a recent shooting. A van known to be associated with Johnson arrived. Johnson exited the vehicle with Carthans; Wiza exited his vehicle and drew his gun. Howard and Williams then exited the van. Wiza ordered the men to the ground. Officer O’Keefe arrived, and while O’Keefe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Carthans fled. Howard and Williams were compliant. O’Keefe found 11 grams of crack cocaine in Johnson’s pocket. All of the men had bloodstains on their clothing. The officers frisked the men and, in Howard’s pocket, found half an ounce of crack cocaine. Wiza searched the van and found a baseball bat and a gun wrapped in a bloody shirt. Soon after, Madison police arrived and said that the men were suspects in an armed robbery that had occurred in Madison less than an hour earlier. Howard later told police that he used the shirt to wipe the robbery victim’s blood off the gun at Johnson’s request. The district judge concluded that the stop and the frisk were reasonable to protect the officers during an unexpectedly chaotic encounter and refused to suppress the drugs or Howard’s statement. Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once Howard was stopped, the discovery of the drugs in his pocket became inevitable. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Aponte sued four officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He brought one claim against each officer for unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each for failing to prevent an unreasonable search and a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) He claimed that because of damage done during the search, $9,462 was spent refurnishing his home. He also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The jury was instructed about compensatory damages and that if they found “in favor of Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensatory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).” The jury form, however, had no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict. The jury found for Aponte on one claim against only one officer and awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the space designated for “compensatory damages.” Aponte sought attorney’s fees of $116,435 for 450 hours under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as a “prevailing party.” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the verdict as a mere nominal victory with no public benefit. View "Aponte v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After a search of Medina’s garage revealed 9.5 kilograms of cocaine, packaging materials, $124,124 in cash, and $51,890 worth of jewelry, Medina pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Based on statements by Medina’s customer and cocaine seized from Medina, the government took the position that Medina was accountable for more than 50 kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to 190 months. A few months later, Medina provided a safety valve interview (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)) in an effort to obtain relief from the 10‐year mandatory minimum sentence, but challenged the quantities for which he was sentenced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge adequately considered the potential pitfalls of relying on the testimony of Medina’s customer and adopted a conservative estimate of drug quantity that was supported by the evidence. There was no improper speculation. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

Iacona worked as a process server for D&L, an investigation service owned by Clymer and agreed to purchase the business. Clymer structured the arrangement so that she would retain ownership of the business while Iacona paid $2000 per month for two years toward a purchase price of $95,000, with a balloon payment of the remaining balance. The agreement contemplated a line of credit to pay a recurring monthly expense for an investigative research service. In reality, Iacona established several lines of credit in the name of D&L and in Clymer’s name. He misrepresented his position with the company and the company’s income. He had his sister represent herself as Clymer, used Clymer’s social security number and personal information, and incurred significant debt unrelated to the business. Iacona was convicted of fraud in connection with an access device and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2) and 1028A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Where the evidence supports an inference that the defendant has lied, then a comment in closing argument as to his credibility, is a hard but fair blow, as long as the argument is based on the evidence and not a comment on the prosecutor’s personal opinion . View "United States v. Iacona" on Justia Law