Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a collision, the driver of the struck vehicle chased the fleeing vehicle (Chandler), who turned into a dead-end alley. Rhodes, accompanied by Bridewell, Manuel, and Watkins, pulled up behind him and confronted Chandler. Hearing that Chandler had a gun, they backed off. Shots were fired. Chandler’s horn began to sound; his head was pressing the button. Witnesses indicated that two men, who may have been Manuel and Watkins, had a gun and left the scene. Police arrived. Bridewell and Rhodes told them that Chandler had shot at them. Detectives Eberle and Forberg, found Chandler dead, with a gun near his hand. They took Bridewell and Rhodes into custody, then located and arrested Manuel and Watkins. Rhodes and Watkins told police that Bridewell had shot Chandler. Bridewell, under indictment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, was charged with murder. The others were released. After three years in custody, Bridewell pleaded guilty to a reduced drug charge; prosecutors dismissed the murder charge. Bridewell, Rhodes, and Manuel filed suit against Eberle, Forberg, and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that their arrests were unlawful. Bridewell also claimed that the police took longer than the fourth amendment allows to present her to a judge, malicious prosecution, and emotional distress. The district judge granted summary judgment to all defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bridewell v. Eberle" on Justia Law

When a Cook County, Illinois property owner fails to timely pay property, the amount of tax past due becomes a lien on the property. The county sells tax liens at auctions, with bids stated as percentages of the taxes past due. The percentage bid, multiplied by the amount of past‐due taxes, plus any interest, is the “penalty” that the owner must pay to clear the lien. The lowest penalty wins the bid. When bids are identical, the auctioneer tries to award the lien to the bidder who raised his hand first. The rules permit only one agent of a potential buyer or related entities, to bid. Plaintiffs accused defendants of fraud for having multiple bidders representing a single potential buyer and sought damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 and for interference with a prospective business advantage under Illinois tort law. On remand, a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of $7 million, to which the judge added $13 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, describing the defendants as hyperaggressive adversaries who drove up the plaintiffs’ legal costs without justification. View "BCS Servs., Inc. v. BG Inv., Inc." on Justia Law

Hacha and his wife, Solano, extorted money from Solano’s former boyfriend, Tenorio. Hacha told Tenorio that he had kidnapped Solano and her children and would harm them and would harm Tenorio and Tenorio’s parents unless Tenorio paid ransom. After paying Hacha nearly $55,000, Tenorio contacted the FBI, which arrested Hacha after recording calls during which Hacha pretended to have shot Solano in the leg and broken her fingers, and in which she was heard screaming in the background. Hacha and Solano pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 371, and extortion. 18 U.S.C. 875(b). Both pleaded guilty. She was sentenced to 42 months in prison and he was sentenced to 87 months, the bottom of his guidelines sentencing range. His appointed counsel for an appeal of the sentence concluded that the appeal wholly lacked merit and moved to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, rejecting arguments concerning acceptance of responsibility and an enhancement based on his “demonstrated ability to carry out” his threat to harm Solano and the others. View "United States v. Hacha" on Justia Law

Okoro was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanor property crime. For unknown reasons, Okoro never received a “Gerstein hearing” to determine probable cause during his two months of incarceration. Okoro, then 23, had Type I diabetes, which he could control by monitoring his blood sugar levels. While he was in college, however, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which compromised his ability to care for his diabetes. Immediately after his arrest, Okoro’s relatives began calling to inform correctional employees and medical staff of his conditions. Okoro was detained in his cell, usually in isolation, and was dependent on jail employees and medical staff to monitor his blood sugar level and provide insulin shots. On December 23, 2008, Okoro collapsed in his cell. An autopsy revealed that Okoro’s death was the result of diabetic ketoacidosis, a buildup of acidic ketones in the bloodstream that occurs when the body runs out of insulin. A doctor and a nurse, employed by the healthcare company that contracts with the jail, moved for dismissal of the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied their qualified immunity claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record easily supports a finding of deliberate indifference to Okoro’s serious medical condition. View "Currie v. Chhabra" on Justia Law

In 2005, 10‐year‐old “Jessica” reported that she had been sexually assaulted by a man named “Ron” several years earlier. Based on her description, where she lived at the time, and the sleeping arrangements of the home, Jessica’s mother identified McElvaney, who had been her live‐in boyfriend and estimated that the assault occurred between August 2001 and February 2002. Based on additional information, McElvaney was charged with assaulting Jessica between September 26, 2001, and December 19, 2001. McElvaney’s attorney Celebre, moved to require the district attorney to indicate with greater particularity the time of the alleged assault and to prohibit modification of the time period at trial so that McElvaney could formulate an alibi and identify potential supporting witnesses. At a hearing, Celebre conceded that the state had authority to allege the three‐month date range. The trial court judge said that he would not allow the state to amend at trial. Convicted under Wisconsin law, McElvaney was sentenced to 15 years. Wisconsin courts rejected appeals asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on Celebre’s failure to object to the way in which Jessica’s videotaped testimony was presented. State courts then denied post-conviction relief based on failure to pursue the more-specific-date issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a federal habeas petition. View "McElvaney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Norman Green was convicted of first-degree murder. While an inmate, Green decided to adopt a spiritual name: Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil. Atum-Ra was an Egyptian deity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom; and al-Mutawakkil was an Abbasid caliph who ruled in Samarra. The addition of “Prince” is a mystery. He does not contend that he chose the name as part of his devotion to a particular faith. Wisconsin’s current policy is to permit an inmate to use the name on the conviction (the committed name), or the committed name in conjunction with a second name, but not to use a second name by itself unless a court grants a petition for change of name. Green claims that he suffers injury because, for example, a letter addressed to “Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil” will be returned to the sender, while a letter addressed to “Norman Green” or to both names will be delivered to him. The Seventh Circuit rejected an equal protection claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, finding that the policy does not create a “substantial burden.” View "Green. v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

In 1999 Obriecht was convicted of attempted second‐degree sexual assault of a child, five counts of fourth‐degree sexual assault and one count of disorderly conduct and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and probation. He was released pending his appeal, but probation was revoked when he violated its terms. In 2001, he was sentenced to seven years of consecutive imprisonment for the probation revocation. He exhausted direct appeal of the 1999 convictions. In 2002, Obriecht sought habeas relief in the district court, which was denied, because he had not exhausted state remedies. The court warned him concerning deadlines. Obriecht’ attorney apparently believed that an extension granted for appeal of the state parole violation conviction tolled the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations for the 1999 convictions. Obriecht was the placed in medical segregation and later in a mental health facility. His attorney withdrew and, when declared competent, Obriecht began to act pro se. The district court rejected his habeas petition as untimely and finding that he had not demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Obriecht could not establish that an extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing and that he pursued his rights diligently. View "Obriecht v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Evans, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and of possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(1)(D), was sentenced to 55 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Eleven days later he pleaded no contest, in Wisconsin state court, on two charges involving sexual abuse of a minor, and was sentenced to five years of probation to follow his federal term of supervised release. When the federal district court learned of the state convictions two years later, it modified the terms of Evans’s original sentence to require Evans to attend a sex offender assessment and treatment program while on supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court did not have authority to change the terms when he had not violated existing terms and that the court was not authorized to impose sex‐offender treatment because it is unrelated to the crimes of conviction in federal court. Because Evans’s sex‐offense conviction was contemporaneous to his drug and firearm convictions, the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public justified the decision. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit previously held that Kaufman’s request to form an atheist prison study groups must be treated as a request for a “religious” group rather than a nonreligious activity group. Kaufman was later moved to another prison and encountered similar resistance to creation of an atheist group. After submitting grievances, he filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, also citing denial of his request to wear a “knowledge thought ring,” which he regards as a religious symbol, and failure to make donated atheist books available in the prison library. The district court recognized that the atheist study group is a religious one, but found that the prison supplied a legitimate secular reason for its actions: Only two inmates were thought to have any interest. The court found that prohibition of the ring did not impose a substantial burden on religious practice and was justified by the secular interest in security. There was no evidence that the defendants were responsible for losing the books Kaufman donated or that the loss was more than isolated negligence. The Seventh Circuit vacated with respect to the study group, but otherwise affirmed. View "Kaufman v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Kirklin asked Jones whether she wanted to help rob a bank. Kirklin promised it would be “easy,” showed her two firearms he had stashed in his van, and Jones agreed to participate. They were caught. A jury convicted Kirklin of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113; 924(c)(1)(A); 2 and was sentenced to 171 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to accurately instruct the jury on aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during the robbery and that Kirklin is entitled to resentencing because the district court wrongly imposed a 7‐year sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for his accomplices’ “brandishing” firearms even though the jury never found this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The court acknowledged that any fact that increases a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury, but stated that it was not convinced that the sentencing error resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the evidence supporting the court’s finding of brandishing was overwhelming. View "United States v. Kirklin" on Justia Law