Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Simon is a CPA, a professor of accounting, and an entrepreneur “whose business dealings require a flowchart to unravel” and included managing three foreign companies. For tax years 2003 through 2006, the Simon family received approximately $1.8 million from those companies and spent approximately $1.7 million. Simon paid just $328 in income taxes for 2005, and claimed refunds for the other years, while pleading poverty to financial aid programs in order to gain need‐based scholarships for his children at private schools. Charged with filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2; failing to file reports related to foreign bank accounts, 31 U.S.C. 5314, 5322 and 18 U.S.C. 2; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; and financial aid fraud, 20 U.S.C. 1097 and 18 U.S.C. 2, Simon sought to demonstrate that money received from the entities was loaned to him and was not taxable or constituted partnership distributions, not taxable because they did not exceed his basis in the partnership. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Simon’s convictions, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. View "United States v. Simon" on Justia Law

Volpentesta owned and operated a construction business and used the company to defraud customers, investors, subcontractors, and the government. Charged with six counts of mail and wire fraud and 17 counts of federal tax violations, Volpentesta was represented by Federal Defender Gaziano. Due to the volume of discovery (about 11,000 pages of Bates-stamped discovery and 40 banker’s boxes of documents seized by the IRS), Gaziano ensured that Volpentesta could review the discovery electronically from the jail. When Volpentesta complained that the computer was too slow, Gaziano obtained an order for periodic transport to review the documents. Volpentesta eventually filed nine motions to substitute counsel, most related to the difficulty in reviewing discovery. The court ultimately allowed him to proceed pro se. Volpentesta was convicted, sentenced to a total of 133 months in prison, and ordered to pay more than one million dollars in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given; and that the district court erroneously denied his motions to continue the trial once he had decided to represent himself. View "United States v. Volpentesta" on Justia Law

Rosen, as owner of Kully Construction, submitted a development plan to the city of East St. Louis for a $5,624,050 affordable housing project to be constructed with a combination of private and public funds: $800,000 in federal grant funds, $1,124,810 in Tax Increment Financing (TIF), and $3,699,240 from Rosen and Kully. Rosen constructed elaborate lies about his credentials and history. After obtaining a contract for 32 units, Rosen learned that the project was under-funded by about $2.7 million dollars. To conceal the problem, Rosen misrepresented to the city that he could build 56 units without increasing construction costs, then substituted less-expensive prefab modular housing units in place of the promised new construction; he nonetheless submitted an itemized list of materials and expenses related to construction. He also submitted falsified tax returns to obtain financing and falsified statements that he had obtained financing. After the scheme was discovered, Rosen pleaded guilty to seven counts of wire fraud, and based on the court’s calculation of the loss amount and determination that Rosen was an organizer or leader of criminal activity, was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and sentenced to nearly 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Brown’s claim that he was only a customer to his suppliers, not a co-conspirator and a challenge to jury instructions concerning how to distinguish a buyer-seller relationship from a conspiracy. The court concluded that Brown was an integral part of the operation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

A child services case worker and detectives went to the home Hurlow shared with his fiancée, Funk, to check on Funk’s children. Hurlow claims that he requested that they leave unless they had a search warrant; the detectives asked Funk for permission to search, stating that her children would be taken if she did not consent. Funk gave written consent. The detectives found methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. In custody, Hurlow stated that all of the illegal items were his and that Funk had no knowledge that drugs were in the home. Harlow claims that his attorney did not listen to his version of events, did not investigate, and persuaded him to plead guilty to avoid a sentence of “30 years to life.” Hurlow entered a plea with an agreement not to contest his conviction or sentence in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The stipulated basis for the plea stated that Funk granted consent to search in writing. Hurlow affirmed the factual basis for the plea before the district court and stated that he was satisfied with his representation. The district court denied Hurlow’s subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing and concluded that his 2255 motion was barred by the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a hearing, finding that the waiver did not bar his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in negotiating the agreement. View "Hurlow v. United States" on Justia Law

Kennedy pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and threatening an informant, 18 U.S.C. 1513(b), for his role in a scheme to sell counterfeit art online and at art shows. At sentencing hearings, the government provided a list of 135 victims’ names, addresses, and loss amounts, and sought restitution of $821,714.65. The district court found that the prosecution had met its burden as to 21 victims and sentenced Kennedy to 96 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of $316,425.65. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

After Newman, then 16 years old, turned himself in to police and was arrested, his mother told Newman’s attorney that her son was a “special child” who attended a “school for the handicapped, the mental school.” She gave him a two-inch-thick stack of educational and psychological records reflecting Newman’s lengthy history of severe mental and cognitive deficits, including a diagnosis of mental retardation from the Social Security Administration and a psychologist’s report indicating that Newman’s IQ was 62. Newman was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 47 years’ imprisonment. Following unsuccessful appeals, Newman filed a state post-conviction petition. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. Newman filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate his fitness for trial and failing to seek a fitness hearing. The district court held an evidentiary hearing days and determined, on the basis of the state court record, that the Illinois courts unreasonably concluded that Newman was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate his fitness to stand trial and that counsel’s failures to investigate known deficiencies in Newman’s mental capacity and to raise the fitness issue constituted ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Melvin Newman v. Michael Atchinson" on Justia Law

Carter, an Illinois prison inmate, sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. His petition was transferred to Illinois in June, 2010. On December 5, having heard nothing about the status of his case, Carter inquired. The clerk’s office incorrectly responded: “As of this date, the Court has taken no further action on the requested case. When an order is entered, you will be promptly notified by mail.” The district court had actually denied Carter’s petition in February 2011. The opinion was not sent or otherwise made available to Carter. After more than a year, Carter again wrote the clerk and was correctly informed that his petition had been denied two years earlier. Fewer than 30 days later, Carter filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a certificate of appealability. The district court did not docket his papers until about six weeks later. The Seventh Circuit allowed an appeal. While Federal Rule 58(c)(2)(B) provides that a judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the court’s decision, it does not set an appeal deadline. A jurisdictional rule is not waivable, but the Rule is subject to equitable tolling. View "Carter v. Hodge" on Justia Law

In December, 2005, Chicago police officers Malaniuk and Shields arrested then-14-year-old Barber. Barber claims that the arrest was without probable cause and that Malaniuk used excessive force in shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny those allegations and say that the head injury occurred because Barber was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. In Barber’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1982, a jury sided with the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding merit in Barber’s claims that the district court erred when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction. View "Terrence Barber v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

McGee was convicted of rape, home invasion, aggravated battery, and burglary, and was incarcerated in Illinois from 1980 until 2005, when, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, he was civilly detained and placed in the Rushville facility. In 2001, while serving his criminal sentence, McGee was diagnosed with liposarcoma cancer and underwent surgery to remove a tumor and adjacent muscle tissue in his right thigh. Since then he has undergone extensive treatment, biopsies, and other procedures to prevent or detect possible recurrence. McGee alleges that he suffers from edema and “neuropathic pain” in his legs as a result of the cancer treatments. Rushville has a policy, requiring detainees who are transported outside of the facility to wear metal leg irons. McGee complained several times to his treating physician about being required to wear restraints, but was never exempted. He was, on occasion, denied use of a wheelchair, and suffered cuts. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in McGee’s action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that 23 state officials, employees, and private medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "McGee v. Adams" on Justia Law