Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Hurt was a retail seller of crack cocaine, assisted by Holcomb and Clardy. The government, led to the group by a customer (Pickett), believed that Lee was one of Hurt’s suppliers. Controlled purchases, along with discovery of a distribution-sized quantity of crack cocaine in a car driven by Lee, led to the arrest and indictment of Lee, Hurt, Clardy, and Holcomb. Only Lee went to trial, after initially pleading guilty to conspiracy and possession, on the understanding that the more favorable statutory penalties put into place by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, would apply at his sentencing. The district court had applied the FSA in sentencing Holcomb before Lee pleaded guilty. Lee nonetheless withdrew his plea and was tried twice. Convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, he was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence proof that Lee had previously been convicted of possessing cocaine base, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Stokes was a public school teacher for more than 10 years. In 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery for indecently touching two boys who were his students. Stokes was sentenced to probation, with a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. Less than a month after sentencing, Stokes obtained permission to complete his probation in Thailand. Within weeks of his arrival in Thailand, he began seeking boys for sex. This continued for several years until someone tipped off the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service, which, with the Royal Thai Police, searched Stokes’s home and recovered a camera, a computer, and compact discs containing thousands of images of Stokes’s sexual activity with Thai boys. Stokes was extradited and convicted of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sex act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims related to a procedural mistake in the extradition process and to the legality of the search. The Thai foreign ministry waived the “Rule of Specialty,” allowing the government to proceed on a substitute charge. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Warrant Clause have no extraterritorial application, but Stokes was protected by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness. The search was reasonable. View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

abiu worked as a bank teller, 2003-2007. He searched account records for account holders with balances exceeding $100,000, then stole their information and, along with codefendants, compromised that information to divert money into fraudulently opened bank accounts. Postal inspectors lawfully searched his home and seized notes containing names, Social Security numbers, and account information of 86 customers, and an unspecified number of fake driver’s licenses and Social Security cards bearing the names of some of those customers, but only 17 customers suffered a loss. The losses were reimbursed by the banks. Rabiu pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1344, 1029(a)(2), 1028A(a)(1), admitting participation in the scheme, but insisting that some of the names and identifying information on the phony driver’s licenses and Social Security cards were fictitious and not from customers. The government successfully sought a four-level upward sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) based on 50 or more victims. The government cited a definition of “victim,” which, for offenses involving identity theft, was broadened in 2009, after Rabiu’s arrest, to include “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the court overstated the number of victims, it was clear that the judge would have imposed the same sentence even had he accepted Rabiu’s calculation; the error was harmless. View "United States v. Rabiu" on Justia Law

Weddington was convicted in two separate Indiana state trials of four counts of rape, two counts of criminal confinement, one count of criminal deviate conduct, and one count of robbery. He was sentenced to 133 years’ imprisonment. After unsuccessful appeals, Weddington filed a state petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The state court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief. Weddington did not appeal. In 2011, Weddington filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop and ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains that his wife would have testified and given him an alibi, but counsel failed to contact her or any other witness, although aware that she wanted to testify. Weddington asserts that prison administration confiscated his legal work, legal books, pens and pencils, and even legal mail, for more than a year. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal and remanded for assignment to another judge. The district judge, in her former capacity as a state judge, presided over Weddington’s conviction for state criminal charges related to charges underlying the federal habeas action. The record presents factual issues regarding equitable tolling and procedural default of certain issues. View "Weddington v. Finnan" on Justia Law

Davis was convicted of three Milwaukee-area bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Four robberies were committed in a similar fashion and surveillance photos also suggested that the robberies had been committed by the same individual; images from the four robberies showed a male robber with similar facial features who sometimes wore the same clothes. He was acquitted of one count of robbery and of witness intimidation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two witness intimidation counts should have been tried before a separate jury under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14(a). Although the Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions use the word “should,” in describing the government’s burden, substituting the word “must” in the place of “should” did not alter the jury instruction to Davis’s prejudice, View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2007, Williams was pulled over for allegedly running a stop sign. Because he had no proof of insurance, he and his car were taken to a Chicago police station. The next day, officers approached Williams on the street and claimed that he had wrongfully taken his car from the station the previous night. Williams claimed that one of the officers said he could take the car and gave him the keys. The officers sought to tow his car; Williams resisted. According to Williams, the officers beat him repeatedly; after he was handcuffed and taken to the station, the physical abuse continued. Williams sued the officers for false arrest and excessive force, 42 U.S.C. 1983. . The trial was largely a credibility contest; defendants presented evidence that Williams had committed seven drug or gun felonies in the last 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of defendants, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing in evidence of his prior convictions under Federal Rule 609, because it did not articulate a probative-prejudice balancing analysis. Williams did not ask the court to perform the balancing test. View "Williams v. Dieball" on Justia Law

Stinefast delivered a compact disc full of child pornography to an FBI informant; he was arrested and his home was searched. Agents discovered Stinefast’s collection of more than 190,000 images of child pornography, including images depicting sexual molestation of infants. Stinefast pled guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) and received an above‐guideline sentence of 216 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that: during the sentencing hearing the prosecutor improperly referred to inadmissible and potentially incriminating statements Stinefast made to the government’s psychiatric expert, which led to his unreasonably lengthy prison term; that the court erred by failing to address an argument that Stinefast’s psychological disorders stemming from his own history of sexual abuse limited his ability to refrain from engaging in child‐pornography; and that the court imposed an unreasonably high sentence. View "United States v. Stinefast" on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals and pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence reasoning that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after a criminal judgment has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. The court found that rehearing was not warranted by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Peugh v. United States, (2013), reasoning that, unlike this case, Peugh involved constitutional error: violation of the ex post facto clause. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Robinson, the subject of an anonymous tip to Chicago police, was asleep on his grandmother’s living room sofa when officers conducted an early-morning search of her apartment, looking for evidence that Robinson was selling marijuana from the premises. The officers found less than two grams of marijuana, but recovered a loaded revolver from a laundry basket by the front door. According to officers, Robinson admitted, at the time of its discovery and during a later station house interrogation, that the revolver was his; Robinson denies making such statements. Robinson was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated after rejecting arguments that the revolver should have been suppressed because the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the district court should have conducted a Franks hearing to assess whether police officers knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in support of the warrant application. The court committed reversible error by refusing to give a requested limiting instruction about his prior felony conviction and that error was not harmless. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals knocked on Sabo’s trailer door attempting to locate a fugitive, Sabo’s stepson. When Sabo opened the door, they noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Sabo denied that his stepson was there. Asked whether he was smoking dope with his children in the trailer, Sabo responded, “Get the fuck out of here” and slammed the door. The deputies called the Sheriff’s office for assistance. Detective McCune, who knew Sabo, arrived and knocked. Sabo opened the door and physically blocked entry. McCune asked, “Terry, do you mind if I step inside and talk with you?” Sabo said nothing, but stepped back and let the door open. McCune did not force his way in, but entered and noticed the odor of marijuana and guns leaning against a wall. Sabo was a convicted felon. While the guns were secured, officers swept the trailer looking for the fugitive. McCune obtained a search warrant and seized marijuana in the subsequent search. The district court denied a motion to suppress and Sabo conditionally pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the search consensual. View "United States v. Sabo" on Justia Law