Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mire’s business, the Indianapolis Somali House of Coffee, served as a place where people could get and use khat. Government agents received a tip, after which Mire and Rafle were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Mire was also indicted for knowingly using or maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing and using cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) and possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). They were found guilty on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendants’ arguments that their due process rights were violated because they were not given fair warning that the possession of khat may be illegal and that the district court erred under Daubert in admitting prosecution expert witness testimony regarding khat plants that were seized at the coffee house and tested for cathinone. Mire’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute khat and for maintaining a place for the distribution or use of khat did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Mire" on Justia Law

Shaw and two others were charged with aggravated battery after King was beaten to death outside a Fort Wayne motel. Shaw denied participating in the beating, but the other defendants, in exchange for prison sentences of less than three years, agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and to testify against Shaw. The court allowed the prosecution to elevate the charge against Shaw to murder over Shaw’s objection that an Indiana statute limits the time for amending charging documents. Shaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, Shaw’s new attorney abandoned the argument that the information was amended too late and argued, unsuccessfully, insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Appellate counsel dropped the case and did not file with the Supreme Court of Indiana. Shaw unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state courts. The federal district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed that the lawyer’s decision to forgo challenging the amended information in favor of a frivolous challenge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Indiana appellate court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington (1984), and the 2000 elaboration in Smith v. Robbins. View "Shaw v. Mize" on Justia Law

In 1999, Quintana and his friends lured a woman into a van. Quintana restrained the woman, while his friend sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped by jumping nude out of the moving van. Quintana was arrested and charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. After a year in prison awaiting trial, the state offered Quintana a plea deal of a four-year sentence on the kidnapping charge and a four-year sentence on the sexual assault charge to run concurrently at 50% good time, so that Quintana could plead guilty and serve one more year in prison. Quintana declined the deal, opting to go to trial and face a minimum of two six-year consecutive sentences. He was convicted and the district court sentenced Quintana to a term of six years and a consecutive term of 21 years. After 13 years, Quintana sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea under the Illinois “accountability law,” under which his sentence had to be served at 85%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that Quintana did not establish deficient performance or prejudice. View "Quintana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Walsh and Martin, principals of a futures and foreign currency trading company that acted as a “futures commission merchant” and as a “forex dealer member,” used customer funds for personal expenses, then concealed the company’s insolvency and their criminal conduct by misleading customers about the company’s ability to meet its obligations. Existing customers got account statements that falsely stated their available margin funds, and they solicited new customers by making false statements. They also used a Ponzi-like scheme for redemptions. Shortly before it was shut down, the company had $17,654,486 in unpaid customer liabilities and only $677,932 in assets. Walsh and Martin pleaded guilty to wire fraud, tax evasion, and to making false statements in a report to the Commodities Futures and Trading Commission, a Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6d(a)) violation. The district court sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of 150 and 204 months, respectively, and ordered each to pay $16,976,554 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a finding as to the amount of loss and restitution and to application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a finding that each was an officer or director of a futures commission merchant. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials retaliated against him for speaking up about two guards allegedly assaulting him. He was placed in segregation and forbidden to discuss the alleged assault. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison rules. He responded that he interpreted the prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault to extend to filing a grievance and was afraid to file it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. While the duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to suing under section 1983 is limited to those remedies that are “available,” and a remedy is not available to a prisoner prevented by threats or other intimidation from seeking an administrative remedy, Wisconsin regulations limit the offense of making false statements to prison staff to statements made “outside the complaint review system.” The inmate had no reason to fear filing a grievance about alleged retaliation. View "Schultz v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Maxwell was arrested after selling 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 2.8 grams of powder cocaine, and five ecstasy pills to a confidential informant. The arresting officer searched Maxwell and found two straws and a bag hidden in his underwear. The bag contained an off-white substance, which the officer weighed, “field-tested,” and concluded was crack cocaine. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory analyst who originally tested the substance seized from Maxwell retired before trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of his co-worker, who did not personally analyze the substance, but concluded that it contained crack cocaine after reviewing data generated by the original analyst. Maxwell did not object to this testimony and was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Maxwell failed to show plain error, given that the testimony was subject to cross-examination at trial. The court issued a limited remand for consideration under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Smego agreed to civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. During intake, he was seen by Mitchell, a dentist who found that 12 of his teeth had cavities. Throughout 2006, Smego’s cavities worsened and became painful, but he was not given a follow-up appointment. He made healthcare requests for unrelated medical issues, but not for his teeth. He claims that he believed requests were not necessary for problems already known to medical staff. During a chance encounter in 2007, Smego asked a dental hygienist who worked with Mitchell why he had never been called for the follow-up appointment. Smego, claims that she responded that the suction machine was inoperable and that Mitchell could not work on his teeth without it and warned that being a “pest” would not help him get an appointment. Smego saw Mitchell again 18 months after she told him about his cavities, but Mitchell repeatedly delayed treatment until 30 months after the first appointment. In Smego’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, stating that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that some of the defendants violated his constitutional rights. View "Smego v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Wright met with an individual who was secretly cooperating with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Chicago Police Department as a confidential informant and was wearing a wire. The CI told Wright that he had a customer, looking to buy cocaine. Wright said he was stocked up. The CI did not testify at trial, but the prosecution presented evidence that Wright admitted to stocking up drugs for sale. Wright was convicted of cocaine distribution and sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Wright’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the CI’s statements were admitted without live testimony. The statements, mostly confirmatory inquiries, were used to provide necessary context for Wright’s admissions, which does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court also rejected an argument that the court should have told the jury that it could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution because it did not call the informant to the stand. The primary purpose of the missing witness instruction is to address situations where a defendant was unfairly deprived of and opportunity to elicit favorable testimony; Wright failed to show that the CI would have given such helpful testimony. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. Smith fled on foot. When police captured him, they found him with a plastic bag containing 9.9 grams of crack. Two weeks later, Smith sold $60 worth of crack (0.3 grams) to a confidential police informant in a hand-to-hand transaction. He pleaded guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Given the amount of crack, Smith’s base offense level would have been 18, and his prior convictions would have placed him in criminal history category III. However two prior convictions for aggravated fleeing from police (a felony) qualified as crimes of violence, U.S.S.G.4B1.2(a), and Smith was sentenced, as a career offender, to 151 months in prison, the bottom of the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the nature of his offense and his personal characteristics made the sentence substantively unreasonable and that, because the career-offender guideline was not empirically based, but congressionally-mandated, it was not entitled to deference or a presumption of reasonableness. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law