Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Heron and his friend, Hamilton, worked as truck drivers. Hamilton invited Heron to accompany him on a trip, involving delivering furniture to San Diego, then picking up marijuana for delivery on their way east. They picked up a legitimate load in Las Vegas and returned to Phoenix, where a crew loaded marijuana. Heron was present, but did not personally load the boxes. The sleeper berth was packed with bags of marijuana and cocaine, so that the two took turns sleeping in the passenger seat in violation of 49 C.F.R. 395.1(g) (2). The DEA tracked the truck; a buyer in East St. Louis was actually a confidential informant. Local police stopped the truck after it made a turn without signaling. Hamilton was driving and consented to a K-9 search of the exterior. The dog alerted, leading to discovery of the drugs. Heron was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a substance containing marijuana and a substance containing cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a). The court imposed concurrent sentences of 108 months and 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution used a peremptory strike to remove a juror on the basis of religious commitment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the court abused its discretion in admitting testimony that Hamilton identified Heron as his “co-driver” during the traffic stop. View "United States v. Heron" on Justia Law

Officer Kermon charged Gutierrez with public intoxication and resisting arrest. According to Gutierrez, he was walking home from work, minding his own business, when Kermon, who never identified himself as a police officer, stopped him at gunpoint, pepper sprayed him, placed him in handcuffs, delivered gratuitous kicks to his torso, and uttered a racially derogatory slur. Officer Kermon says that Gutierrez was a belligerent drunkard, unsteady on his feet, who yelled at Kermon, and assumed an aggressive fighting stance. Gutierrez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Kermon violated his fourth amendment. The district court concluded that Kermon had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative detention but that a finding of qualified immunity was precluded genuine issues of material fact on the issue of probable cause. Because Kermon’s argument depends on a disputed fact, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction..Tinde View "Gutierrez v. Kermon" on Justia Law

On May 10, 2011, Harmon was indicted Harmon for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, attempting to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and using a telephone to facilitate a drug-trafficking crime. Harmon was detained pending trial. The court set trial for July 18, 2011. On June 30, the government filed its only motion for a continuance. Following a hearing, the court reset the trial to August 22. Defense counsel had indicated that he had scheduled a vacation in early August. The court explained that the prosecution needed a reasonable opportunity to investigate evidence about Harmon’s alleged consciousness of guilt, which could not have been obtained before his arrest, by reviewing 200 to 250 telephone calls Harmon had made while detained Convicted, Harmon was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning a speedy trial violation; that disclosure of his prior drug conviction deprived him of a fair trial; and that the district court erred in its fact finding at sentencing. View "United States v. Harmon" on Justia Law

Pulungan tried to acquire 100 Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescopes, for export to Saudi Arabia and transship to Indonesia. He did not secure an export license, but later claimed that he was buying small lots, not to avoid the license requirement, but to be to be unnoticed in an effort to avoid an embargo (which had been lifted two years earlier). Pulungan spent 23 months in prison for attempting to export defense materials without a license, 22 U.S.C. 2778, before the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that a license was required. Pulungan requested a certificate of innocence, 28 U.S.C. 2513, can be used to seek compensation, 28 U.S.C. 1495. The judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of Pulungan’s actual intent. A conclusion that the prosecution did not prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt is not a conclusion that the defendant is innocent in fact View "United States v. Pulungan" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of drug offenses, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, which the district court found to be the statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Simpson’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had furnished ineffective assistance, was rejects. Three years later he filed another collateral attack, which the district court rejected as lacking required appellate authorization. At the time of Simpson’s sentencing, either the jury or the judge could decide whether a defendant’s conduct met requirements for a mandatory minimum sentence. In 2013 the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot make that decision unless the defendant waives entitlement to a jury. Simpson argues that the decision entitles him to a second collateral attack because it establishes a new constitutional rule, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), and proposes another ineffective assistance attack, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and a claim based on the jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that section 2255(h)(2) applies only when the new rule has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the Supreme Court. View "Simpson v. United States" on Justia Law

Thompson, convicted of a gun crime based entirely on the testimony of Chicago police officers, claimed that the officers planted a gun in the vicinity of his stop and arrest to fabricate a case. While he was imprisoned, the State’s Attorney uncovered widespread corruption in the department, implicating the officers who testified against Thompson. His conviction was vacated. Thompson sued the arresting officers, alleging due-process violations under Brady v. Maryland and sued the city. During discovery, the defendants and other potential witnesses from the department invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thompson had to rely on his own testimony and the adverse inference from assertion of the Fifth Amendment. The court excluded much of Thompson’s proferred testimony from other victims of police misconduct and the guilty-plea testimony of officers who were convicted. The jury found one of the officers liable, only on the Brady claim. As damages for more than three years of wrongful imprisonment the jury awarded $15,000. Thompson challenged the evidentiary rulings and certain trial tactics by defense counsel that he claims were improper. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While none of the errors were prejudicial standing alone, their cumulative effect had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Thompson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Bey was convicted of conspiring to possess heroin with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, based on his involvement in a heroin transaction in which the buyer was a government informant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on an entrapment defense. Bey had abandoned that defense. Under the co-conspirator exclusion from the rule against hearsay, there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy to allow admission into evidence of out-of-court statements made by alleged co-conspirator. View "United States v. Bey" on Justia Law

Police saw Rabin carrying a holstered gun on his hip in public. He was handcuffed and detained for about 90 minutes while officers sought to confirm the validity of his carrying license. None of the detaining officers were familiar with Rabin’s unique license, carried primarily by private detectives and security officers. When it was confirmed that the license was legitimate, Rabin was released. Rabin sued the officers for unlawful arrest and excessive force. The district court denied the officers summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding the officers entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim, because even if they had known about the type of license, it would have been reasonable under clearly established law to detain Rabin while they verified its legitimacy. The length of Rabin’s detention was “unfortunate,” but was caused by the government’s failure to have an efficient system of license verification. One officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that unnecessary tightness of the handcuffs exacerbated Rabin’s preexisting medical conditions. Rabin only told that officer about his medical issues. View "Rabin v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Turley is serving a life sentence in an Illinois state prison. Between January 7, 2008, and October 4, 2010, administration 25 times placed the prison on lockdown, confining prisoners to their cells without yard time; the longest continuous lockdown was 81 days, for a total of 534 lockdown days, more than 50% of the period at issue. Turley brought Eighth Amendment claims and a Due Process claim, claiming that lockdowns were often imposed for non-penological purposes, such as isolated fights, rumors of a potential fight, or no reason at all. Turley claimed that he suffered injuries including irritable bowel syndrome, headaches, tinnitus, sleep deprivation, colon spasms, nosebleeds, weight loss and extreme stress; that there was of a conspiracy among prison officials and union employees to create a staff shortage, negotiate a pay raise, and allow staff to take vacation; and that his $10 monthly idle pay stipend was withheld during lockdowns without due process. Turley’s grievances were denied; he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Turley exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims, that those claims are not time-barred, and that they sufficiently state a claim. The Due Process claim was properly dismissed. View "Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to gun and drug offenses and was sentenced to 270 months in prison: 240 months for those offenses, with classification as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)), plus 30 months for violation of supervised release imposed for a previous drug offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence, finding error in making the sentence of 30 months consecutive and a clerical error. The 240-month sentence exceeded the applicable guidelines range of 188 to 235 months, and it was unclear whether the judge knew he was sentencing above the range. On remand, the judge imposed a sentence of 230 months, based solely on the gun and drug offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the remand required that the court “start from scratch.” View "United States v. Simms" on Justia Law