Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Five died after using heroin distributed by a narcotics trafficking organization; five defendants pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Because of the deaths, the prosecution requested a mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district court believed that it was required to impose the same penalty on each defendant under a theory of strict liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed three of the sentences and vacated two. A trial court must make specific factual findings to determine whether the relevant conduct of each defendant encompassed the distribution chain that caused a victim’s death before applying the 20-year penalty. Three defendants were found to be in the distribution chain that led to the deaths; the record supported those findings. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hill filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that the district court had erred in deeming him a career offender when calculating his sentence in 1999. The Seventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) forecloses resort to 2241, because Hill could have used section 2255 to present the same argument, if he had acted promptly after the decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Hill did not seek rehearing or Supreme Court review, but sought relief in the district court under F.R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the Seventh Circuit overlooked that he had earlier lost a 2255 motion The district court denied the motion, concluding that failure to apprise the court of important facts is not “excusable neglect,” permitting reopening of a judgment. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that 2241 may apply under specific circumstances when 2255 does not allow successive collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, reasoning that legal developments after a final judgment do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for a litigant who bypassed arguments on appeal. The court noted that Hill did not argue that he is in prison for an act that is not criminal; his sentence is within the range that would have prevailed had the judge not applied a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Rios" on Justia Law

Taylor, convicted of murder in Illinois state court, was sentenced to 35 years in prison. In his habeas corpus petition, Taylor claimed that his counsel operated with a conflict of interest by jointly representing him and his brother, Lowell, in simultaneous murder trials. He claimed that the conflict adversely affected his representation because his lawyer refused to call certain exculpatory witnesses, because they might implicate his brother in the murder. The Illinois Supreme Court denied relief, finding that Taylor’s interests did not conflict with those of his brother and relied upon a purported credibility finding by the trial court that any conflict did not adversely affect the performance of Taylor’s lawyer. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest between Taylor and Lowell adversely affected Taylor’s representation. The state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in holding that Taylor’s interest in presenting exculpatory witnesses did not conflict with his brother’s interest in preventing admission of inculpatory testimony and unreasonably determined that the trial court’s bare rejection of the claim must have constituted an implicit credibility finding concerning the motivation of the lawyer. View "Taylor v. Ground" on Justia Law

Vaughn was the leader of a heroin distribution conspiracy in Beloit, Wisconsin. Tips from heroin users led police to one of Vaughn’s distributors, who was arrested with 70 bags of heroin on his person. The distributor signed a plea agreement and agreed to testify against Vaughn and Vaughn’s other distributor, Lockhart. They were charged with conspiring to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. A jury convicted them on largely-circumstantial evidence. Vaughn was sentenced to 240 months and Lockhart to 72 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence. The district court properly concluded that a 350-page production detailing witness statements and surveillance activities was adequate to satisfy the need for a bill of particulars without being so voluminous that it placed an unreasonable burden on the defendants. View "United States v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Vitrano pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm while under a domestic abuse injunction, 922(g)(8)(B). The prosecution argued that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), he should have faced a minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment based on three prior “violent felony” convictions for escape and recklessly endangering safety. On remand, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vitrano moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing Fifth Amendment violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the court erred in sentencing him under ACCA. Vitrano claimed that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost due to his 1977 conviction for endangering safety. The prosecution determined that the certificate was forged. Vitrano was indicted for perjury and corrupt influence, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a); 1512(b)(1) & (c)(2). Instead of filing a reply, Vitrano sought leave to amend his 2255 motion, claiming that the earlier convictions were not violent felonies for ACCA purposes. The government argued that, not filing a reply to his initial 2255 filing, Vitrano had abandoned his claims. The district court denied Vitrano’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Vitrano v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011 Miller pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The prosecution contended that a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), was required because three of his prior convictions qualified as “violent felonies.” Miller did not dispute that his two burglary convictions qualified, but objected to inclusion of a Wisconsin conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Construing ACCA’s “residual clause,” the district court denied the objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the approach for evaluating prior convictions under the residual clause has changed. Mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not a violent felony under ACCA because mere possession does not fit with the more active crimes included in the statute; and not all instances of possession pose a risk of violence. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

FBI agents Freeman and Howell investigated the Hinds, who worked for Indiana criminal defense attorney Alexander, for bribery of witnesses, including Kirtz. They equipped Kirtz and Chrisp with recording devices for a meeting, during which Alexander stated that he did not know about Hinds’s bribery and would attempt to find out what was going on. Although Kirtz and Chrisp later confirmed that this meeting occurred and that they delivered the recordings, the agents never produced the recordings and claimed that the meeting never occurred. Months later, McKinney, who had a grudge against Alexander, became the new prosecutor. Alexander claims that McKinney conspired with Kirtz and Chrisp (then under investigation for participation in an arson ring) to destroy the recording and manufacture evidence against Alexander. Alexander was acquitted of bribery charges and filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the FBI, stating his intention to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. The FBI declined to act. Alexander filed suit, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, based on failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution and untimely filing of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Alexander alleged specific events that fell within the limitations period. View "Alexander v. United States" on Justia Law

Muratovic admitted to planning, with co-conspirators, robbery of a truck that he believed would carry drug money from Illinois to California, by following the truck and robbing it at a rest stop after a passenger exited. The co-conspirators would wear disguises, threaten the driver at gunpoint, and use violence if necessary. The co-conspirators unknowingly invited a police informant, wearing a wire, to participate. The crew met in a parking lot, carrying firearms for use in the robbery, traveled to obtain another gun, located their target, and began surveillance. Two co-conspirators went to get gas cans and extra gas. The target truck never left the parking lot and, thinking that its driver had spotted them, the crew left without robbing the truck. Muratovic did not dispute the facts nor the pre-sentence report and received a 90-month prison term for violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that there was no factual basis for Hobbs Act jurisdiction, for finding that he took a substantial step toward commission of the robbery, and that conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act is not a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Muratovic" on Justia Law

Loffredi’s securities brokerage firm offered investments in certificates of deposit, mutual funds, and Treasury bills. Instead of actually purchasing investments requested by customers, Loffredi diverted their money to his personal expenses and business debts. He fraudulently misappropriated about $2.8 million over four years. A customer alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to irregularities in his financial statements. After an investigation, Loffredi was charged with five counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. He pleaded guilty to one count. The judge applied a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense involving at least 10 victims and imposed a sentence of 78 months. The presentence report counted as victims each of the 14 defrauded customers whose funds Loffredi had misappropriated. Loffredi argued that the only victim of the offense was his broker-dealer parent firm, which had reimbursed the losses of 12 of the 14 customers (Loffredi reimbursed the other two). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Loffredi never asserted that his fraud was painless for his customers and rejecting his “all-or-nothing” defense that the customers cannot be victims if they were reimbursed. View "Unted States v. Loffredi" on Justia Law

Serrano pled guilty to attempted first degree murder and possession of cannabis in exchange for a total sentence of 15 years in prison. In an unrelated case, Villanueva pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a 25-year sentence. Each claims that the plea agreements did not mention supervised release even though Illinois imposes a mandatory three-year term of supervised release (MSR) on murder and attempted murder charges. At the time, Illinois law did not require listing MSR on the conviction and sentencing order. At both plea hearings, however, the state judges mentioned MSR and obtained the defendants’ understanding that the law imposed such a term. Illinois law now requires that the term of MSR be specified in the sentencing order. Serrano’s conviction became final in 2002; Villanueva’s conviction became final in 2004. The two claim to have learned of the MSR while in prison. After extensive proceedings, state courts denied their petitions for post-conviction relief, which argued that the state denied them the benefit of their plea bargains in violation of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied petitions for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Villanueva v. Anglin" on Justia Law