Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During a crack cocaine deal between a confidential informant and a known crack dealer (Blake), a concealed video and audio recording device captured Gulley, Blake’s driver, getting into the CI’s car and exchanging a bag of crack cocaine for $200. Charged with knowingly and intentionally distributing five or more grams of a mixture and substance containing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(B), Gulley argued that he did not “knowingly or intentionally” deliver a controlled substance. The prosecution presented testimony that Gulley admitted to driving Blake to a drug deal with the CI two days after the charged offense and Gulley’s admission that he knew Blake was a crack dealer, that he frequently drove Blake, and that he had made a previous “delivery” for Blake. There was evidence that crack cocaine, ecstasy, and a firearm were found at Blake’s stash house on the day the two were arrested. The district judge sentenced Gulley to 327 months in prison, reasoning that precedent prohibited retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The precedent was subsequently overturned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gulley’s conviction, rejecting challenges to admission of certain testimony and evidence, but vacated his sentence. View "United States v. Gulley" on Justia Law

Findlay and his uncle, Howey, live on adjacent lots. Findlay found a surveillance camcorder set up near the property line and called the Sheriff’s Office to file an abandoned property report. Howey had set up the camera because he suspected Findlay of trespass and vandalism. Deputy Lendermon responded. With video running, Findlay made comments suggesting he had trespassed. Lendermon decided to confiscate the memory chip containing the statements as evidence. The memory chip separated from the camera and fell to the floor. Findlay says Lendermon tackled him as he reached for the chip. Lendermon says he simply grabbed Findlay’s arm to prevent him from picking up the chip. Findlay sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive use of force. The district court denied Lendermon’s motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Findlay did not carry his burden of showing the violation of a clearly established right, so Lendermon is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Findlay v. Lendermon" on Justia Law

Richards was followed from the scene of a controlled drug buy conducted by an undercover officer and surveillance. Although the car did not commit any traffic violations, an officer stopped him, searched the car, and found 10 kilograms of cocaine in a backpack in the trunk. Richard claimed that the car belonged to his cousin, that he thought the backpack contained cash, and that he was the unwitting stooge of California drug dealers. The district judge denied his motion to suppress and his motion to exclude recorded phone calls in which Richard discussed unrelated drug activity; he was convicted of possession with intent to distribute. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the government improperly relied on the phone calls to argue propensity. View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officer Cates sexually assaulted Lemons while responding to her 911 call and was convicted of violating the woman’s civil rights while acting under color of law, 18 U.S.C. 242. Cates reported problems with his attorney. The district court delayed sentencing. Two months after appointment of new counsel and five months after the deadline for filing post-conviction motions, Cates’ new attorney requested an extension of time to file post-conviction motions. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Cates to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the circumstances did not warrant a finding of excusable neglect. View "United States v. Cate" on Justia Law

A former Illinois state prison inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2001, alleging that he was subjected to improper strip searches intended to humiliate him in retaliation for his grievances complaining about the earlier searches. Following a remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The trial judge put the burden of proof on the wrong party by instructing the jury that “to prevail on his claim of retaliation, the plaintiff must prove that the grievances … were the sole cause of the particular strip search.” View "Mays v. Springborn" on Justia Law

The federal government sought forfeiture of cash seized in searches of an apartment, vehicles, and storage units, possessed or occupied by Unsworth and Pillsbury, who were suspected of drug trafficking. The state court prosecution of the two collapsed after the court suppressed evidence. Unsworth and Pillsbury submitted, as permitted by Rule G(5)(a)(i), claims to the cash, signed under penalty of perjury, identifying the specific property and the claimant’s interest in the property. They moved to stay the forfeiture proceeding on the ground that it would undermine their right not to incriminate themselves in the pending state proceeding (18 U.S.C. 981(g)(2)). The district court denied the motion without explanation and required the claimants to respond to special interrogatories. They objected and refused to answer several, including one that asked for the sources of the cash and whether the cash was proceeds of sales of illegal drugs. The district judge struck their claims on the ground that, by failing to answer all the interrogatories, the claimants had failed to “establish” Article III jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that, at this stage, Article III jurisdiction need only be alleged, not proven, and that the government had given no reason for opposing a stay. View "United States v. Funds in the amount of $574,840" on Justia Law

Natale,a vascular surgeon, was compensated by Medicare for repairing a patient’s aortic aneurysm. Another doctor reviewed the post-surgical CT scan, which did not match the procedure Natale described in his operative reports. After an investigation, Natale was indicted for health care fraud related to his Medicare billing, mail fraud, and false statements related to health care. A jury acquitted Natale on the fraud counts but convicted him of making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1035. The trial court used jury instructions that seemingly permitted conviction for false statements completely unrelated to Medicare reimbursement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the error harmless, but clarified that under the statute, even conviction for false statements made in connection with items or services still must relate to a “matter involving a health care benefit program.” View "United States v. Natale" on Justia Law

Indiana police recovered $ 574,840, cash in a search of the home of Johnson, a suspected drug dealer, and turned the money over to the federal government. The Justice Department filed forfeiture proceedings under 18 U.S.C. 983(a)), claiming that the cash was proceeds of illegal drug activity, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). The state constitution requires that criminal fines and all forfeitures be paid to the Common School Fund, rather than law enforcement. By allowing the federal government to conduct civil forfeiture, local law enforcement can attempt to receive a share of the forfeited proceeds and avoid payment to the Fund. Johnson filed a claim of ownership, which the district judge dismissed as noncompliant with Rule G(5)(a)(i). The Rule requires that the claim be signed under penalty of perjury, served on the government, and “identify the specific property claimed ... and state the claimant’s interest in the property,” but the judge held that the claimant must state “how he obtained possession of the currency … the date of receipt, the place of the receipt, and a description of the transaction which generated the currency.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that the claim may be frivolous, but met the requirements of the Rule. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Munoz pled guilty to distributing and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, but fled to Mexico before sentencing. After five years he was found and extradited. The district court sentenced him to 181 months, which was below the advisory sentencing guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting arguments that the prosecution breached the plea agreement by advocating a higher base offense level than agreed-to in the plea agreement and recommending a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range rather than at the bottom. The court stated that Munoz materially breached an implied term of the plea agreement, so that the prosecution could treat the plea agreement as rescinded. View "United States v. Munoz" on Justia Law

The defendant’s sentence, under the heading “additional imprisonment terms,” states that the “defendant is to be turned over to the proper immigration authorities for deportation proceedings upon completion of term of incarceration. If deported, defendant is to remain outside the United States and is not to return without the written consent of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.” The Seventh Circuit struck the provision as unauthorized. Only an immigration judge may order removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a)(3), unless the prosecutor and immigration officials request that the district judge hold a removal hearing, a request not made in this case. A district judge may order, as a condition of supervised release, that a defendant be turned over to immigration officials, but if there is no order of supervised release, as here, imposition of such a condition is ultra vires. The court noted that there is no need for the “added measure” in this case, because the defendant is an aggravated felon. An aggravated felon who is an alien is removable upon the completion of his prison sentence, removal proceedings must be begun before the end of his prison term, and he must be detained until completion, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1)(B), 1228(a)(1)-(2), (3)(A). View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law