Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Weaver sold methamphetamine on credit to two buyers, who paid off their debts by selling the drugs to their own customers. Weaver pleaded guilty to conspiring with those buyers to possess and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and the district court sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the guidelines range, assessing a 3-level upward adjustment for his perceived leadership role as a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that there was no evidence that Weaver managed or supervised his buyers or any other participant. Although he determined how much and how often they got drugs, Weaver did not control to whom or at what price the others sold the drugs Weaver fronted. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Since entering the U.S. from Mexico in 1993, Garcia-Segura has had arrests. He was first removed in 2003 after serving two years in jail for possessing cocaine. Less than two months later, he was arrested in the U.S. for delivering cocaine to an undercover officer. After serving part of his nine-year prison sentence, he was removed a second time in 2007 but returned within three days. In 2009, he encountered immigration officials while incarcerated on charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was charged with unauthorized presence in the U.S. after removal, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). He pleaded guilty and sought a 19-month reduction to account for time he served in county jail after immigration officials learned of his illegal presence but before he was charged. He argued that, had the government charged him when immigration officials first discovered him, he would have received concurrent sentences. The government responded that concurrent sentences would have been inappropriate because the state crimes were unrelated to the illegal-reentry and that his recidivism merited a more severe sentence. The district court imposed a sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment, within the guideline range of 77 to 96 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Segura" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner serving a term for unarmed robbery and confined in a two-person cell in the prison’s segregation unit because of a fight he’d had with another inmate, strangled his cellmate. He was convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he killed in “the heat of passion” and should have been convicted only of voluntary manslaughter. The jury had to find malice beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of murder, so evidence that he acted in the heat of passion and therefore without malice would, if believed, have required the jury to acquit him of the charge of murder. The heat of passion “defense” just puts the government to its proof. View "United States v. Delaney" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Farmer of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a),(d), and 2, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Several days after the trial, an alternate juror contacted Farmer’s counsel and said that other jurors had made statements during the prosecution’s case indicating that they had discussed the evidence and had already decided Farmer was guilty, all before jury deliberations could have properly begun. Farmer moved for a new trial, arguing that this premature deliberation prejudiced her and violated her right to a fair trial. The district court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of 141 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.The information, which did not indicate any external influence, came to the attention of the court only after the verdict was returned, when no corrective action could be taken and any inquiry into the effects of the comments would have run into Rule 606(b)’s bar on such inquiry. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

While proceeding to the Stateville prison cafeteria, Navejar spoke to other inmates in their cells. Officer Iyiola ordered him to get out of the line because prison rules forbid inmates from stopping to speak to other inmates. Navejar disobeyed, became belligerent, and punched Iyiola. Other guards wrestled Navejar to the ground where he was handcuffed. Navejar claims that guards kicked him in the forehead, stomped his head against the ground, pepper-sprayed him, dragged him along the floor, and left him alone for a half-hour, while he screamed in pain, before he was allowed to wash off the pepper spray. The next morning a guard brought Navejar to Stateville’s health care unit, where nurses examined him. Before a doctor could provide attention, a guard escorted Navejar out, explaining that he was being transferred to Pontiac. At Pontiac, Navejar was examined by a physician, who concluded that he had suffered only bruises and scratches. In Navejar’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied motions to recruit counsel and entered summary judgment for the guards on Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the court applied the wrong legal standard to Navejar’s motion and that lack of counsel prejudiced him. View "Navejar v. Iyiola" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2003, Schmitz convinced financial institutions and others to lend him money, ostensibly for real estate development, by stating that he was the beneficiary of a multi-million dollar trust fund whose assets were available as collateral. There was no trust; Schmitz concocted a trail of paper and digital documents, even creating a phony financial services firm (with a website and virtual office space), and filing suit against fictitious employees of the (non-existent) firm claiming mishandling of the trust. Schmitz obtained more than $6 million from seven banks and two additional lenders. He used about half to pay off previous lenders, and the rest for personal expenses. Schmitz pleaded guilty to mail fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Because Schmitz began the charged fraud in 2003, while on supervised release in connection with a prior state conviction, the advisory Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months in prison. The court imposed an 87-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that “factor creep” in the Guidelines has inflated beyond reason the sentencing range for white collar frauds, particularly for someone of Schmitz’s age (60) and health and concerning the timespan of the fraud. View "United States v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Harris was a registered representative with an affiliated broker of MetLife and sold insurance, annuities, and other financial products. Investigations by the Illinois Securities Division, MetLife, and the IRS revealed that for almost eight years, Harris had been diverting client funds, using deposit and accounting methods that substantially departed from MetLife’s standard practices. She manipulated software to generate account summaries that falsely displayed the investments that her clients intended to purchase. Harris received $10,938,986.58 in client funds from more than 50 but fewer than 250 clients, reinvested $4,055,945.73 on the clients’ behalf, and used the balance for personal purposes. MetLife settled with clients who suffered a loss, paying more than $7 million. Harris pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The court’s sentencing calculation included addition of 18 offense levels for a loss in excess of $2.5 million, four levels for the number of victims, two levels for sophisticated means, for a total offense level of 35. The final guideline range was 168 to 210 months; the court sentenced her to 210 months in prison plus $6,812,764.98 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred in counting married couples as two separate victims. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Earl was convicted of intentional homicide, jailed, and placed for five days onto “suicide watch” segregation where he was dressed in a “suicide-proof gown,” kept in continuous light for 24 hours, and constantly monitored. The jail says that suicide watch is required of every inmate convicted of a serious felony until he is examined by a mental-health expert. Earl claims that he was placed on suicide watch as punishment after an officer relayed false information that he had threatened other guards. Earl claimed an allergic reaction to the special gown and received medical attention. After a mental-health worker recommended that Earl be discharged from suicide watch, Earl was placed for 12 days in administrative segregation, apparently as punishment for initially refusing to wear the suicide gown, and afterwards was transferred to a Wisconsin state prison. Two years later Earl returned to the jail for a court appearance and again was housed in segregation. In his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Earl’s placement in segregation was too short to deprive him of a liberty interest and that conditions were not “unusually harsh.” Earl did not show delay in responding to his claim of allergic reaction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Earl v. Racine Cnty. Jail" on Justia Law

Martin made images and videos depicting child pornography available on a file-sharing network. A search of his home uncovered hundreds more images and several videos of child pornography on computers. Martin pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The presentence report calculated that sentencing guidelines yielded a range of 121 to 151 months. Given the ten-year statutory maximum sentence, Martin’s effective guidelines range was 120 months, U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(c)(1). The PSR noted that Martin had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, dysthymia, alcohol and marijuana dependency, and polysubstance abuse, and had received a “possible, but doubtful” diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Martin had engaged in self-mutilation, had been hospitalized for mood disorders, and had attempted suicide, but was not receiving medication or treatment because he could not afford it. Martin did not object to the calculations, but argued that: his personal characteristics indicate a low likelihood of recidivism; the guidelines produce excessive sentences in possession cases: his contribution to the total harm of child pornography was negligible; and a shorter sentence was necessary to avoid disparities. The district court sentenced Martin to 120 months’ imprisonment, explaining that child-pornography offenders “are not rational thinkers in the first place.” The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, because the court failed to address arguments concerning Martin’s personal characteristics and the goals of sentencing. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Ramos was arrested in 2007 and charged with residential burglary. After an Illinois state court acquitted him of that charge, he brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Chicago and five police officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in conducting a false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserting state law claims for malicious prosecution and indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the section 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ramos’ state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on a report of a burglary and a description of the suspect, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was ongoing, sufficient to justify a “Terry” stop. Ramos’ failure to produce a valid driver’s license provided probable cause for his arrest. View "Ramos v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law