Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gomez was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to concurrent 84-month terms. A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning admission of evidence of his possession of cocaine weeks after the charged crimes, and that the judge did not specify his perjurious statements when increasing his sentencing range for obstruction of justice. The court later considered the case en banc to clarify the framework for admitting other-act evidence and held that the circuit’s four- part test should be replaced by an approach that tracks the Rules of Evidence. The extent to which a proffered “other crime, wrong, or act” is close in time and similar to the conduct at issue in the case may have a bearing on its relevance, but the importance of testing for similarity and recency will depend on the specific purpose for which the other-act evidence is offered. The proponent of the other-act evidence should address its relevance directly, without an artificial checklist. Rule 404(b) allows the use of other-act evidence only when its admission is supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning. A trial court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose; these questions will help identify evidence that serves no permissible purpose. Applying a rules-based framework, the court concluded that the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom should not have been admitted, but that the error was harmless, and affirmed. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

When purchasing a house, the defendants submitted loan documents containing false incomes and bank statements, and failed to disclose that husband’s company was selling and his wife was buying. The company received $750,000 and rebated money paid above that amount to husband. The $1 million in loans they received resulted in $250,000 extra that was not disclosed as going to the couple. They were able to sell the house four months later for the same inflated amount, without raising any concerns. They failed to disclose on the HUD-1 forms in the second transaction that they would be giving the buyer kickbacks. The buyer received $1,090,573.06 in loans, but defaulted without making a payment. The lender eventually sold the house for $487,500. Defendants were convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and aiding and abetting wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2. The Presentence Investigation Report determined that the lender’s loss was $603,073.06 and recommended a 14-point enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions but remanded for explanation of why the loss was “reasonably foreseeable” and why the sentencing enhancement was proper. Involvement in a fraudulent scheme does not necessarily mean it was reasonably foreseeable that all the subsequent economic damages would occur; there was no evidence that defendants knew they were selling to what turned out to be a fictional buyer. View "United States v. Domnenko" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department and the FBI conducted an investigation of a suspected cocaine-distribution organization, employing various investigative techniques, including interviews of confidential informants and suspects, surveillance, staged or controlled drug purchases, and consensual (on one side) recording of telephone conversations. The investigation also involved court-authorized pen registers of telephone traffic, wiretaps of telephone conversations, and interdiction stops of selected individuals, which were often initiated on the basis of information gleaned from the wiretaps. In January 2010, a series of searches and arrests were effectuated and 20 defendants, including Mockabee, Jones, Drake, and Young, were indicted. Mockabee pleaded guilty, the other three were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Jones, Drake, and Young, but vacated the sentences of Mockabee, Jones, and Drake and remanded for resentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat 2372. The court rejected Jones’s challenges to the warrant and to the sufficiency of the evidence; Drake’s challenges to admission of a detective’s opinion testimony interpreting drug code language, restrictions on her cross-examination of that detective Clark, claimed prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal argument; and Young’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Mockabee" on Justia Law

Defendants, including Adame were charged with drug conspiracy and cocaine distribution. Adame was also charged with illegal reentry of a previously deported alien following conviction for an aggravated felony. With a written plea agreement under FRCP 11(c)(1)(C), Adame sought to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge; the parties stipulated to a base offense level of 38. The government agreed not to file an information under 21 U.S.C. 851, which would have increased the mandatory minimum sentence due to a prior felony drug conviction. The guidelines range was 188-235 months; the parties agreed to a sentence of 204 months as appropriate. At sentencing, Adame denied that he personally delivered more than 150 kilograms of cocaine, and objected to a fact underlying an adjustment for his aggravated role. The prosecutor argued that this constituted breach of the agreement. At the end of the hearing, Adame asked whether he could abandon his objections and proceed with sentencing under the agreement, but the court denied his request. The judge reset a trial date; the grand jury later returned a second superseding indictment against Adame. Before the trial date, Adame filed an amended "Renewed Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty.” Rather than indicating a desire to enter a guilty plea to the new indictment, it stated that Adame did not “wish to withdraw" his plea and requested a sentencing hearing. At a hearing, the judge indicated substantial confusion about the case, proceeded through a Rule 11 colloquy, later indicated that she “refused to accept his plea,” but later explained the implications of a plea. Asked how he pleaded, Adame said “guilty.” The court found him guilty of two counts and sentenced him to 300 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to allow Adame to maintain his guilty plea and be sentenced under the terms of the parties’ original written plea agreement. View "United States v. Adame-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Fletcher pled guilty to one count of producing, two counts of receiving, and two counts of possessing child pornography, over a seven-year period. The district court sentenced him to a 30-year term of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. Because his crimes spanned years during which the guidelines for child pornography offenses underwent significant changes, his sentencing posed complex calculations and raised potential constitutional problems. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any errors the court made in calculating the guidelines sentence for Fletcher were harmless. View "United States v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

In 2007, Coleman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 121.989 grams of crack cocaine, which subjected him to a statutory imprisonment range of five to 40 years. With past convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and for sexual assault of a child, the court determined that he was a career offender, increased the sentencing range to 188-235 months, and imposed a sentence of 225 months. Subsequently, the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. United States, held that the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition encompasses the types of crimes that categorically involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct. The Seventh Circuit then held, pursuant to Begay, that conviction for sexual assault under the relevant Wisconsin statute, which prohibits “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years,” is not a “crime of violence” under the career offender designation because it is a strict liability offense. The district court recalculated, excluding that career offender designation and finding that a reduction in the base offense level was appropriate because the Guidelines range for the drug offense had been lowered. The court sentenced Coleman to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, with instructions to reinstate the conviction and sentence. Error in applying the career offender provision in determining the advisory Guidelines range is not cognizable in a section 2255 motion. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

King was in custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, King was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and post-remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct, but defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. The court subsequently clarified that the reversal applied only to the individual defendants, not the county. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Socha was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide in 2002. He simultaneously pursued direct appeal and state post-conviction relief. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed; the state supreme court denied review in 2007. Socha did not pursue certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from the date his conviction became final to file his federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). For a state prisoner who does not seek collateral relief, the year runs from the date when the judgment becomes final by expiration of the time for seeking direct review, including the period during which the prisoner is pursuing certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. AEDPA suspends the running of that one year for state prisoners who seek state collateral relief, but only for the period when the state courts are considering the case, not including time during which certiorari may be sought. Socha’s petition was untimely. After a remand, the district court denied equitable tolling, finding that Socha had not been diligent in pursuing his rights and that the state had not placed intentional barriers in the way of his petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the unusual obstacles that confronted Socha, his repeated attempts to obtain his record and comply with the deadline, and the court’s initial grant of an extension. View "Socha v. Haine" on Justia Law

Thomas and Chapman were part of a scheme to fleece real estate lenders by concocting multiple false sales of the same homes and using the loan proceeds from the later transactions to pay off the earlier lenders. They were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud. Thomas was also convicted of aggravated identity theft for using an investor’s identity without permission to craft a phony sale of a home that the victim never owned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting: challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; a claim by Thomas that there was no proof that he created or used the falsified documents at issue; Chapman’s claim that there was no evidence that he was the Lamar Chapman identified by the evidence, because no courtroom witness testified to that effect; Chapman’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the government dropped a co-defendant from the indictment; and a claim that the government failed to turn over unspecified exculpatory evidence. The court noted testimony from several victims, an FBI investigator, an auditor, and an indicted co-defendant who had already pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Walton was a passenger in a rented Suburban driven by Smoot, when they were pulled over by an Illinois state trooper. According to the trooper, the two were nervous and gave an implausible description of their travel plans. The trooper decided to extend the stop for 20 minutes so that a police canine could smell around the car. The dog allegedly alerted. Troopers searched the vehicle and found seven kilograms of cocaine. At the time, Walton was on parole in Kentucky, with a condition that he could not leave that state without permission. He was subject to searches by his parole officer. Walton was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He moved to suppress the narcotics, arguing that he was subject to search only by his parole officer, not by a law-enforcement officer who was ignorant of his parole status, and offering evidence that his license was valid.. The district court denied the motion, finding that Walton lacked a subjective expectation of privacy because he knew he was in violation of his parole and had rented the vehicle without a valid license, in violation of the rental agreement. Walton entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Walton’s alleged illegal acts did not deprive him the opportunity to vindicate his privacy interests against a government search and seizure of his rental vehicle. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law