Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, defendant was sentenced to 168 months of incarceration, applying a relatively recent sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considering the frequency and significance of the illicit activities conducted on the premises, application of the enhancement was clearly warranted; the judge did not improperly consider the defendant’s personal characteristics. View "United States v. Flores-Olague" on Justia Law

Parker was employed as a bank teller, assigned to reconcile temporary checks to temporary check issuance forms. Temporary checks were blank checks kept behind the counter for customer use. Investigation of a 2006 robbery at the branch led to the allegation that Parker stole eight temporary checks, drawn on the accounts of four customers, and cashed them for a total of $76,450. Some of the funds were returned, the actual loss to the Bank was approximately $49,890. Parker was represented by four different appointed counsel and eventually proceeded pro se; in 2011, the district court ordered a competency evaluation. Although represented by counsel, Parker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to dismiss on several grounds, including an alleged speedy trial violation. More than 18 months after her arraignment, Parker’s jury trial commenced. Convicted of three counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and of embezzlement by a bank employee, 18 U.S.C. 656, she was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, including an enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The district court’s comments did not clarify whether it found that Parker’s denial of involvement in the scheme was willful. View "USA v. Ruby Parker" on Justia Law

Davenport showed his gun to his friends at a bar. A bar employee observed him and called the police, and Davenport, a felon on probation, was arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 192 months’ imprisonment. Davenport filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. In challenging the voluntariness of his plea, Davenport could not meet the stringent plain-error standard on the record before us. The district court ensured that he understood the charge against him, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), the penalties he faced (from 15 years to life in prison, a fine of up to $250,000, and up to 5 years of supervised release), id. at (H)-(M), and the various trial and appellate rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The court’s single omission from the list of waived rights was Davenport’s right to testify if he went to trial, but such an oversight does not constitute plain error unless the error actually renders the defendant’s conviction unjust. View "United States v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The defendant was a member of a six-man gang of thieves that stole trucks and sold the cargoes to fences. The district court ruled that he was a leader or organizer and increased his base offense level by four levels, raising the guidelines range from 41 to 51 months to 63 to 78 months for conspiring to transport, and transporting, stolen motor vehicles and goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 371, 312, 2314. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 58 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant was a “mere manager or supervisor.” The defendant used his information about what the fences would buy to direct the other members. The fences paid him for the cargoes and he split the money, acting as a paymaster and as a recruiter. Without him or someone in his position the gang would have fallen apart. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, an assault on an officer, and a four-hour standoff at a hotel, Brown was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by an armed career criminal, bank robbery, interference with interstate commerce by robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Brown pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e) without a plea agreement and moved to continue the remaining counts of the indictment until after his sentencing on the firearm possession charge. Prior to sentencing, Brown objected to four factual representations contained in his Presentence Investigation Report and objected to the PSR’s application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight. The district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 400 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge articulated her view of the disputed facts and explained how they impacted her ultimate sentencing determination. Taken together, the undisputed facts surrounding Brown’s flight demonstrate that Brown “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person” when he fled from law enforcement on the day of his arrest, U.S.S.G. 3C1.2. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Federal agents and local police executed a search warrant at Williams’ residence and found five kilograms of marijuana, a handgun, and several scales. Williams moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid because officers presented the warrant judge with an affidavit that contained false statements and misleading omissions made with at least reckless disregard for the truth. The district court held a Franks hearing and found that the officers did not recklessly disregard the truth, and that even if they had, once the errors were removed and the omitted material included, probable cause would have remained for a search warrant to issue. Williams was convicted of being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the police were rushing to draft an application and hastily omitted both favorable and unfavorable evidence from the affidavit. The court particularly noted omission of the information from monitored calls involving Williams that was “clearly sufficient to establish probable cause.” That omission provides a reasonable basis to believe that the police did not intend to mislead. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Elkhart police responded to a report of gunfire at an apartment and were greeted at the door by an obviously intoxicated Bloch. The officers told Bloch to step outside while they checked to see if anyone was injured. The apartment belonged to Bloch’s girlfriend, who was also told to wait outside. There were no gunshot victims, but the officers located a loaded Glock handgun and an assault rifle in plain view. As the officers removed the firearms, Bloch protested that the guns were his and demanded their return. Bloch is a felon and also has a conviction for a domestic-violence misdemeanor, making his firearm possession a federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), (g)(9). While in jail awaiting trial, he told a fellow inmate that the police found his Glock and SKS rifle at his girlfriend’s apartment and that he should have hidden them better. The district court imposed consecutive sentences of 120 months and 18 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing. The evidence was sufficient to prove possession, but a single incident of firearm possession can yield only one conviction under section 922(g), no matter how many disqualified classes the defendant belongs to or how many firearms he possessed. View "Unted States v. Bloch" on Justia Law

From 2005 to 2008, Collins obtained drugs from the Flores twins in Mexico. They would contact their couriers, who would deliver 20-50 kilograms of cocaine to Collins in the Chicago area, often on “credit.” Collins would sell it to his “crew” at a profit of approximately $1,500 per kilogram. The crew sold the cocaine on the streets. In 2008 the Flores twins agreed to cooperate with the Drug Enforcement Administration. As a result, Collins was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. At trial, the government was allowed to play Flores’ taped conversations with Collins and to use the testimony of Officer Coleman regarding the “coded drug-dealing language” on the tapes. Collins did not object to the testimony’s admissibility at the time. Convicted, Collins was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, called for a term of 360 months to life, with an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 because the judge determined that Collins’ conduct in the conspiracy qualified him as a “manager or supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

In 1996, Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court classified Brown as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Brown filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion arguing that “counsel was ineffective for failure to object to his sentencing as a career offender which resulted in his sentence being a minimum of 360 months instead of between 262 and 327 months.” The district court rejected this argument. The Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Now incarcerated in Indiana, Brown filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that under the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. U.S., his Delaware conviction for Arson in the Third Degree did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the savings clause in 2255(e) requires a claim of actual innocence directed to the conviction, not merely the sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to a sentence are not categorically barred under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Under Begay, Brown’s prior conviction does not qualify as “generic” arson under the Guidelines’ enumerated crimes clause, nor is it covered by the residual clause. View "Brown v. Lockett" on Justia Law

In 2002, Roux moved in with Roberta and her daughters, seven to 14 years old. In 2003, CC, reported that Roux was sexually molesting her. Although the Illinois DCFS determined the charge to be unfounded, CC was removed from the household. Roux began molesting nine-year-old EV. . Roux acknowledged the abuse to Roberta in 2008 and Roberta evicted him. Roux returned and again began abusing EV. EV told school officials and the police that Roux had taken sexually explicit photographs. Investigators seized a computer and digital cameras and recovered deleted images, including sexually explicit photographs of EV and photographs of a man’s penis. No male face was visible. Roux was convicted of knowingly employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct, using interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Roux was sentenced to 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admission of testimony about sexual abuse of EV’s sisters and of mug shots reflecting that Roux was heavier when arrested than at trial and based on the prosecutor’s reference to “jail phone calls” and, while cross-examining Roux, asking about records and witnesses that might corroborate his testimony but which had not been produced. View "United States v. Roux" on Justia Law