Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Goodwin pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to register and update a registration as a sex offender, under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which makes it a felony for a sex offender knowingly to fail to register following an interstate move, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). He was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release, subject to 10 special conditions. Goodwin claimed that the relevant SORNA provision is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; that the district court committed plain error by miscalculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for supervised release and then imposing a sentence within that miscalculated range; and challenges four conditions of his supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but vacated the sentence, noting erroneous calculation of the advisory Guidelines range and the imposition of special conditions without explanation by the district court. View "United State v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Reynolds and seven others drove to Gary, Indiana, and ambushed Russell, a marijuana dealer, outside his house. Russell turned over $15,000. Reynolds and the others beat and cut Russell, then tied him up, demanding more money or drugs. To create an opportunity for escape, Russell proposed that he take them to a cache of marijuana at a Chicago garage. Before they reached the garage, Russell convinced the men to let him drive so that the garage employees would not become suspicious. While held at gunpoint, Russell opened his door and dove onto the pavement. The assailants fled, but were arrested after Russell reported the crime. Russell and the other defendants identified Reynolds as the group’s leader. Reynolds insisted that he departed before the others and had not known of the plan to take Russell to Chicago. Convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and brandishing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), Reynolds’s guidelines range was life imprisonment plus seven years for the firearm conviction. Reynolds had a four-level increase for his role as leader, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), and a six-level increase for a ransom demand. The Seventh Circuit upheld the leadership adjustment, but held that section 2A4.1(b)(1) requires that the ransom demand be “made” to a third party. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Loera was a passenger in a car stopped for traffic violations. The driver consented to a search and the police found cocaine. Arrested, Loera was read his Miranda rights and refused to sign a waiver. Loera stated that he knew nothing about the cocaine; he had been asked to deliver the car. He offered to assist in apprehending intended recipients of the drugs. On his attorney’s motion, the judge suppressed statements made after a request for counsel, but did not suppress all post-arrest statements, nor rule that Loera had actually requested a lawyer. The court dismissed without prejudice, for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). After reindictment, Loera's attorney moved to suppress all the statements made after his arrest. The court ruled that Loera had never asked for a lawyer. Loera was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Loera then moved to aside his conviction, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective, 28 U.S.C. 2255, for failing to argue that the first ruling on suppression should be binding at trial and for failing to argue that the delay violated both the Speedy Trial Act and the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, so that dismissal should have been with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Loera v. Unted States" on Justia Law

Jacob was convicted of selling an unregistered security, 15 U.S.C. 77e(a), and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment and $241,630.95 in restitution. He was granted permission to travel to Australia two weeks after sentencing. He had been traveling to Australia for work while on bond before sentencing, had returned to be sentenced, and pledged to earn additional money to pay restitution. Five days after he was to report, the probation office informed the court that Jacob had failed to surrender as ordered, and his attorney suggested that he may have fled the country. The government then moved to dismiss Jacob’s pending appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Jacob failed to respond to his attorney’s motion to withdraw, missed his deadline to file an opening brief, sent the court a rambling email arguing the merits of his appeal, and told his probation officer that he had no intention of returning to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. View "United States v. Jacob" on Justia Law

Tucker was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), the use of which resulted in death, and sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment. During the trial, the prosecutor made references to the devastating effects of heroin and to possible its impacts on members of the jury, the criminal backgrounds of Tucker’s coconspirators, the plea agreements made by coconspirators “with the judge,” and the consistency of statements by coconspirators outside trial. Tucker’s trial counsel did not object to these statements. The jury also heard from the lead investigator on the case, Officer Baranek, describing how his investigation of Tucker unfolded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and a challenge to the use of Officer Baranek as a “dual capacity” witness, without giving the jury any guidance on how to properly evaluate such testimony. A “dual capacity” witness weaves fact and expert opinion testimony together and the prosecutor did lay a foundation for Officer Baranek’s expertise. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican native, first entered the U.S. illegally before June 1988. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, auto theft, attempting to pass a fraudulent check, selling cocaine, and forgeries, and was deported in 1992. In 1994, he burglarized Nebraska construction companies. He was deported again in 1999. By 2005, defendant had returned and was convicted of burglarizing companies, stealing payroll checks, and fraudulently cashing checks. He was deported for the third time in 2008. In 2010 defendant stole blank checks from Illinois and Iowa businesses. Three banks cashed checks, losing more than $42,000. Defendant was charged with unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; conspiracy to utter forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 371; and uttering forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 513(a). Defendant pleaded guilty unlawful reentry and to three bank fraud counts,. The district court sentenced him to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Neither party objected to the sentencing reports at the time, but both agree that the sentence was based on an improper U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range and that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Tovar-Pina" on Justia Law

Kamlager was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and use of a dangerous weapon in the death of his girlfriend, Wis. Stat. 940.01(1)(a), and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for extended supervision. He was also convicted of hiding a corpse and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After exhausting postconviction remedies, Kamlager sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his writ of habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing as “harmless error” the admission of statements Kamlager made to officers after he requested to see counsel. Given the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict even if the tainted evidence had been suppressed. View "Kamlager v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In 2005 Smith was charged with impersonating a police officer and was detained in the Sangamon County Detention Facility pending trial. Because he had a parole hold and a history of problems during a prior detention, Smith was housed in a maximum-security cellblock. While there, he was severely beaten by another inmate who was awaiting trial on armed-robbery and aggravated-battery charges. Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that the Department’s approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement ignores serious risks to inmate safety by failing to separate “nonviolent” from “violent” inmates with assaultive tendencies. A magistrate entered summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To avoid summary judgment, Smith needed evidence that the jail’s security classification policy systematically fails to address obvious risks to inmate safety. He had no such evidence. View "Smith v. Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Collins fled police officers by car and then by foot after he was stopped for speeding. An officer kicked Collins repeatedly and dosed him with pepper spray, but Collins did not stop resisting until another officer deployed his Taser. Afterward, the officers discovered a bag containing crack and powder cocaine that Collins had discarded during the foot chase, and a wad of cash in his pocket. The district court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that use of excessive force during an arrest is not a basis for suppressing evidence and that the drugs and money were not seized as a result of the alleged use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Days after a widely-publicized threat by a Florida pastor to burn 200 copies of the Quran on the 2010 anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Conaway posted on Facebook his plans to burn the “holy quaran” and invited people to witness the event at his home address. Conaway then began making phone calls to an imam and government officials, repeating his threats to burn the Quran and threatening other violent acts. These calls culminated in a standoff at Conaway’s home, with response by more than 12 agencies and evacuation of the street. His threats, including a promise blow up the entire block, were bogus; a device strapped to his chest held squares of putty, not explosive C-4. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 60 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to making false threats to detonate an explosive device, 18 U.S.C. 1038(a)(1), and influencing a federal official by threat, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court “simply concluded that it was appropriate to assign more weight to the extraordinary nature of the crime and the need to protect the public” from Conaway’s escalating pattern of menacing behavior than to Conway’s claims of mental illness. View "United States v. Conaway" on Justia Law