Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Stitts was convicted of murder in Indiana state court and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Stitts claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, because, before deciding not to present an alibi defense, he only interviewed one alibi witness, Stitts’s father, unreasonably failing to investigate whether there might be more. The state court found that such a limited investigation was sufficient under Strickland. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to state court for a factual determination of the amount of investigation actually conducted. Stitts’s alibi was that he was at a nightclub, where there could be any number of potential alibi witnesses, so failure to explore that possibility would be unreasonable. The state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no prejudice, because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the shaky testimony of two witnesses which could have been neutralized by alibi witness testimony. View "Stitts v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Zitt and Wampler were charged in a multi-count, multi-defendant indictment alleging a heroin conspiracy and substantive counts of distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Zitt was convicted after a jury trial of conspiring to distribute, and distributing, heroin. Wampler pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed consolidated appeals. A statement, by a witness, that he and Zitt were in jail together, was not so prejudicial or inflammatory as to deny Zitt a fair trial. The court granted an Anders motion to withdraw by Wampler’s appointed lawyer noting that Wampler waived his right to appeal as a condition of his plea agreement. View "United States v. Zitt" on Justia Law

Annoreno was an administrator of an internet chat room called “Kiddypics & Kiddyvids,” on which users broadcast live videos of people sexually abusing young children, including infants. The chat room allowed users to interact and trade child pornography through “peer-to-peer” file sharing. Big Daddy, another user, broadcast his molestations of four children live to other users. Big Daddy eventually cooperated with investigators and testified at Annoreno’s sentencing hearing that he watched Annoreno molest a child, then no more than one year old, about five times. Investigators identified Annoreno sufficiently to get a warrant for computers in the home Annoreno shared with his mother and daughter. Investigators found more than 57 computer files containing child pornography. Annoreno confessed and helped identify other users. While in custody, Annoreno offered to pay another inmate to procure child pornography for him. Other inmates attacked Annoreno, leaving him nearly blind. After being found competent to proceed, Annoreno entered into a plea agreement, which noted that the maximum sentence was 50 years; a presentence report concluded that the guidelines recommended a 50-year sentence. U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 480-month sentence, rejecting argument that the court improperly considered Annoreno’s mental disabilities and the time needed for rehabilitation. View "Unted States v. Annoreno" on Justia Law

In 1999 Irons was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and 846, and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He sought, for a second time, a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on a 2010 amendment to the federal Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. The district court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Irons was unable to show that his applicable sentencing range had been retroactively lowered; at his sentencing hearing, the court determined that Irons was found responsible for 31 kilograms of crack cocaine. That amount greatly exceeds the minimum 8.4 kilograms under the amended guidelines for the highest base offense level, 38, under which Irons was originally sentenced. View "United States v. Irons" on Justia Law

Berg ran a cross-border smuggling scheme that traded American arms for Canadian cannabis. He supplied several bags of cocaine to a dealer who unwittingly resold them to a government agent. Berg confessed to both sets of crimes, hoping that his cooperation would win him leniency. Instead, the government took Berg to trial, and a jury convicted him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his two sets of crimes were improperly tried in one case and that he was denied an opportunity to call an exculpatory witness. His attorney made a strategic choice not to call the witness. The evidence against Berg was overwhelming; he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s decisions at trial. He could not show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance. View "United States v. Berg" on Justia Law

Convicted of possessing child pornography, defendant was sentenced to 108 months in prison. The judge increased his base offense level by 15 levels, including a two-level enhancement for actually distributing the pornography, although the separate offense of distributing child pornography was not charged, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). This adjustment raised the sentencing range from 108 to 135 months to 135 to 168 months. The statutory maximum for the offense of possession was 120 months at the time of the offense, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) (2011), so the judge could not sentence him within the higher range. The sentence of 108 months was the floor of the lower range. The defendant admitted to having downloaded quantities of child pornography, but he denied knowing that the files he downloaded could be viewed by other users of the programs. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that the defendant was 61 years old and in poor health. The government failed to prove that the defendant knowingly made files of child pornography available to other users of LimeWire or FrostWire. Someone who knew little about computers and had never seen a file-sharing program before might not realize that files are automatically available to others. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Westerfield was a lawyer working for an Illinois title insurance company when she facilitated fraudulent real estate transfers in a scheme that used stolen identities of homeowners to “sell” houses that were not for sale to fake buyers, and then collect the mortgage proceeds from lenders who were unaware of the fraud. Westerfield facilitated five such transfers and was indicted on four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. She claimed that she had been unaware of the scheme’s fraudulent nature and argued that she had merely performed the typical work of a title agent. She was convicted on three counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to admission of a codefendant’s testimony during trial, and to the sentence of 72 months in prison with three years of supervised release, and payment of $916,300 in restitution. View "United States v. Westerfield" on Justia Law

A jury found Terrance Jones guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and of using a telephone to facilitate possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal under FRCP 29. The district court granted Jones’ motion, concluding that “the inferences the jury had to draw in order to reach a guilty verdict fall into the realm of impermissible speculation.” The government has appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the circumstantial case simply required too much speculation to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. No witnesses testified that they saw Jones in possession of any cocaine, and the intercepted telephone calls that the government relied upon were not tied directly to actual or constructive possession of any cocaine. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Davis repeatedly gave false addresses when purchasing guns, six of which were later recovered from persons who could not lawfully possess them. Davis claimed that the guns were stolen, but pleaded guilty to two counts of lying to gun dealers, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(A). Other charges were dismissed. Davis was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. His offense level, would have been lower had the district judge given him a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility by pleading guilty. It deducted only two levels, because the prosecutor declined to move for the subtraction of a third level under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). The prosecutor wanted Davis to waive his right to appeal, and his refusal to do that led the prosecutor to withhold the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a motion from the prosecutor is mandatory whenever the defendant pleads guilty early enough to spare the prosecutor the burden of trial preparation. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

When Meherg was arrested on an outstanding warrant, police discovered that he had been carrying a firearm and ammunition. Meherg pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(a) defines an offender who has three earlier convictions for qualifying crimes as a career criminal and prescribes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. Qualifying crimes include “serious drug offenses”—manufacturing or delivering a controlled sentence where the maximum punishment is greater than 10 years’ imprisonment—and “crimes of violence”— crimes that either have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force; or present a serious potential risk of physical injury. 18 U.S.C. 922(e)(2)(A), 924(e). The district court found that Meherg was a career criminal because he had two Illinois state convictions for manufacture or delivery of 1-15 grams of cocaine (punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment) and a conviction for aggravated stalking, which, the court found, has as an element the use or threatened use of force and in addition presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. The court imposed the mandatory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Meherg" on Justia Law