Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After years of paying taxes on wages he received for his work as a carpenter, Scheuneman stopped paying federal income tax in 1998. In 1999, in an effort to prevent the IRS from discovering his income, Scheuneman purchased a sham tax avoidance system from an Arizona company, Innovative Financial , and formed a limited liability corporation, Larch, and two illegitimate trusts, Soned and Jokur. Scheuneman retained complete control of all three. Scheuneman was eventually convicted of three counts of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201 and one count of interference with the Internal Revenue laws, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting arguments that that a clerical error in the indictment’s description of the relevant date rendered two counts legally insufficient and that the government constructively amended the indictment by introducing proof regarding dates other than those described in the indictment. Schueneman also claimed that the district court improperly ordered restitution for losses that are unrelated to his tax evasion offenses. The court rejected the argument; although those losses were not caused by the conduct underlying his tax evasion offenses, they are properly included as restitution because they were attributable to his interference with the Internal Revenue laws. View "United States v. Scheuneman" on Justia Law

Gomez was convicted of four drug-related crimes and sentenced to four concurrent 84-month terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his possession of cocaine a few weeks after the charged crimes, and that the district judge did not specify his perjurious statements when increasing his sentencing range for obstruction of justice. Given the context of the statements, the district court made a sufficient record. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 2007 Maniscalco hosted a party for a local politician at his Gurnee restaurant. Maniscalco capped the night with celebratory shots of tequila and a trip to McDonald’s, where he encountered Fidel Castro at the drive-through window. Minutes earlier, a police officer had handed Castro a note containing four numbers (2626) and told him to give it to his co-worker Guzman. Castro did so. The numbers partly corresponded to Maniscalco’ license-plate number: C112626. Maniscalco got into an argument with Guzman while paying for his order, grabbing Guzman and, according to Guzman, nearly pulling him through the window. Maniscalco released Guzman and drove to the pick-up window. As Castro was giving him his food, Guzman yelled to stop. Castro stopped; Maniscalco drove off. The manager called 911. A dispatch went out over the police radio. Maniscalco was arrested. A jury found him not guilty of drunk driving and battery. Maniscalco sued the officers and McDonald’s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming conspiracy to induce him to breach the peace so the officers would have a pretext to arrest him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Notwithstanding Castro’s deposition testimony about the unexplained note, the evidence supported probable cause to arrest. McDonald’s cannot be liable because there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. View "Maniscalco v. Simon" on Justia Law

From 1997 through 2009 Sachdeva, the vice president for accounting at Koss, instructed Park Bank, where Koss had an account, to prepare more than 570 cashier’s checks, payable to Sachdeva’s creditors and used to satisfy personal debts. She embezzled about $17.4 million, pleaded guilty to federal crimes, and was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The SEC sued Sachdeva and an accomplice because their scheme caused Koss to misstate its financial position. Koss and Park Bank are litigating which bears the loss in Wisconsin. In this suit, Park Bank argued that Federal Insurance must defend and indemnify it under a financial-institution bond (fidelity bond) provision that promises indemnity for “Loss of Property resulting directly from . . . false pretenses, or common law or statutory larceny, committed by a natural person while on the premises of” the Bank. Sachdeva did not enter the Bank’s premises. She gave instructions by phone, then sent employees to fetch the checks. The district court entered judgment in the insurer’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; every court that has considered the subject has held that a fraud orchestrated from outside a financial institution’s premises is not covered under the provision, which is standard in the industry. View "Bankmanagers Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lisa Williamson and her husband Lance were arrested on a charge that they had stolen someone else’s horse. The facts are disputed, but the horse had apparently been boarded at Lance’s stable, by an agent of its owner, but against the owner’s specific wishes. After being acquitted, Williamson filed suit against two Lake County, Illinois sheriff’s deputies under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they arrested her without probable cause and in violation of her right to equal protection by arresting her based on nothing more (she contends) than her status as Lance’s wife. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. So far as the deputies knew, Lance was in the wrong in maintaining possession of the horse, and the lien filed by Williamson Stables was a ruse to give cover to his conversion of the horse and, quite possibly, to extort money from the horse’s owner; they also had reason to believe, based in large part on Williamson’s own interaction with them, that she shared responsibility along with her husband and Williamson’s Stables for the possession of and refusal to surrender the horse. View "Williamson v. Curran" on Justia Law

In 1996, Stalker was fatally bludgeoned and stabbed following a drug sale. Witnesses led Chicago police to Monroe and three fellow members of the Black P-Stone Nation street gang: Thomas, Curry, and Jackson, who had been selling crack cocaine and Stalker, a member of another gang, who had recruited customers. Members of Stalker’s gang drove up to make a purchase but sped off without paying for the cocaine. Stalker was beaten by Monroe and Curry, then stabbed by Thomas. Monroe later acknowledged striking Stalker but denied any foreknowledge that Thomas would stab him. Monroe pleaded not guilty. Jackson, after himself being acquitted on a murder charge, was a key witness. Monroe was convicted of first-degree murder on an accountability theory and sentenced to 40 years. After exhausting state remedies, Monroe unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Monroe was arrested without probable cause; that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his brother and sister-in-law as witnesses at trial and in support of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements; and that the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction on an accountability theory. View "Monroe v. Birkey" on Justia Law

Dill was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). After closing arguments, the district court read jury instructions and had counsel approach the bench, where it asked whether they had any objection to leaving the alternate in the jury room with an instruction that the alternate may not deliberate. The prosecutor stated that he did not think “it’s generally done,” but neither party objected. The district court gave the instruction orally. The jury retired for deliberations and was given a written set of instructions without the instruction covering the alternate juror’s role. The jury did not submit any notes or questions. A little over an hour later, the jury returned its verdict finding Dill guilty. When the jury was polled, all 12 regular jurors confirmed the verdicts read by the foreperson, but the alternate juror was not polled and remained silent. The district court sentenced Dill to 420 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the alternate juror participated in deliberations. View "United States v. Dill" on Justia Law

Defendant, arrested after assaulting a woman and pointing a pistol at her, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 188 months in prison. He argued that the pistol was not a firearm, defined as “any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” or “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” Defendant’s pistol is a Hi-Point .380 caliber semi-automatic, designed to be a gun, but inoperable because of “significant damage, missing/broken parts, and extensive corrosion.” To restore the gun to firing condition would require that it be disassembled and cleaned and the corroded and missing parts replaced. All this would take an hour or two for an expert in gun repair. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The gun, although in bad condition, neither was redesigned to be something other than a gun nor is so badly damaged that it could no longer be regarded as a weapon designed to fire bullets. Its outward appearance is normal and it was not so dilapidated as to be beyond repair. View "United States v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Warren shot and killed a man in 2002, during a marijuana sale. Although Warren was originally charged in state court with first-degree intentional homicide, he eventually pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide, a reduced charge. Soon after entering the plea, Warren began attempting to withdraw it. He unsuccessfully fought his 40-year sentence through the Wisconsin court system and was denied habeas corpus in federal district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the state trial court’s refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea deprived him of due process and that he received unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his state court proceedings. View "Warren v. Baenen" on Justia Law

Following his arrest in 2009, Budd spent 45 days in the Edgar County Jail. In newspaper articles, the sheriff described the jail as not “livable” and violating “acceptable standards.” During his detention, Budd was confined with eight inmates in a space intended for three; he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets. After another arrest, Budd returned to the jail. Vents were blocked, the heating and air conditioning systems did not work, and inmates were denied any recreation. During a third stay at the facility, something scratched or bit Budd’s leg. After infection set in, the jail nurse gave Budd ice. Budd wrote to the sheriff asking to see a doctor. Over the course of several hospital visits, he received tests, medication, and an MRI. He developed a “hole in [his] leg,” which doctors attributed to unsanitary conditions at the jail. He became “hysterical” at the prospect of returning to the jail. A judge ordered that he be taken to another facility. After a video conference to screen Budd’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, the district court dismissed, but furnished no written statement of reasons and did not prepare a transcript. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. View "Budd v. Motley" on Justia Law