Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Lomax pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). By the time he was sentenced in 2011, Congress had enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, which increased the threshold amounts of crack that will trigger enhanced statutory penalties under section 841(b)(1). The court rejected Lomax’s arguments concerning application of the 2010 Act, but still imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 188 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that it could not determine that any error was harmless, given the incomplete record. The court noted that the judge must first resolve whether Lomax is subject to the section 851 recidivism enhancement. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

McDaniel arrived at the emergency room in May, 2001, with a gunshot wound to the head. She died two days later. Her death was ruled a homicide, and Brady, her boyfriend and the father of her child, became a suspect. After several weeks on the run, Brady was arrested in Los Angeles, extradited to Illinois, and convicted. Brady claims the shooting was an accident and has identified four witnesses to corroborate his story. None of them testified at trial, because Brady’s lawyer did not call them. State courts were not persuaded that the omission was serious enough to undermine his conviction, and the federal district court held that their decision was not so unreasonable that federal relief was possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the performance of Brady’s lawyer fell below constitutional standards, he cannot show prejudice. The court characterized the proffered testimony as only “marginally exculpatory.” View "Brady v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are correctional officers and were part of a specialized unit, the Special Operations Response Team (SORT) that guarded inmates in the Cook County Jail’s Abnormal Behavioral Observation Unit (ABO). In 2006, six violent felons escaped from the ABO, raising suspicion of inside assistance. A correctional officer, Gater, confessed to allowing the escape and named three others as assisting him or having advance knowledge of the escape. Those officers were investigated and reassigned after disbandment of SORT. They filed suit, claiming psychological and emotional injuries from the investigation and that they were investigated due to their political support for a then-candidate for Sheriff. Following a remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact relating to the political retaliation claims, the veracity of Gater’s confession and the fact that no other officers were investigated for the jailbreak. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Authorities had probable cause to investigate the officers, making other possible motivations for their treatment less relevant. While the defendants may have expressed negative opinions regarding the officers’ support of the candidate, it was objectively reasonable to investigate officers implicated in a multi-felon jailbreak. View "Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Burge joined the Chicago Police Department in 1970 and rose to commanding officer of the violent crimes section in the 1980s, but his career was marked by accusations from more than individuals who claimed that he and officers under his command tortured suspects in order to obtain confessions. Burge was fired in 1993 after the Office of Professional Standards investigated the allegations, but he was never criminally charged. When asked about the practices in civil interrogatories served on him years later, Burge lied and denied any knowledge of, or participation in, torture of suspects. A jury heard overwhelming evidence to contradict that assertion and convicted Burge for obstruction of justice and perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) and 1621(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence showed that Burge lied when he answered the interrogatories, his false statements impeded an official proceeding, and the statements were material to the outcome of the civil case. Burge received a fair trial and hearsay reference to a victim impact letter was admissible at sentencing.View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

Scott pleaded guilty to distribution of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). His plea agreement, entered under FRCP 11(c)(1)(C), specified a prison term of 192 months; the district court accepted the agreement and that sentence. Later, Scott filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c), seeking a reduction in his sentence based on changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied that motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Scott was not eligible for a reduced sentence. When a plea agreement is governed by Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and accepted by the court, the judge does not play as great a role as usual in selecting the final sentence. Scott chose to accept a binding sentence to induce the government to dismiss a repeat-offender notice that it had filed under 21 U.S.C. 851. Had the government not done so, Scott would have been subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). View "Unted States v. Scott" on Justia Law

An inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, complaining that officials denied him an accommodation of his religious observances. He is a member of a religious sect, the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, and took the “Nazirite vow,” which committed him not to cut his hair. He wore his hair in dreadlocks, which form naturally in some people who do not cut their hair. His previous suit, based on the prison’s refusal to allow him to have visitors unless he consented to a haircut, settled in 2003; the parties agreed that he could receive visitors, if he allowed prison staff to search his hair before and after any visit for concealed contraband. In 2004, for appearance in court in a case he had filed, the prison gave the inmate a choice: a haircut, or segregation as punishment for eluding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent recognizes the need for and validity of rules regulating the hairstyles of prisoners in the interest of security; the Nazirite vow is an optional rather than mandatory observance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. View "Peter Lewis v. Jerry Sternes, et al" on Justia Law

Peterson pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), after robbing a bank to pay off a debt with a drug dealer. During Peterson’s sentencing hearing, the district court read from a portion of the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation, which she had submitted only to the court. The report noted a relatively easy childhood, followed by a history of drug abuse and other offenses. After the hearing, the district court sentenced Peterson to 168 months in prison, within Peterson’s sentencing guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court’s reliance on the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation violated Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because Peterson had no opportunity to respond to the analysis contained therein. Peterson received and had the opportunity to comment on all facts supporting the probation officer’s analysis and his counsel presented a comprehensive sentencing argument on the basis of those facts. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Westmoreland was convicted first for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and in a second trial, for additional counts stemming from the murder of the wife of his partner in drug-dealing: causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; using interstate commerce facilities to commit murder for hire; conspiring to commit murder for hire; tampering with a witness by committing murder; and causing the death of a witness through use of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 he moved for a new trial, based on outrageous conduct, including the fact that a state police officer had an affair with his wife and a recantation. The court took no significant action before denying the motion in 2010. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Westmoreland did not present “newly discovered evidence” and was not prejudiced by allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

In 2008 Stein pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery in Wisconsin, after he struck his live-in girlfriend, breaking two of her teeth and bruising her face. As part of Stein’s plea bargain, the state prosecutor dismissed a domestic-abuse surcharge that normally would apply. Stein, an avid hunter, wanted to preserve the ability to possess and use guns. His attorney advised in open court that he would not violate federal law by possessing and using the guns that he already owned. The state judge warned Stein that “there’s no guarantees” he could possess guns after his conviction. At a hearing in 2009 on his request for early termination of his probation, Stein received new information making it clear that his attorney had given him bad advice. Stein subsequently admitted to possessing guns and the district judge ruled that evidence concerning Stein’s knowledge of his legal status was irrelevant and rejected his proposed jury instruction. Stein was convicted for possessing a firearm following a misdemeanor conviction for a crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law