Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Congress created Health Savings Accounts to help people with high-deductible health plans save for health care costs by providing tax-preferred treatment for money saved for future medical expenses, 26 U.S.C. 223. Banas and others started a company that created a suite of software products that allowed savers to manage their Health Savings Accounts online. By 2009, the company had more than 100 employees. Venture capital and private equity firms thought the company was a solid investment and bought stock, but the company had provided counterfeit financial documents and had even “faked” customer calls. The owners started raiding clients’ Health Savings Accounts. By the time Banas and Blackburn were stopped, they had misappropriated more than $18,000,000 in client funds. Banas admitted his guilt, accepted responsibility for his actions, and has worked to secure some degree of restitution. The district judge sentenced Banas to 160 months of imprisonment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, well below the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, particularly noting the impact of the crime on victims. View "Unted States v. Banas" on Justia Law

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Alexander boarded a train in Chicago carrying a large amount of cocaine. When he disembarked in Springfield, police officers were waiting, ordered Alexander to place his hands on a brick wall and proceeded to search him. After initially submitting to a pat-down, Alexander turned and swung a right hook at Officer Steil, striking him on the left side of his head behind the ear. Steil ducked a subsequent punch and wrestled Alexander to the ground. Alexander continued struggling, got back on his feet, and began running. A police dog caught and subdued him. Alexander pled guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A probation officer concluded that Alexander’s punches had posed a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to Steil, and recommended in the presentence report a six-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1). Alexander objected. At Alexander’s sentencing hearing Steil testified that he had suffered only minor injuries that did not require medical attention: a sore neck and scraped knees. The district court applied adjustment and imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Sanchez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than five grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and was sentenced to 262 months in prison, based on an enhancement for having “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). He had used his residence to distribute drugs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting procedural arguments and holding that the enhancement merely changed the penalty for already-illegal conduct and did not implicate the ex post facto clause. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Rodriquez entered the U.S. illegally in 1988 and came to the attention of the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, following a misdemeanor DUI conviction. He subsequently pleaded guilty to using a fraudulent social security card, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). He sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to his children, who are U.S. citizens, but failed to timely comply with the IJ’s request for biometrics. The IJ deemed the petition abandoned and ordered removal, after which Rodriguez provided the information. Following a remand, DHS notified the BIA that Rodriguez had been removed. BIA withdrew the remand. The Seventh Circuit remanded. An IJ then held that Rodriguez was ineligible for cancellation of removal, based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that fraudulent use of a social security card is a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Engel was convicted in 1991in Missouri state court for a drug-related kidnapping and was sentenced to 90 years in prison. In 2010 the state’s highest court vacated the conviction, based on the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that a police investigator had paid a key witness to testify. The state declined to retry him and Engel was released after 19 years in prison. He sued the police department, the United States, individual officers, and the FBI agent claimed to have fabricated evidence. The district court denied the FBI agent’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a “Bivens” action is available for “Brady” violations and that qualified immunity did not apply because the Brady obligations at issue were well-established at the time of the events at issue. View "Engel v. Buchan" on Justia Law

Hale, former head of a racist church, was convicted of putting a contract on the life of a federal judge who ruled against the church in a trademark case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then rejected Hale’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hale defaulted claims relating to the trial judge excluding him from a portion of jury selection that dealt with pretrial publicity concerning Hale’s praise of an individual who shot at least 11 people belonging to minority groups. Hale’s lawyer agreed that inquiries would best be made out of Hale’s presence and Hale did not raise the issue on direct appeal. With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance, the court noted that lawyers are forbidden to use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based on race and it that it would not second-guess trial counsel’s choice to defend by claiming entrapment or that Hale’s instructions to kill the judge were a misunderstanding. View "Hale v. United States" on Justia Law

Turner was charged with distributing cocaine base premised on sales of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Hanson, the crime laboratory chemist who analyzed the substances obtained by the officer, was on maternity leave at the time of trial. Over Turner’s objection, the supervisor who reviewed her work, Block, testified as an expert, opining based on Hanson’s data that the substances contained cocaine base, that Hanson had followed standard procedures, and that he reached the same conclusion as to the nature of the substances. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Turner’s conviction, rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim. The Supreme Court vacated. On remand, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the conviction. To the extent Block testified about anything that Hanson did or concluded, his testimony may have violated the Confrontation Clause, but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Apart from Block’s testimony, there was other evidence indicating that the substances were crack cocaine, and Turner did not contest the issue. The bulk of Block’s testimony was permissible: the government could establish through Block’s expert testimony what the data produced by Hanson’s testing revealed concerning the substances, without having to introduce Hanson’s documentation of her analysis or Hanson’s testimony. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Sanders and an accomplice pushed into Nobles’s apartment and abducted Nobles’s 10-year-old daughter, R.E. in order to induce Nobles to rob her own mother. Nobles attempted to comply and left bag of cash for Sanders’s accomplice to pick up. Law enforcement authorities were already aware of the plot and arrested Sanders’s accomplice. Sanders surrendered shortly thereafter. No one was injured, and police recovered the money. A jury convicted Sanders of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201, and extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Two mandatory minimums apply to kidnapping: 18 U.S.C. 1201(g) requires 20 years and 18 U.S.C. 3559(f)(2) requires 25 years. The district court concluded that the higher penalty applied and sentenced Sanders to concurrent sentences of 25 years on the kidnapping count and 20 years on the extortion count. . The Seventh Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, rejecting arguments that the court denied Sanders due process by admitting Nobles’s three identifications of him and abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of Nobles. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Officers stopped a truck after they witnessed occupants apparently engaging in a drug deal. Hunter fled from the passenger seat with something resembling a gun in his hand. Officers ordered Hunter to stop, but Hunter continued to run. The officers heard a gunshot and fired at Hunter, striking him in the left buttock and in the foot. Hunter fell to the ground and was handcuffed. Police recovered a revolver from the ground close to Hunter, with one spent shell casing in the cylinder. Hunter was transported to a hospital by ambulance. Detective Karzin accompanied Hunter, who was handcuffed to the hospital gurney at all times. Doctors administered narcotics, but a treating nurse later testified that he had remained “alert and oriented.” While Hunter was receiving treatment, Karzin sat silently in the room until Hunter initiated interaction. Karzin read Hunter his Miranda rights. At some point, Hunter gave the name of his lawyer and asked if Karzin would call him. Karzin did not do so. Hunter made incriminating statements to officers who arrived after the conversation. The district court suppressed the statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the interrogation occurred after Hunter unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law