Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An inmate of the Illinois Danville Correctional Center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The inmate suffers from scoliosis and the prison rejected his “incessant” requests for a lower bunk and for a medical mattress, a back brace, and orthopedic shoes. The district judge granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, in an opinion that included references to a Wiki-How article on bunk-climbing and to the recent discovery of the skeletal remains of Richard III of England and a picture of inmates in bunks. The court noted “overwhelming” evidence that he had no medical need for any of the requested items, except, possibly a lower bunk. Noting the inmate’s claim that he was injured trying to get into the upper bunk after being refused permission to sleep in the health care unit, the court remanded for a determination of the facts on that claim. View "Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Administrators of city agencies were convicted of mail fraud for their roles in a scheme to award Chicago jobs and promotions to favored applicants. They had conducted sham interviews and falsified interview forms. Consistent with case law at the time, the jury was instructed that the defendants were guilty of mail fraud if they deprived the city of money or property, or if they deprived the city of its right to honest services. After the Seventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court ruled in Skilling v. U.S. (2010) that the honest-services fraud statute is limited only to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. The district court rejected an argument that the defendants are entitled to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the jury’s receipt of an honest-services theory was error because the scheme did not involve bribes or kickbacks, the error was harmless. The trial reflected a single scheme to take city jobs and promotions through false representations, and these jobs and promotions were the city’s money or property. Any honest-services violation had to be premised on the money/property fraud, and the Skilling error did not have substantial effect on the jury’s verdict.View "Sorich v. United States" on Justia Law

After drinking very heavily and accelerating to 80-90 miles per hour on a road with a posted limit of 35 mph, to escape alleged pursuers, McNary woke up in a hospital and learned that he had killed a pedestrian and then two occupants of a vehicle, during a police chase. He claims that he has no memory of speaking to officers at the hospital, of receiving Miranda warnings, or consenting to blood alcohol test. He is serving two life sentences, without the possibility of parole, in an Illinois state prison. State courts rejected arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on failure to prove that McNary was in custody while speaking to officers by eliciting testimony from his sister about her observations at the hospital and eliciting prejudicial testimony from McNary. The district court denied a habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the conclusion of the Illinois appellate court. View "McNary v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Wang was involved in a high-volume conspiracy that produced an estimated 7,000 phony identification documents by altering valid passports to match customers’ identification information, creating fake documents to prove Illinois residency, and helping customers obtain state identification cards or driver’s licenses. Wang participated from 2008 until 2009, connecting customers with document manufacturers, transporting them to state facilities, collecting payments, and retrieving false passports for reuse. At sentencing, Wang received a nine-level increase to his base offense level because the district court held him accountable for more than 100 false documents. The court denied Wang’s request for a minor participant reduction, set his offense level at 21, and calculated his guideline range as 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count. The court imposed a term of imprisonment of 37 months on that count and a consecutive, mandatory sentence of 24 months on the aggravated identity theft count. 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the scope of Wang’s jointly undertaken criminal activity, his demonstrated commitment to the conspiracy, and his active, essential role in many aspects of the scheme. View "Unted States v. Wang" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Obeid and his twin Esawi were indicted for conspiracy to smuggle pseudoephedrine from Canada into the U.S., to be used in Mexico for methamphetamine production. They smuggled at least 215 million tablets and were involved in money laundering related to the scheme. Each pleaded guilty, with sentencing to be deferred while they assisted in the ongoing investigation. At Obeid’s sentencing, the government noted that much of the cooperation being attributed to Obeid actually had been provided by Esawi because the brothers possessed the same information. The district court sentenced Obeid to 178 months in prison, a 45 percent discount from the low end of the guidelines range. Before Obeid’s sentencing, the government entered into another plea agreement with Esawi , agreeing to seek a further reduction for continuing cooperation. Esawi received an additional 24-month reduction. Obeid never attempted to negotiate such an agreement or to provide further cooperation, but spent years challenging his sentence before filing a “motion to compel the government to seek an additional reduction under [Rule 35(b)].” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the motion should have been filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and was, therefore, not timely. View "United States v. Obeid" on Justia Law

Smith was arrested with narcotics on his person. Smith alleges and the officers deny that the officers stomped on his hand and beat him. When Smith arrived at the police station around he had an obvious finger injury. Officers delivered Smith to a hospital; a doctor determined that Smith’s finger needed to be moved back into place and that painkiller should be administered. Smith declined local anesthetic and instead requested “Dilaudid” (a morphine derivative similar to heroin). A doctor administered Dilaudid, and splinted Smith’s finger. Smith returned to the hospital days later; his finger was swollen and infected. It was no longer medically alive. The doctor told Smith that amputation might be necessary. Before Smith could return for another appointment, he was arrested and again alleged mistreatment (officers kneeling on and slapping his injured hand), which the officers again deny. After processing Smith at the station, officers returned him to the hospital, where the finger was amputated. At trial on Smith’s claims of excessive force and failure to provide medical attention, the district court allowed the defense to present evidence of Smith’s heroin use prior to one of the arrests. The jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Smith v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In 2006, the DEA interviewed Bennett concerning transactions involving marijuana, ecstasy, and crack cocaine. Before the interview, the government agreed not to use Bennett’s statements against him, provided that Bennett not later take a position inconsistent with his statements. Bennett admitted that he had supplied all three drugs to a government informant. After the interview, Bennett fled. A grand jury later indicted him. In 2010, Bennett was arrested living under an assumed name in Georgia. During negotiations, Bennett, disavowed some of the proffer statements, but eventually pled guilty to possession of ecstasy and marijuana with intent to distribute. He was warned that the cocaine might be considered “relevant conduct” at sentencing. The probation office concluded that 33.9 grams of crack cocaine were part of the offense conduct, used it to calculate a recommended base guideline sentence, and recommended a two-level enhancement for being “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). The report did not recommend crediting Bennett for accepting responsibility. The district court overruled Bennett’s objections, finding that Bennett’s objections constituted a position inconsistent with his proffer statements and breached the proffer agreement, thereby unlocking the entire content of the interview for sentencing purposes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Patrick made his living as a pimp, trafficking minors and adult women. In 2010 he was arrested in connection with the shooting death of another Milwaukee pimp and was charged with sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1591. Patrick pleaded guilty to four counts. The district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, consecutive to a 20-year state court sentence that Patrick was serving. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to discuss Patrick’s cooperation with the authorities . View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Uribe was driving along I- 70 in Indiana, apparently in compliance with all traffic laws, in a vehicle that had no visible evidence of noncompliance with vehicle requirements other than that it was a blue Nissan with a registration number that traced back to a white Nissan. A deputy following Uribe’s car initiated a traffic stop “to check for registration compliance.” Uribe consented to a search of the vehicle, which yielded nearly a pound of heroin and indictment for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i). The district court granted Uribe’s motion to suppress, finding the government’s explanations insufficient to establish that at the time of the stop the deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Uribe was engaged in criminal activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that one lawful act in isolation, driving a car of one color with a registration number attached to a car of a different color, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal activity. View "United States v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Wells shot his gun into the air several times to celebrate the New Year, 2008. Arriving to investigate, Officer Coker shot Wells three times, seriously injuring Wells. Coker claims that Wells turned toward him and pointed a gun in his direction; Wells denies doing so. Through an agreement with the state to dismiss a felony count, Wells pleaded guilty to reckless conduct that he “discharged a firearm multiple times . . . and then pointed the firearm at [Coker].” Before entering the plea, Wells sued Coker and the City of Springfield, alleging that Coker used excessive force in shooting Wells. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Wells was judicially estopped from denying that he had pointed the gun at Coker because Wells pleaded guilty to a charge that included the statement that he had pointed the gun at Coker. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither judicial estoppel nor other doctrines of preclusion apply to the particular facts of Wells’s plea agreement. The discussion of the facts supporting the charge was brief and that Wells’s guilty plea was not specific with respect to what he admitted. View "Wells v. Coker" on Justia Law