Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Spanish-speaking linguist working for the Drug Enforcement Administration listened to recordings of Mendiola’s prison telephone conversations prior to testifying before a jury that Mendiola’s voice was likely the one on several wiretapped calls in which Mendiola and others planned a large-scale cocaine deal. Mendiola was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the linguist’s testimony constituted impermissible opinion testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence and violated the Best Evidence Rule. View "United States v. Mendiola" on Justia Law

Gutierrez was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Raymond. After pursuing his Illinois state court avenues for post-conviction relief, Gutierrez brought a federal action for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: Gutierrez received two trials in state court; that his testimony was contradicted by testimony witnesses and by the physical evidence at trial; and that, before the second trial, the court heard extensive testimony as to Gutierrez’ history of treatment for mental illness. The Illinois appellate court held that even if evidence of Gutierrez’ mental illness had been presented, there was no reasonable probability that the court would have found that Gutierrez had a genuine, though unreasonable, belief that it was necessary for him to use deadly force to defend himself from Raymond. That court properly analyzed the evidence and reasonably applied the law. View "Gutierrez v. Anglin" on Justia Law

In 2008 Foster pleaded guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 130 months’ imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal as frivolous after his lawyer filed an Anders brief. Two years later, after the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guideline ranges for crack-cocaine offenses and made the changes retroactive, Foster sought a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2). The district court cut his sentence to 120 months but held that it lacked authority to reduce it below the statutory minimum that was in effect when Foster committed his crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that Foster’s attorney had not identified any authority for his appointment, at public expense, to prosecute the motion. A proceeding under section 3582 is limited to the application of changes in the Guidelines and is not a full resentencing. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals who were trying to arrest him for his latest violation of supervised release. He pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, on the ground that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after the judgment in a criminal case has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate of a federal prison, filed a “Bivens” suit against seven named prison staff members plus several unnamed defendants, complaining that in retaliation for the plaintiff’s going on hunger strikes, they used excessive force to force feed him and extract blood samples, placed him in a cell infested with feces, denied him minimal recreational opportunities, refused to allow him to have a Bible, refused to allow him to file grievances, and tried to block his access to the federal courts. The district judge dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground that the “99-page complaint defies understanding, rendering it unintelligible” and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that a complaint may be long not because the draftsman is incompetent or is seeking to obfuscate, but because it contains a large number of distinct charges. The 28-page complaint, with a 71-page appendix, is not excessively long given the number of separate claims and is “not only entirely intelligible; it is clear.” View "Kadamovas v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Wren and Moton provided valuable assistance and received sentences lower than the presumptive floor of 120 months’ imprisonment for crack cocaine offenses, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), (b)(1). The original sentencing range for each was 121 to 151 months; each original sentence was 100 months. Under Amendment 750, which reduced the ratio between crack and power cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1, the range for Wren would be 100 to 125 months and the range for Moton 84 to 105 months. Judges declined to reduce their sentences after Amendment 759 authorized retroactive application. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that prisoners whose original sentences are below the presumptive statutory minimum are eligible for a reduction “comparably less than the amended guideline range.” Nothing in the revised Guidelines, or the explanations for them, indicates a goal of giving uncooperative defendants greater sentence reductions than those available for cooperative defendants. The district court may grant a motion under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2) without resetting the Guideline range at the statutory minimum. View "United States v. Wren" on Justia Law

Cowart, arrested for dealing Vicodin, acted as a confidential informant and was assigned a target: Love. After one staged purchase, Love apparently believed that Cowart was responsible for robbing Love’s crack house. Thinking things had blown over, Cowart arranged another drug buy. Cowart went inside a house with Love. Outside, a surveillance team saw the same white SUV from the earlier buy park at a nearby gas station. People got out and walked to the house. Then the team heard Cowart being beaten and questioned about the crack house robbery. Officers swarmed the house and arrested Love, who was convicted of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of insufficient evidence and that the trial court improperly declined to give a “buyer-seller” jury instruction and improperly admitted a hearsay statement, but vacated the sentence. Drug quantity should not be included in a sentencing calculation if “the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase . . . the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1; Love never actually intended to provide drugs to Cowart at the second meeting. View "United States v. Love" on Justia Law

Schuster pleaded guilty to knowingly using a minor to produce child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The district court sentenced him to nearly 22 years of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the district court erred in finding that he distributed certain of the child pornography that he produced; the distribution of other child pornography was not “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines; the district court erred in finding that a certain other photograph that he took of a young boy constituted child pornography; and that the sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Schuster" on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law