Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Eight participants in a Rockford, Illinois heroin distribution conspiracy pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin and more than 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court determined that the conspiracy distributed 700 grams of heroin per week. Defendants argued that the district court failed to consider sentencing disparities between drug runners who were prosecuted in federal court and those prosecuted in state court and that the district court failed to address each of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) at his sentencing. The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments, but vacated the sentenced of a defendant who received a two-level enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of firearms by his coconspirators. View "United States v. Block" on Justia Law

Dean boarded an airplane in Chicago bound for Canada, carrying a laptop computer housing more than 14,000 still images and 700 videos of child pornography. He served 21 months in a Canadian prison. Later, in U.S. custody, the district court found Dean competent. Dean acknowledged that he downloaded the files and knew that the laptop contained child pornography, but maintained that he “didn’t knowingly, purposely want to break the law … I had it on my computer, and my intentions were not to let it out of my hands until I could get rid of it … I did not knowingly break the law … I didn’t know that it existed.” The district court explained that 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) did not require knowledge of illegality but only knowing transportation of child pornography across state lines or an international border. Dean responded: “Yes. And that is why I plead to that.” The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 151- to 188-months’ imprisonment, but stated that the “range is too severe.” Beginning at 108 months, the court deducted 21 months for Dean’s Canadian imprisonment and imposed an 87-month term with lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “state of mind” argument. View "Unted States v. Dean" on Justia Law

Vidal planned with an undercover FBI officer to rob a “stash house.” He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846; (2)); attempt to possess with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 846; (3)); Hobbs Act violation committed by attempting to rob the house (18 U.S.C.1951(a)); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The probation officer calculated an offense level of 35, upward adjustment for leadership role, and a reduction for his timely plea and acceptance of responsibility, that, with Vidal’s criminal history, yielded an advisory sentence of 210 to 262 months. The PSR noted a history of mental illness. A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder, bipolar spectrum disorder, claustrophobia, and drug and alcohol abuse. The district court sentenced Vidal to 210 months with a consecutive term of 60 months, stating: “I also note the mental health issues that you appear to struggle with. Certainly your drug abuse problem does not go well with your mental health issues.” The Seventh Circuit remanded the sentence. The district court failed adequately to consider psychiatric history, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Vidal" on Justia Law

Diaz-Rios, a 21-year-old Mexican national with no criminal history and a valid tourist visa, was staying with in-laws until he was kicked out. He spoke no English. He accepted a friend’s offer of the use of a car and agreed to pay for and pick up some “luggage” in return. Diaz-Rios suspected that “luggage” meant illegal drugs, but agreed because he felt obliged. Caught picking up 45 kilograms of cocaine, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and faced a statutory minimum term of 10 years. The government stipulated to downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and anticipated that he would qualify for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. 5C1.2, 2D1.1(b)(16). While the presentence investigation, Diaz-Rios declined to speak with the probation officer. He had debriefed government agents about the others involved in the crime, but that information was not shared with the probation officer, who concluded that Diaz-Rios did not qualify for a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 At sentencing the prosecutor agreed that reduction was warranted. The district court found that Diaz-Rios was not a minor participant, without discussion or acknowledging any factor relevant to 3B1.2 apart from drug quantity. The Seventh Circuit vacated.View "Unted States v. Diaz-Rio" on Justia Law

Animal control officers responded to a complaint about the Abbotts’ dog running loose. Travis interfered with efforts to capture the dog and made threats, prompting a call to police. After his mother, Cindy, coaxed him out, Officer Sweeney informed Travis that he was under arrest for obstruction and assault. Travis attempted to evade the officers. Sweeney handcuffed Travis and placed him in a cruiser. A taser was used. Seeing Travis struggling in the moving car, with no partition, Sweeney reached to gain control. His foot slipped and his cruiser rolled into Cindy’s vehicle. Cindy became upset and began screaming. Sweeney, concerned that she was trying to help Travis escape, ordered her to stop, but she continued toward the vehicles. He shot her in the abdomen with his taser. Cindy fell; after another jolt, she was handcuffed. Cindy was never informed of charges against her. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part; Sweeney had probable cause to arrest Travis and is entitled to qualified immunity on Travis’s excessive-force claim. Qualified immunity also applies to Cindy’s false-arrest and false imprisonment claims, but the court vacated with respect to her excessive-force claim.View "Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1983, Matamoros was sentenced to 10 years in prison, with a three-year special parole term to follow. When his ordinary parole term expired in 2005, Matamoros’ parole officer issued a Notice of Discharge, explaining that he was no longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission. Neither the Commission nor Matamoros’ parole officer noticed that Matamoros still had the special parole term left to serve until a month later, when the Commission issued a Certificate of Special Parole, nunc pro tunc. About six hours after the Commission issued the Certificate, Matamoros participated in an armed robbery, for which he was later sentenced to jail in Wisconsin. The Commission issued a warrant for Matamoros’ arrest for violating the conditions of his special parole. The warrant later lodged as a detainer that remains in effect. Matamoros sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the special parole term imposition, the detainer, and the delayed dispositional review of the detainer. Matamoros argued that the government should be estopped from enforcing the detainer because he was mistakenly told he was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. The district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Matamoros v. Gram" on Justia Law

At the request of a local detective, Winkle, a member of the violent crime task force, was dispatched to investigate a group of men, reportedly drinking beers on a public sidewalk. The location was in a high-crime area; there had been multiple, recent reports of shots-fired; two nights earlier, there had been a drive-by shooting one block from the site. Several officers arrived and converged on the men, blocking escape. Patton was among the group. The officers directed the men to a spot for a pat-down before writing citations. Winkle noticed Patton backing away, looking from side to side nervously, and perceived Patton’s behavior as a “flight or fight” response to police presence that could mean he had a weapon or was wanted on a high-bond warrant. Ultimately he began walking forward, his demeanor still nervous. Winkle then patted the front of Patton’s waistband and immediately felt a gun. Patton entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a weapon 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after the court denied a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the pat-down was supported by a reasonable suspicion that Patton might be armed and therefore pose a danger to the officers.View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain individuals required to register as sex offenders (Ind. Code 11-8-8) from knowingly using a social networking web site, an instant messaging, or chat room program that the offender knows allows access or use by a person who is less than 18 years of age. Violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor; subsequent violations constitute Class D felonies. The law does not differentiate based on the age of victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the predicate offense. It provides a defense if the individual did not know the website allowed minors or upon discovering it does, immediately ceased use, and exempts persons convicted of consensual “Romeo and Juliet relationships” where the victim and perpetrator are close in age. In 2000, Doe was convicted of child exploitation. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds on behalf of a class of similarly-situated sex offenders. The district court rejected the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the law unconstitutional. Though content neutral, it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors.View "Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County" on Justia Law

From 2008 until his 2010 arrest, Dickerson sold crack cocaine to Vankuiken. In August 2010, Dickerson proposed to trade crack cocaine for guns. Vankuiken took five stolen guns, unloaded, to Dickerson’s Kankakee apartment. Dickerson and Vankuiken then drove to a storage facility, where Dickerson left the guns in a rental unit, then returned to Dickerson’s apartment, where Dickerson gave Vankuiken several bags of crack cocaine. Vankuiken was later arrested on suspicion of stealing the guns and agreed to cooperate, directing officers to Dickerson’s storage unit, where they found a cache of weapons and accessories, including three machine guns and two handguns. The officers then arranged for Vankuiken to make a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Dickerson, after which they lawfully searched Dickerson’s apartments, where they recovered 125.6 grams of crack cocaine and a loaded gun. Dickerson was convicted of knowingly possessing firearms in furtherance of drug distribution under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the statute does not cover such guns-for-drugs exchanges; that jury instructions stating otherwise were in error; and that a discrepancy between the offense date charged in the indictment and the date for which the government offered evidence at trial required reversal. View "Unted States v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Boroczk has five children and, between 2006 and 2008, approximately 300 still images and multiple videos of his three- to five-year-old daughter and two-year-old son engaging in sexually explicit conduct. In addition, authorities found approximately 8,452 still images and 186 videos of child pornography on Boroczk’s computer. He was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and with manufacturing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Boroczk admitted to taking pornographic pictures of his kids, to touching them sexually, and sending pornographic images over the internet. Although he initially claimed that he did not think he had done anything wrong and that his children seemed to be having a good time, his level of remorse later “dramatically improved” and a doctor stated that Boroczk’s clinical prognosis for successful long-term rehabilitation was excellent. Another doctor noted research showing that incest sexual offenders recidivate at a lower rate than extra-familial sexual offenders. The government argued that all of the relevant sentencing factors favored the maximum possible sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The district court imposed a 70-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Boroczk had described himself as a “kingpin” of child pornography. View "United States v. Boroczk" on Justia Law