Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Suggs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 300 months. He challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, succeeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced him to 240 months. After his 2009 resentencing, Suggs obtained new information that he argues was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A key witness has recanted and claims that his first statement to law enforcement did not implicate Suggs. The government agreed that if this were Suggs’ first 2255 motion, the evidence would require an evidentiary hearing, but sections 2244(a) and 2255(h) restrict “second or successive” motions to circumstances that do not apply. The Seventh Circuit denied permission to bring a second challenge, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), finding that his new evidence did “not come close to showing that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.” Suggs filed a new 2255 motion, arguing that the new evidence challenge should not be barred because his resentencing imposed a new judgment. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Magwood v. Patterson, did not address this situation. View "Suggs v. United States" on Justia Law

The Mungiki are a violent, outlawed sect, notorious for extortion, torture, and murder by dismemberment. The Kenyan government has been unable to bring the group under control. At age 14, Wanjiru accepted his teacher’s invitation to join the Mungiki, unaware of the group’s character. He was afraid to leave because the Mungiki punish defectors by execution. At age 20 he came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2005. He briefly attended school. He was arrested in 2009, following a sexual encounter with a woman he met in a nightclub while intoxicated. Wanjiru pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and received a suspended sentence, requiring surrender to immigration authorities. He petitioned for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and deferral under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The IJ found that Wanjiru was convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” was not persuaded of the Kenyan government’s acquiescence in the threat to Wanjiru, and denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the CAT does not exist only for persons with unblemished records. The possibility of deferring removal rather than withholding it exists for people who might be undesirables but who are entitled not to be sent to experience torture.View "Wanjiru v. Holder" on Justia Law

McMurtrey pled guilty and was sentenced to 180 months in prison for possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The plea reserved his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. He claimed that the warrant was obtained with an affidavit that was deliberately or recklessly false. McMurtrey made a sufficient preliminary showing under Franks by offering police officers’ affidavits that were contradictory on which of two houses should be searched. The affidavits also indicated that each officer previously had contradicted himself in providing information to the other. Rather than hold a full Franks hearing, the district court held a pre-Franks hearing and permitted the government to offer additional evidence. The defense was not permitted full cross-examination. The court relied on the evidence to find that the defense was not entitled to a full Franks hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the procedure was erroneous. A court should not allow the government to present its evidence on the validity of the warrant without converting the hearing into a full evidentiary Franks hearing, including cross-examination. View "United States v. McMurtrey" on Justia Law

Aguirre pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) by illegally reentering the U.S. after a prior deportation that had followed a felony conviction and was sentenced to 48 months in prison. He argued that he should receive a below-guideline sentence because the Northern District of Illinois did not have a “fast-track program” to defendants shorter sentences in exchange for very prompt guilty pleas and waiver of nearly all trial and appellate rights. While the district court imposed a sentence that was below the guideline range, the downward variance was not based on the lack of a fast-track program. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prosecutor’s response to Aguirre’s request for a fast-track plea agreement was not deceptive and the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing, to the effect that Aguirre failed to show he could have qualified for fast-track status under any program in any other district, was both accurate and fair. The district judge did not legally err in his understanding of fast-track disparity mitigation arguments at sentencing. The court noted that it has never imposed requirements that a defendant must fulfill before making a fast-track disparity argument at sentencing. View "United States v. Anaya-Aguirre" on Justia Law

Clarke cooperated in a scheme to defraud her employer. The scheme netted more than $250,000; Clarke’s share was $50,000. She pled guilty to committing a fraudulent act that caused a loss of $8,000 and was sentenced to 14 months. Clarke was a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. An alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); “aggravated felony” includes an offense that involves fraud in which the loss exceeds $10,000. Removal proceedings were instituted after Clarke completed her prison sentence. She filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asking that her conviction be set aside because neither the judge nor her lawyer had advised her that she could be removed if convicted. Her lawyer had told her there might be “immigration consequences.” The district court denied the motion. She has been removed to Jamaica. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The one-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. A lawyer’s failure to advise his client concerning a critical consequence of conviction can be a “fact” supporting a claim of ineffective assistance, but in this case it could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence within a year after the plea. View "Clarke v. United States" on Justia Law

In a trial on drug charges, the district court excluded an exhibit labeled “Roberson Seizure 2,” the testimony of Koop about the recovery of latent fingerprints from that exhibit, and testimony regarding comparison of the latent prints with patent fingerprints known to be the defendant’s. The judge suspected that the government had tampered with the fingerprint evidence and threatened to grant a mistrial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct. The Seventh Circuit ordered that the evidence be admitted and that the case be reassigned to another judge. The trial resumed and resulted in conviction of the defendant and a sentence of 340 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the fingerprint evidence and to the impact of the 11-day hiatus on jurors. With respect to its earlier mandamus decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that the district judge “seriously disrupted the prosecution’s case … on the basis of utterly baseless but damaging imputations of grave (criminal, really) prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Herrera" on Justia Law

An officer stopped the car because Weir, a front-seat passenger, was not wearing his seat belt. The officer ascertained that the driver lacked valid registration documents or proof of insurance, but possessed only an open title. The officer decided to impound the car. He ordered the passengers out of the vehicle and asked whether they possessed any weapons. Weir told the officer that he had a pocketknife. The officer conducted a patdown, removed the small pocketknife from the pocket of Weir’s trousers, and felt an object in Weir’s pocket that he believed was a large sum of money. The officer removed the money from Weir’s pocket, counted $6,655, and seized it. As the traffic stop progressed, officers determined that the car had been reported stolen and that there were digital scales in the car that could be characterized as drug paraphernalia. Weir was allowed to leave the scene, but the driver later implicated Weir in a drug conspiracy, claiming that the money was the proceeds. The Seventh Circuit rejected Weir’s challenge to the seizure of the money and later denied rehearing. View "United States v. Weir" on Justia Law

Keskes owned and managed Asena, a resale operation that sold goods on its own website, eBay, and Amazon.com. Between 2006 and 2009, Keskes sold more than $3.5 million in merchandise and disbursed more than $12.2 million but none of its checks was written to manufacturers of products sold. Instead, Keskes wrote checks totaling $3.1 million to “Cash” and another $2.1 million to individuals. FBI agents searched Keskes’s warehouse and seized enough merchandise to fill 350 large boxes. Many items still had security tags or store price tags on them. No documents were found to indicate a legitimate source. Convicted of six counts of wire fraud and five counts of mail fraud, Keskes was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s comment that a judge had issued a search warrant for Keskes’s warehouse, that the court erred in admitting testimony about “gypsies” being thieves and testimony about statements attributed to a man named “Robert,” and that the court erred at sentencing by relying on his silence as a sign of a lack of remorse and by relying on an inaccurate fact. View "United States v. Keskes" on Justia Law

Bueno and Zavala belonged to a drug trafficking organization investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Bueno’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop; although he was detained beyond the time reasonably required to conduct a traffic stop, the delay justified in light of the circumstances that developed during the stop. Zavala’s sentence of 480 months was justified by application of enhancements under sections 2D1.1(b)(12) and 2D1.1(b)(14)(E) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Bueno" on Justia Law

In 2006 defendant, a Nigerian living in Chicago, learned that police were at the home of a co-conspirator. He called his home and heard strange voices. He warned his drug supplier that the police were closing in, then called relatives and had them send an alias Nigerian passport and a plane ticket. He picked up the documents and ultimately flew to Amsterdam, where he evaded arrest for five years. After a year of fighting extradition, was returned to the U.S., pleaded guilty to a heroin offense, and was sentenced to 116 months. The sentence was within the guidelines range because the judge added two levels for obstruction of justice. Without that addition his range would have been 87 to 108 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although there is no general federal crime of obstruction of justice, section 3C1.1(1) of the guidelines adds two offense levels to the base level if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” The court opined that, although defendant had no duty to surrender, “This certainly describes the behavior of the defendant in this case.” View "Unted States v. Nduribe" on Justia Law