Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of charges stemming from his involvement in a document-fraud operation that made fake Chinese passports and other identification documents. Defendant challenged the district court's application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L2.1(b)(5)(B) for fraudulent use of a foreign passport. The court held that, to avoid enhancing defendant's sentence twice for the same offense conduct, the Sentencing Commission has directed judges not to apply any specific offense characteristic for the transfer, possession, or use of a "means of identification." Because a foreign passport is a "means of identification," the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Defendant's deadline for filing a notice of appeal was July 22, 2013. On July 17, he filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. By statute a motion for sentence modification must be brought under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and motions under that rule do not extend the time for filing an appeal. The district court denied reconsideration on July 19 and defendant filed his notice of appeal on July 30. Because defendant's notice was eight days late, the court dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit against the City and the police deputy superintendent who had ordered him to be processed criminally for allegedly driving his personal vehicle while drinking alcohol. A breathalyzer test detected no alcohol in plaintiff's bloodstream but he was cited for driving a motor vehicle with an open container. The charge was dropped after testing of the contents of the container indicated that it did not contain alcohol. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and state-law claims. The court concluded that, given the eyewitness accounts and the presence of a bottle labeled as containing an alcoholic beverage in plaintiff's car, a reasonable person would have believed that plaintiff had committed a DUI offense; there was probable cause to administer the breathalyzer test with a warrant given the exigent circumstances; the deputy superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity; and plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim failed. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Seiser v. City of Chicago, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and one of the predicate state felony convictions upon which the district court relied was a federal conviction under Illinois's felon-in-possession statute. The court concluded that the petition was blocked by 28 U.S.C. 2255(e), which restricts a prisoner from applying for habeas review where a prisoner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion already has been denied and that motion was not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Petitioner presented the same argument that he made to the initial sentencing court - the court misconstrued the text of the Illinois statute, to this court on appeal, and to the district court in his motion for relief under section 2255. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mathews, Jr. v. Rio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., after he was attacked by a fellow prisoner which resulted in blindness in one eye and serious impairment in the other eye. Plaintiff was released from prison while his suit was pending and failed to notify the court of his new address. Consequently, the suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff, through counsel, later sought to set aside the dismissal twice and the district court denied his motion both times. Given the unusual gravity of plaintiff's injuries, the absence of any suggestion of prejudice to defendant from the delay in suing, and the district court's cursory treatment of the issue of equitable tolling, the court vacated and remanded to the district court for further consideration of the tolling issue. View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law

The State appealed for the second time the district court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. On remand, the district court held that petitioner's trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington and granted the petition. The State appealed, arguing that the district court analyzed the state court's decision under section 2254(d), instead of analyzing independently whether petitioner was being held unconstitutionally under section 2254(a). The court concluded that, although the district court used incorrect language to describe its job on remand, it recognized its duty to correctly review petitioner's claim under section 2254(a). The court agreed with the district court's assessment that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights and affirmed the district court's order to release or retry petitioner. View "Mosley v. Butler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and law enforcement officers, alleging that plaintiff's arrest was not supported by probable cause. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to excuse a prospective juror for cause on the grounds that she held a prior belief concerning the possession of firearms by convicted felons, which plaintiff believed made her unfit to serve. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred by refusing to agree to an ad hoc alteration of the parties' agreed-upon jury selection procedures for the express purpose of ensuring that the petit jury would include jurors of a certain race. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the prospective juror for cause, nor did it do so by denying plaintiff's motion to adjust the agreed-upon size of the petit jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Marshall v. City of Chicago, et al." on Justia Law

Before entering his mother’s wedding reception, Miller smoked marijuana. At the reception, Miller drank three shots of vodka in an hour and a half. Miller then dropped off his girlfriend and went to a Kenosha bar. He smoked more marijuana and had three beers. He left for another bar, where he drank more beer, then bought a final Heineken for the road. He drove to a gas station to use a phone to call his girlfriend. At the same time, Kenosha police received a call about a stabbing that occurred two blocks away from the same gas station. Responding to an inquiry by Officer Gonzalez, Miller denied seeing anyone running. Gonzalez asked Miller his name. Miller, who was driving without a license and had been seen exiting his car with a beer, replied with the fake name. Miller admitted that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. Gonzalez told Miller, who was becoming increasingly fidgety and nervous, to take his hands out of his front pockets and not to run. Miller took off running with Gonzalez in pursuit. Another officer captured Miller, who was on the ground when Gonzalez jumped a fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw. The district court rejected Miller’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Miller, if believed, presented evidence from which a rational jury could determine that Gonzalez deliberately inflicted the blow that broke his jaw. View "Miller v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Albu, a Romanian citizen, applied for asylum in 2003. His application would have been deficient in a number of ways, but at the prompting of his attorney (who was subsequently convicted of asylum fraud) he engaged in deception, lying about religious persecution, his date of entry, and his home address. When his lies came to light, he was subject to 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6), which makes any person who files a frivolous asylum application permanently ineligible for any immigration benefits. He was placed in removal proceedings. Both the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals applied the statutory bar and denied him cancellation of removal. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Albu v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Light v. Caraway" on Justia Law