Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

McIntosh has an extensive history of bank fraud, escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), violation of supervised release, and failure to surrender, going back about 20 years. In 2009, the court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to an additional 16 months of imprisonment. He did not surrender, but rented a car and drove to Nashville. He failed to return the car. The district court found McIntosh guilty of failing to surrender, 18 U.S.C. 3146, and sentenced him to 60 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Lara, a citizen of Mexico, was 19 when he first entered the U.S. illegally in 1985. His wife and child joined him; they had three more children, each a citizen of the U.S. by birth. Lara was deported following a 1999 conviction for selling $50 worth of cocaine. In 2001, he unlawfully returned to the U.S., pled guilty to illegal reentry, and was sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), which requires an offense level increase of 16 levels if, prior to deportation, the defendant is convicted of a drug offense that results in a term of imprisonment exceeding 13 months. Lara argued that he did not receive the sentence until his probation on the drug offense was revoked. The court found that he ultimately received a three-year sentence for the drug trafficking offense prior to deportation. The court also upheld the decision not to grant a downward departure under Note 8, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which applies to unlawful entry if a defendant has “assimilated” to the local culture, noting that Lara did not move to the U.S. until he was an adult and has a lengthy criminal history. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Lara" on Justia Law

Harney and Muldoon occupy one unit of a three-unit Chicago building; DeVarela occupies another. In 2004, DeVarela contacted police to complain about damage to her vehicle. Midona’s police report noted an “unknown offender.” Months later, DeVarela’s dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident. Days later, DeVarela telephoned Midona, claiming that Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her. Months later DeVarela again called Midona and showed officers a videotape that may have shown Harney and Muldoon damaging the car. The next day Midona went to the building with detectives, and, outside the unit, told Harney that he was under arrest. While outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite them in, but did not instruct them to remain outside. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed them that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney did not know that they were in the unit until then. Harney and Muldoon were found not guilty of damaging the vehicle and sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) Midona and the city. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harney v. Devarela" on Justia Law

Preacely pleaded guilty in 2009 to tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The district court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release, with a special condition, prohibiting him from participating in his former occupation of tax preparer. When the district court imposed the special condition, counsel asked: “may he own the business if he himself does not prepare any taxes himself?” The court responded, “No … you should not engage in the business of tax preparation directly or indirectly.” After his release from prison, Preacely transferred ownership of his business to his wife, but when an undercover IRS agent asked to speak to the vice-president, he was directed to Preacely. The IRS also executed a search warrant at the business and interviewed a number of employees. The district court revoked Preacely’s supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and that Preacely was involved only administratively with the business by doing things such as dropping off food, office supplies, and signing paychecks. View "United States v. Preacely" on Justia Law

Henry pleaded guilty to drug offenses in Iowa state court. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, suspended, and 5 years’ probation. The same day, Henry and Parazine drove to the Chicago area. On the way, Henry used his cellular telephone to contact his Chicago-area drug supplier. Henry purchased heroin and cocaine from his supplier, intending to distribute the drugs in Iowa. They were stopped by law enforcement in Illinois. The Iowa court revoked Henry’s probation and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. Henry was subsequently charged in federal court and pleaded guilty to two counts of using a communication facility to further commission of a drug felony. As part of his plea agreement, he waived the right to appeal any part of his sentence. The district court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, rejecting Henry’s argument that his plea was not knowingly given because the district court did not explain that his federal sentence could be consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. The court also rejected a claim that his waiver of appellate rights is ineffective because it stands or falls with the plea. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Wolfe was convicted on one count of bank theft and one count of interstate transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. 2113(b) and 2314 for his role in a copper theft scheme. The district court sentenced Wolfe to 88 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release and ordered restitution in the amount of $3,028,011.29. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Wolfe was deprived of a fair trial because of statements the prosecutor made during closing argument that Wolfe was a knowing participant of the scheme from the beginning and his testimony was not to be trusted. The prosecutor supported this contention by highlighting the fact that Wolfe would not even identify himself on the video. The court also upheld the sentence and restitution order. View "United States v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In 2006, B.T., 14 years old, was failing in high school. Her friends accused her of making a bomb threat. She attempted suicide. In July 2006, B.T. told police that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted her between June and August 2004 when she was 12 years old. Dietrich was charged repeated first-degree sexual assault of a child and intimidation of a child victim. Dietrich sought in camera review of B.T.’s counseling records. Dietrich believed the records would show that though the alleged sexual assaults occurred in 2004, B.T. did not tell her therapist about the assaults until after her April 2006 suicide attempt. The state trial court declined. Dietrich was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Wisconsin courts, Dietrich sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Dietrich’s due process rights were violated when the state trial court did not conduct the requested in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The state court reasonably applied precedent, as Dietrich failed to make a plausible showing that the victim’s counseling records contained evidence material to his defense. View "Dietrich v. Smith" on Justia Law

As part of a major interagency effort to combat gang violence and drug trafficking in Racine, Wisconsin, state and federal officers identified Matthews as an “impact player” and used a confidential informant to target him in a series of controlled buys. Matthews sold crack cocaine to the informant on five occasions in 2010. He was indicted on five counts of distributing crack, pleaded guilty to two, and was sentenced to 78 months in prison, the midpoint of the sentencing guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district court deferred to the 18:1 crack-to-powder sentencing ratio adopted in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and rejected an argument for a 1:1 ratio. The judge’s decision to adhere to the ratio endorsed by Congress and the Commission does not make the resulting within-guidelines sentence unreasonable merely because other judges in the district exercised their discretion to use a different ratio. A sentence disparity that results from another judge’s policy disagreement with the guidelines is not “unwarranted” under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Nine defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana; two were also charged as felons in possession of firearms. All were convicted. The sentences were: Moreland 110 months, Smith 151, Bailey 216, Pitts 420, and the others life. Only one defendant, Shelton, was charged with a substantive drug offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the risks inherent in charging conspiracy. The court also rejected an argument that excusing persons who have vacation plans, business commitments, or employment demands tilts the jury’s composition away from the more affluent members of the community and makes jury selection unrepresentative. The court upheld the district court allowing a law enforcement officer to testify as both a lay witness and an expert witness View "United States v. Moreland" on Justia Law

Purnell sold crack cocaine to an undercover agent (27 to 61 grams) on three occasions. During one transaction, Purnell revealed a pistol. In 2007, he pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine in excess of five grams, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and knowingly carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). With a prior drug distribution felony, he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years, but was sentenced to only 78 months. Under the agreement, the government dismissed two charges for distributing more than 50 grams, which carried ten-year mandatory minimum sentences; agreed not to seek the prior offender sentence enhancement (21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1)(A)), and agreed to move for a reduction in Purnell’s guideline offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Purnell waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence, except on grounds that the waiver was involuntary or defective for ineffective assistance. Purnell later sought a reduction in his sentence for crack cocaine distribution in light of the retroactive 2011 reductions to the sentencing guideline ranges, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s consideration of specific instances of false statements Purnell made to the court. View "United States v. Purnell" on Justia Law