Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Over the course of two days in late 2009, Taylor went on a shooting spree in Aurora, Illinois. He fired his black 9 millimeter Beretta semiautomatic pistol on residential streets, at family homes, and at a moving vehicle, all in an apparent attempt to retaliate against rival gang members. Taylor was arrested and charged with possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony. Before his jury trial, Taylor unsuccessfully moved to exclude evidence of two other guns that officers had recovered at the scene of his arrest. The jury found Taylor guilty of violating the felon-in-possession statute. Based in part on the violent circumstances of Taylor’s crime and his extensive criminal history, the district court imposed a sentence of 480 months’ imprisonment, nearly 13 years above his advisory guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motion and the sentence and rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Huber operated a Ponzi scheme in which 118 investors lost a total of $22.6 million. He told investors, mainly friends and acquaintances, who trusted him, that he administered investment funds, using a computer trading model. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud and related crimes, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. A receiver appointed to marshal and distribute remaining assets found $7 million, roughly 24 percent of the total amount and has distributed all but about $1 million to the 118 investors. Instead of distributing recovered assets pro rata among the investors, the receiver made a distinction, counting withdrawals made before discovery of the scheme as partial compensation (“rising tide” method). Those investors argue that he should have used the “net loss” method, under which each investor would receive a sixth of his loss. The district court approved the method of distribution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the investors did not withdraw “their money,” but withdrew portions of the commingled assets in the Ponzi schemer’s funds. View "Merel v. Duff" on Justia Law

An officer responding to a report of gunshots, saw a Hispanic male running toward a building. A witness told the officer that her cousin had been shot by a black male and was hiding in an apartment in that building. Officers approached the apartment. Delgado, the Hispanic male, and the shooting victim, with a visible graze wound, emerged from the apartment. Officers detained Delgado and, without a warrant, searched his apartment, finding firearms. Delgado was indicted as a felon in possession and for possessing an unregistered firearm. The district court agreed that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances, but found that it was a valid protective sweep and denied a motion to suppress. Delgado entered a conditional plea. The government conceded that the search was not a valid protective sweep, but argued that a reasonable officer could have believed that the shooter was in the apartment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that, absent any indication that anyone was in the apartment or had been subjected to violence inside the apartment, the mere fact that the shooter was at large was not enough for a reasonable officer to believe that the shooter was in the apartment. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Foster sold crack cocaine to a paid confidential informant through a series of controlled buys facilitated by federal agent and was charged with several counts of knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine base. He was convicted on four separate counts. The district court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly admitted evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause and improperly rejected his request for a missing witness instruction and erred by not applying the Fair Sentencing Act in the imposition of his sentence. View "Unted States v. Foster" on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Pelletier admitted during a job interview with the FBI that he had pornographic pictures of children on his home computer, which he claimed were related to research. The admission occurred in an unlocked polygraph room, in the presence of an unarmed agent. Pelletier signed a form that provided: “I understand that I am not in custody, that my participation in the polygraph examination is voluntary, and that I may leave at any time.” Another agent, wearing his badge and sidearm, told Pelletier that “you don’t have to answer any questions.” Pelletier refused a request for a computer search, but admitted to “inadvertently” creating child pornography by recording himself having sex with a girl. The agent directed another agent to go to Pelletier’s home and freeze the premises, telling Pelletier that he was going to try to get a warrant. Pelletier signed a consent form. The FBI found more than 600 images of children on his computer. Pelletier conditionally pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(5)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Pelletier was never in custody; voluntarily consented to the search; and the contents of the computer inevitably would have been discovered with a search warrant. View "United States v. Pelletier" on Justia Law

In 2000, Townsend’s Pontiac was stolen by means of breaking a window. The car was seen at a bank 15 miles away. Two armed men stepped out, wearing gloves, dark clothes, and masks. The attempted robbery failed; they fled without any money. Later that day, police found Townsend’s Pontiac, containing the masks, gloves, jacket, and sweatshirt. Investigators recovered latent prints; for reasons unknown, the fingerprints were not immediately analyzed. Investigators also recovered a hair from the gloves and a DNA sample from a mask. having a “mixed,” partial profile, with incomplete DNA sequences from two people. The profile was uploaded in 2001 and immediately registered multiple “hits” on unknown individuals. In 2008, Indiana upgraded its equipment to allow for more sensitive testing, retested the hair, and extracted a complete DNA profile. The database hit on Hagler. Police picked him up and collected a fresh DNA sample. Hagler’s DNA matched that on the mask as a “major contributor;” his brother was likely the minor contributor. One recovered print matched Hagler. Hagler and his brother were first indicted for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C.2 & 2113, in 2009. Hagler was ultimately convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution was untimely. View "United States v. Hagler" on Justia Law

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Plowman was a local government official in Indianapolis when he accepted a bribe from an undercover FBI agent. He was videotaped discussing payment for “taking care of” a zoning variance. The agent gave Plowman $5,000. Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Plowman from arguing an entrapment defense. The district court granted the motion. A jury then convicted Plowman of federal-funds bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1), and attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). Plowman was sentenced to 40 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To argue entrapment to a jury, Plowman needed to provide sufficient evidence of both inducement and a lack of predisposition, but he failed to establish the first element. View "United States v. Plowman" on Justia Law

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law