Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to seven counts of violation of child pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by supervised release for the rest of his life, and payment of restitution to two women, “Amy and Vicky,” in the amount of $3,367,854.00 and $965,827.64; pornographic images of them, as girls, were found in the defendant’s possession. On appeal, the government defended the sentence but not the restitution award, and challenged allowing Amy and Vicky to intervene (rather than merely to be heard under the Criminal Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(4)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the prison sentence and the calculation of the victims’ losses, but vacated the order of restitution and remanded for determination of how much to subtract from Amy’s losses to reflect restitution that she has received in other cases and determination of whether the defendant uploaded any of Amy’s or Vicky’s images. Defendant will not be permitted to seek contribution from other defendants convicted of crimes involving pornographic images of the two girls and the girls will not be permitted to intervene in the district court. View "United States v. Laraneta" on Justia Law

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Based on a scheme that involved purchasing large quantities of cell phones, defaulting on payment, and shipping them for resale, Natour was convicted of four counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2314. At sentencing, the district court attributed to him a loss amount of approximately $292,000 and determined that he was “in the business of receiving and selling stolen property,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(4), resulting in a 14-level increase to the base offense level under the Guidelines. The district court sentenced Natour to 28 months’ imprisonment on all counts, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $104,742.16. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that the conviction violated the Grand Jury Clause. The terms used in 18 U.S.C. 2314 are not of a wholly independent character, and the offense conduct proved at trial and stated in the jury instructions were within the charges approved by the grand jury. The court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to. Natour as a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property and the court used both an acceptable method and evidence-based mathematical figures in arriving at a loss calculation. View "United States v. Natour" on Justia Law

Hible was charged with conspiracy involving distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine; distribution of cocaine; and distribution of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841, 846). The government filed notice under 21 U.S.C. 851 that it would seek an enhanced sentence due to Hible’s prior felony drug conviction. The law in effect at the time had a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for a defendant who distributed 5 grams or more of crack cocaine and had a prior felony drug conviction. In January 2011, Hible pleaded guilty distribution of 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, initially asserting that he should be sentenced under the new Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, under which he faced no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum term of not more than 30 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (C). The district court reviewed the presentence report, which recommended an offense level of 39, criminal history category VI, and an advisory range of 360 months to life and imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hible waived his right to appeal , having failed to assert any right to be sentenced under the FSA at his sentencing. View "United States v. Hible" on Justia Law

A chiropractor pleaded guilty to defrauding health insurers and to money laundering and was sentenced to 70 months (the bottom of the guidelines range) and to pay restitution of almost $2 million. At the guilty-plea hearing the judge asked the defendant whether he was “currently under the influence of any drugs, medicine, or alcohol,” and the defendant answered: “prescription medications.” He told the judge that he was taking medicines for “high anxiety, depression, adult attention hyperactivity disorder, and depression,” but stated that he was “thinking clearly.” He waived his right to appeal, but six weeks later moved to retract the plea, claiming that he had been taking psychotropic drugs, rendering his plea involuntary. The judge denied the motion because the defendant had presented no evidence that switching from Prozac to Lexapro could have the dramatic effects he claimed it had, and because at the plea hearing he had been alert and responsive and exhibited no signs of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Unted States v. Hardimon" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers were investigating gunshots heard near an intersection and learned that one person had been shot in the leg and was recovering at a hospital. An officer approached a backyard shared by two duplexes on one of the streets and noticed bullet holes and a trail of spent casings in the area, including five casings next to one of the duplexes and a casing in the yard itself. Without a warrant, he entered the backyard and found and seized a rifle, which belonged to Schmidt, who was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). The district court denied his motion to suppress. Schmidt pled guilty and was sentenced to 21 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that any danger had dissipated by the time of the search given the heavy presence of police and passage of a few hours’ time. A reasonable officer could have believed that there were other exigent circumstances, i.e., wounded victims in the backyard; the officer’s warrantless presence in the backyard was justified even if the backyard were curtilage and the scope and breech of the rifle were in plain view once he was there. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

The Flukers, father, son, and daughter, operated various fraudulent, Ponzi-like schemes that duped victims into investing millions of dollars. By the time the overall scheme ended in 2007, the Flukers had already received more than $16 million from one scheme, involving more than 3,000 people, and more than $2.6 million from another, involving more than 25 people. Bank records demonstrated that the money received was never invested in any significant way in order for a return to have been generated. The three were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 by mail and wire fraud. The district court found the father “the person who is most responsible for what happened.” Though the Sentencing Guidelines called for a range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment, daughter was sentenced to 96 months’ incarceration, plus restitution of $10,783,960.45. The district court sentenced son to 96 months’ imprisonment with restitution of $7,336,957.49. Father was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus $7,336,957.49 restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, to calculation of the sentences, and to the district court’s decision to provide the jury with an “ostrich” instruction. View "United States v. Fluker" on Justia Law

White created a website to advance white supremacy and included a statement that “everyone associated with the Matt Hale trial has deserved assassination for a long time.” The site also included information related to the foreperson of the jury that convicted Hale, a white supremacist, of criminally soliciting harm to a federal judge. Although a jury convicted him of soliciting the commission of a violent federal crime against a juror, 18 U.S.C. 373, the district court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that White was guilty of criminal solicitation, and that White’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the conviction and remanded for sentencing. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the contents of the website, its readership, and other contextual factors, White intentionally solicited a violent crime against Juror A by posting Juror A’s personal information on his website. Criminal solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

On December 23, 1980, police found a body in a ditch and another nearby; both had been shot in the head. Months later, an informant implicated Pamela Thompkins; she was arrested and confessed to assisting her former brother-in-law (Willie Thompkins) and a friend in a robbery that became double murder. Willie agreed to talk after receiving Miranda warnings. During interrogation, he took a phone call from an attorney, but continued to talk without invoking his right to counsel; in court for a bond hearing, he confessed. A jury convicted him, based on his confession, eyewitness testimony, and evidence from the scene. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal and years of state post-conviction proceedings, the Governor commuted the sentences of all death-row inmates, and Thompkins was resentenced to life. He exhausted remaining post-conviction claims. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the right to counsel had not yet attached when Thompkins confessed, so the trial court properly declined to suppress the confession, or in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on procedural default and lack of factual support. View "Thompkins v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Before selling 13.4 grams of crack cocaine to a police informant in 2010, Ousley had five felony drug convictions. Departeingthe scene of the transaction, Ousley initially eluded officers and abandoned his vehicle. Officers apprehended him, searched his apartment, and discovered 579 grams of crack cocaine and several firearms. Ousley was convicted of distribution of more than 5 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and felony possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851, the government had expressed intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Ousley’s prior convictions. Because Ousley had at least two prior drug felonies and possessed more than 50 grams of crack cocaine that he had intended to distribute, 841(b)(1)(A) required a sentence of life imprisonment on the possession-with-intent-to-distribute count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments precludes a mandatory life sentence for dealers who possess a smaller quantity of crack cocaine than the quantity of powder cocaine necessary to trigger a similar sentence.View "United States v. Ousley" on Justia Law