Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Adams was sentenced, in Illinois, to 180 days in jail plus three years’ probation for a 1981 armed robbery; he committed a second robbery while on probation. He was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery. Paroled in August, 1984, he promptly violated, but was re-paroled in December. He committed another armed robbery in January 1985 and was sentenced to 25 years. While confined, Adams committed aggravated battery of a guard. He had not been out for long when he was caught with a firearm, convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Adams conceded that two convictions qualify as violent felonies but argued that two do not, given 18 U.S.C.921(a)(20), which provides that restoration of civil rights causes a conviction to be disregarded for federal felon-in-possession statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1984 Illinois repealed statutes that had allowed criminals to possess firearms beginning five years after release from prison; his civil right to possess firearms was not restored and that right would not have been restored even under the pre-1984 version of Illinois law, since he has not spent any five-year period out of prison. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant, a black Muslim inmate of an Illinois Federal Correctional Institution, was attacked by Mexican inmates. Later, locked in his cell, defendant attacked another Mexican inmate, kicking and stomping him with steel-toe boots and slamming his head into a bunk. The victim had not participated in the earlier attack and made no effort to defend himself. Defendant was convicted of “assault resulting in serious bodily injury,” 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6), and sentenced to 46 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not inflict “serious” bodily injury,” defined as involving “a substantial risk of death,” “extreme physical pain,” “protracted and obvious disfigurement,” or “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” The victim was bloody, had difficulty walking, required 16 stitches on his head, and had scratches, abrasions, and contusions. His nose was broken and his eyes swollen shut; he had headaches, pain in his face and shoulders, and several loose teeth. He exhibited signs of post-traumatic stress syndrome, for which Zoloft was prescribed. Judge Posner expressed bafflement that inmates are required to wear steel toed boots and stated that there was no basis for a jury instruction on self-defense. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jaquari died from asphyxiation by an elastic band from a fitted bed sheet. That day, his mother, Harris, disciplined her sons for leaving the apartment while she out doing laundry. The state argued that Jaquari would not stop crying and that Harris strangled him while five-year-old Diante slept in the bunk above. The defense claimed that Jaquari had wrapped the elastic around his own neck and accidentally asphyxiated himself. A videotaped confession, recorded the day after Jaquari’s death following 27 hours of intermittent interrogation, was admitted. Diante, has maintained since the day after Jaquari’s death that his brother wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that neither parent was present. The trial court determined that Diante (then six) was not a competent witness, improperly reversing a presumption of competency, requiring the defendant to prove competency. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected direct appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Exclusion of defense evidence violates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause where evidence is material to the outcome and the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the state’s legitimate interests. Harris was denied effective assistance. Counsel did not interview Diante, did not secure a witness to show that Diante’s recollections were consistent, and did not challenge the burden of proof. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Quinn pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment with supervised release for life, subject to conditions. His plea agreement contains a promise not to appeal the conviction or length of imprisonment. Both the Criminal Code and the Sentencing Guidelines authorize lifetime supervised release for such violations, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k); U.S.S.G. 5D1.2(b)(2) and the Sentencing Commission recommends “the statutory maximum term of supervised release” for every sex offense. While the judge explained the prison sentence, he did not address the length or conditions of supervision or address Quinn’s arguments about recidivism. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with respect to supervised release. One term of supervised release prevented contact with most minors without advance approval. Quinn has a young child, whom he has never been accused of abusing. Putting the parent-child relationship under governmental supervision for long periods requires strong justification. . View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

Owens, a Chicago zoning inspector, was convicted of two counts of federal program bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), for accepting two $600 bribes in exchange for issuing certificates of occupancy for four newly constructed homes. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there was insufficient evidence, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the issuance of the certificates of occupancy had a value of $5,000 or more as required by the statute. View "United States v. Owen" on Justia Law

From 2004 until 2010 Gaona’s brothers and others sent cocaine and marijuana from El Paso, Texas, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where associates would receive the drugs. Family or close friends of participants would then wire the proceeds back to El Paso or transport the proceeds by car under the guise of a family trip. In support of the scheme, Gaona wired $69,631 to Texas; traveled south by car on one occasion with proceeds totaling $45,751; accompanied another codefendant, on approximately eight occasions to wire money; and held drug proceeds for her brother on at least two occasions. When charged in connection with the scheme, Gaona negotiated a plea agreement under which she plead guilty to money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956). The agreement stated: “The government will not make a specific sentencing recommendation, but is free to present all facts to the court.” After the prosecution declined, at Gaona’s sentencing hearing, to recommend no prison time, and asked the district court to disregard Gaona’s pregnancy when imposing a sentence, the district court sentenced Gaona to 18 months’ imprisonment plus restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gaona waived her objection to any breach of the plea agreement. View "United States v. Gaona" on Justia Law

Smith, Evans, and Swanson were indicted for bank robbery and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Evans was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Swanson pleaded guilty and testified at trial that he had agreed to “stand guard” while the others robbed a bank. Unbeknownst to the robbers, FBI agents were watching the area in which Evans lived because an informant had described Evans as the perpetrator of previous robberies, intending to rob a bank later that day. Although agents lost track of their car during the time of the robbery, defendants were apprehended when they returned to the neighborhood; the description of the perpetrators matched the descriptions and attire worn by the three. Evans attempted to flee, but crashed the Cadillac. Officers searched the Cadillac and recovered a gun similar to that used in the robbery, black face masks, black stocking hats, and gloves. The district court denied motions to suppress and also allowed evidence identifying a footprint on the teller’s counter as belonging to the shoe Evans was wearing when arrested. The court sentenced Smith to 162 months and Evans to of 444 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Four defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the U.S. by impeding the functions of the IRS and of related fraud and tax offenses in connection with abusive trusts promoted by two Illinois companies. Although the system of trusts was portrayed as a legitimate, sophisticated means of tax minimization grounded in the common law, the system was in essence a sham, designed solely to conceal a trust purchaser’s assets and income from the IRS. It was promoted through a network of corrupt promoters, managers, attorneys, and accountants, but prospective customers who sought independent advice were routinely warned of its flaws. Defendants were sentenced to prison terms of 120 to 223 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Vallone" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law