Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gruenberg, who has accrued 230 misconduct reports since his incarceration for burglary in 1999, seized a set of keys from a prison guard and swallowed them. He was taken to a hospital, where an x-ray showed that the keys were lodged in his abdomen. A physician told the prison officials that Gruenberg would probably pass the keys naturally within five days. They returned him to the prison and kept Gruenberg naked and in restraints for five days until he passed the keys. After five days, Gruenberg had not yet passed them and surgery was needed to remove them. Gruenberg sued, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing qualified immunity. While the conditions were undoubtedly uncomfortable, there was no evidence that any member of the prison staff showed “deliberate indifference” to Gruenberg’s health or safety. Those conditions were a reasonable response to a “unique situation.” View "Gruenberg v. Gempeler" on Justia Law

Spears created and sold counterfeit documents, including fake Indiana driver’s licenses and handgun permits. He was convicted of aggravated identity theft, producing a false identification document and unlawfully possessing five or more false identification documents, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to aggravated identity theft. Spears sold his customer a fraudulent handgun permit bearing her own identifying information, which she then used in an attempt to buy a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), a qualifying predicate felony for aggravated identity theft. The statute covers more than misappropriation of another person’s identifying information; a person commits aggravated identity theft when he “knowingly transfers, . . . without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” during or in relation to a predicate felony. The Court also affirmed conviction for producing a false identification document. The fake driver’s license underlying this count was sufficiently realistic that a reasonable jury could conclude that it appears to be issued by the State of Indiana. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Spears’s production of the fraudulent driver’s license affected interstate commerce. The evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction for unlawful possession of five or more false identification documents. View "United States v. Spears" on Justia Law

Four defendants were convicted of: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 (Count One); attempted possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 (Count Two); possession of four firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three); and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony,18 U.S.C.922(g)(1) (Count Four). The charges arose from an undercover sting operation carried out by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, involving a confidential informant who brought up the possibility of robbing a fictitious drug “stash house.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, an entrapment argument, and challenges to sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Kindle" on Justia Law

The company, S.C. Johnson & Son, was injured by a bribery and kickback scheme involving a dishonest employee and transportation companies with which it had contracts and filed a tort lawsuit in Wisconsin state court. The company filed a second suit, against different transportation defendants, in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit, which raised state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by omission; criminal conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s bribery statute, Wis. Stat. 134.05; conspiracy to commit fraud; violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. 946.80, through racketeering activity and mail and wire fraud; and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by providing bribes and kickbacks. The court indicated that federal law preempted state tort claims because they could have “the force and effect of a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed, but theories based on bribery and kickbacks fall outside the scope of the preemption provision. View "SC Johnson & Son Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Because of the amount of crack involved, his base offense level was 36. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(2). The judge reduced the level to 33 because the defendant had accepted responsibility for his crime. His guidelines sentencing range, based on that offense level and a Category VI criminal history, was 235 to 293 months. Based on retroactive amendment to the guidelines, the judge ultimately imposed a sentence of 188 months. The defendant moved for a further reduction, which was refused. In an Anders brief, defense counsel pointed out that here was no possible basis for a further reduction, as “Amendment 706 provides no benefit to career offenders.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed defendant’s appeal and granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

For several years Chapman, now 46, lured kids as young as 12 to his home with marijuana and alcohol and filmed them, usually through “peepholes,” engaging in sexually explicit conduct. He pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, a crime punishable by no less than 15 years in prison, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), (e) and faced a guidelines range of life imprisonment. He was sentenced to a total of 40 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court did not fully evaluate his arguments in mitigation, and failed to adequately explain its choice of sentence. Chapman exaggerated the evidenced presented at sentencing about his background; the “mitigating” factors he cited lacked evidentiary foundation or amounted to “stock” arguments that required no response from the judge. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury.

Charged with possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Dowell plead guilty in return for the government’s agreement to withdraw an information filed under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that Dowell had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. Without that withdrawal, Dowell would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The court nonetheless applied the “career offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and imposed a sentence of 180 months. Although Dowell claims to have instructed his attorney to file, a notice of appeal was not filed within 10 days, as required for timely filing. Dowell, therefore, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that failure to file constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Dowell’s agreement in his plea not to challenge his sentence on collateral attack precluded relief. The district court agreed with the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination as to whether Dowell told his attorney to file the appeal.

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved.

Robers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on his role in a mortgage fraud scheme; Robers signed mortgage documents seeking loans based on inflated income and assets and on his claim that he would reside in the houses and pay the mortgages. The loans went into default. The district court sentenced Robers to three years’ probation and ordered him to pay $218,952 in restitution to a lender and a mortgage insurance company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, requires restitution in the case of a crime resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property. The court rejected Robers’s argument that the MVRA requires the court to determine the offset value based on the fair market value the collateral had on the date the lenders obtained title to the houses following foreclosure as the “date the property is returned.” Money was the property stolen and foreclosure is not a return of that property; only when the real estate is resold do the victims receive money. Victims are also entitled to expenses, other than attorney’s fees and unspecified fees, related to foreclosure and sale.