Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Martin was the Sheriff of Gallatin County from 1990 until his conviction on 15 counts: marijuana distribution, possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, witness tampering, conspiracy to tamper with witnesses, and attempted structuring of financial transactions. The government obtained audio and video recordings of three deliveries of marijuana to Potts by Martin, while in uniform, in his patrol vehicle, and in possession of his service revolver. While incarcerated jail, Martin solicited inmates to kill Potts and another witness and took steps to obtain payments for the murders. Because of a bizarre case of mistaken identity, a non-juror was in the jury room for no more than five minutes before jurors lined up to enter the courtroom. Each juror testified that the individual did not speak to anyone in the jury room. The court notified the parties that it intended to proceed with the trial. Defense counsel did not object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the district court did not err in its inquiry into the potential jury tampering and in its determination that no improper communication or influence had occurred, but remanded for recalculation of the sentence.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2251(a), and was sentenced to 420 months, reserving the right to appeal the legality of the search of his computer. The warrant affidavit said that authorities had discovered that a pornographic video, which a 13- year-girl had made of herself and uploaded to the Internet, had been downloaded to a computer at defendant’s home and that images from that video had been uploaded from that computer to an image-sharing website. A Facebook message with a link to that website had been sent to the girl’s stepmother from the same computer. Authorities identified the computer’s Internet Protocol address as registered to the defendant. Defendant argued that the facts were stale and that there was no reason to believe that seven months after he had uploaded child pornography there would still be evidence of the crime on his computer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Staleness is highly relevant to the legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object, like cocaine, but rarely relevant to a computer file. Computers and computer equipment are “not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades.”

Defendant gave an informer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration $477,020 for 32 kilograms of what he thought was cocaine. After arresting him officers searched his apartment, with assistance and written consent from his 18-year-old niece, and found 13 kilograms of real cocaine. Defendant's niece had access to the apartment to assist defendant with child care.No charges were based on the real cocaine. He pled guilty to attempting to possess cocaine and intending to distribute it and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. His plea agreement provided that he could challenge the search, based on an apparent belief that he might be acquitted of attempted possession if the real cocaine were kept out of the case. The judge denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The police had a reasonable belief that the niece was authorized to consent to the search.

Plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but remain in state custody as civil detainees under Illinois’ Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. They filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Commitment under the Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not punishment. Generally persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Limitations imposed on their ability to interact with other detainees are justified by security concerns, even if not imposed by treatment professionals. Not allowing detainees to communicate by letter using the facility’s internal mail system does not impinge on a constitutional right or constitute punishment.

Sklena and Sarvey were floor traders in the Five-Year Treasury Note futures pit at the Chicago Board of Trade. Sklena was a “local,” authorized to trade only on his own behalf; Sarvey was a “broker” and could trade for himself and for his customers. On April 2, 2004, the price of the Five-Year Note futures fluctuated wildly. Sarvey and Sklena executed the series of transactions that resulted in criminal prosecution. According to the government, Sklena and Sarvey conspired to sell Sarvey’s customers’ contracts noncompetitively. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a civil complaint alleging that the two “engaged in a series of non-competitive trades” that defrauded customers out of over $2 million. Sarvey died before trial on charges of wire and commodity fraud and noncompetitive futures contract trading. In Sklena’s trial, the district court excluded Sarvey’s deposition as inadmissible hearsay. Sklena was convicted. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, but the court erred in excluding the deposition testimony.

Convicted of fraud, tax, and money laundering offenses, Swanson failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, but was apprehended as a fugitive in Seattle the next month. His presentence report recommended a four-level U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) enhancement for his status as an organizer-leader of criminal activity, driving his total offense level to 34 with a 151-188 month guideline range. Swanson’s trial counsel filed 13 pages of objections, including that the evidence revealed there was no criminal organization and to use of the 2001 guidelines. On remand, the court imposed a 151-month sentence. Swanson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel abandoned a poorly developed but winning objection to the enhancement. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel raised the objection twice and did not withdraw it; his performance was not objectively deficient. Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to make and sell false identification documents, such as documents identifying the bearer as a permanent resident of the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(1), (2), (f). His guidelines sentencing range was 37 to 46 months, but the judge sentenced him to 60 months, within the statutory maximum of 15 years. His lawyer filed an Anders brief in which he argued that there is no valid ground for challenging the sentence and asking to be allowed to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit allowed counsel to withdraw and dismissed. Although the departure was by 30 percent, the guideline range for the false-document offense rises in stages as the number of false identification documents increases, but only up to 100. Defendant was estimated to have been responsible for 2800 documents. The court did not “see how imposing a sentence 30 percent above the guidelines range could be thought excessive punishment for 28 times the number of fraudulent documents that triggers the highest guideline sentence, when a 1 percent increase in documents (from 99 to 100) would have increased his maximum guideline sentence by 39 percent.” Defendant also marketed computer software for producing still more counterfeit personal-identification documents.

Howard and Brown ended their romantic relationship. Howard alternated between attempts to reconcile and attempts to harm Brown. Howard sent letters begging see their son, but hired someone to throw acid in her face and paid a man to shoot at the train on which she works as an engineer. He was convicted of: interfering with a passenger train engineer, with intent to endanger safety and with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(6) and (10), 1992(b)(1); committing and attempting to commit use of a firearm, with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a train company employee while such person was inside of a passenger train located on tracks used in operation of a mass transportation vehicle, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(7) and (10), 1992(b)(1)’ and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “prior bad acts” challenge to admission of evidence to prove that Howard took repeated actions that were consistent with motive and intent to harm Brown and upholding denial of a motion to empanel a new jury after jurors sent notes to the judge concerning Howard’s behavior during voir dire.

In 1999, Hill was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that each of Hill’s prior convictions (attempted murder; two aggravated battery) qualified as a career-offender “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1), and a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and imposed a sentence of 276 months. He filed two unsuccessful petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance, two unsuccessful petitions to modify his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582, then filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224, claiming that his classification as a career offender and armed career criminal was erroneous and that he was “innocent” of the sentence enhancements imposed. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While noting that Hill’s conviction under the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-3, qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, the court held that the petition failed because Hill could not establish that the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Freeman and Garner were caught in a sting operation that used known drug associates as cooperating informants. Freeman and Garner showed up at the appointed time and place for the staged drug transaction in a minivan matching the description given by an informant. They remained at the scene for only a few minutes. As they drove away, police initiated a traffic stop. A search of the men and the van did not turn up any drugs, but the police arrested them. When Freeman was booked into the jail, he was strip-searched, revealing a bag of crack cocaine concealed between his buttocks. He was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced as a career drug offender to 30 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The police had credible information about Freeman’s drug-trafficking habits from the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior to his arrest coincided perfectly with details of the undercover operation, supplying probable cause to arrest. Based on his criminal history, the specific grounds for his arrest, and his fidgeting in his seat, there was adequate justification for a strip search. Freeman’s sentence was at the bottom of the properly calculated guidelines range.