Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brown was convicted in 2000 of being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), for which the maximum sentence is normally 10 years in prison. Following a remand, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and sentenced Brown to 264 months. Following an unsuccessful collateral attack on his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, he filed a second challenge in reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. United States, that driving under the influence is not within the catchall provision of the ACCA because a crime within the catchall “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent’, and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” The district court concluded that Brown had been convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses, and upheld the sentence. The government conceded that Brown could use the habeas corpus statute to challenge the legality of his sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ACCA did not cover either Brown’s Illinois conviction for compelling a person to become a prostitute or a conviction for possession of a gun while using drugs.

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail, was subjected to a pat down and strip search by defendant, a guard. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling plaintiff’s testicles and penis through the plaintiff’s clothing and, while strip searching him, fondled his nude testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to jail policy and without any justification. The guard denies the allegations. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the guard. He acknowledged that because the parties’ factual disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment he had to “presume that the defendant grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals in a way that was not related to penological interests,” but concluded that plaintiff had “presented evidence of only de minimis injury,” had “suffered at most an assault and battery,” and had presented no evidence concerning defendant’s “subjective intent.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. Excessive force is not the only means by which a prisoner’s civil rights can be violated.

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The motion to correct petitioner’s sentence was not a motion pursuant to Ind. Code 35-38-1-15 but a collateral attack on his sentence. Therefore, he had no constitutional right to counsel.

Reeves was arrested for his role in a heroine distribution ring. Prior to trial, the government informed the court and Reeves that it would seek an enhancement (21 U.S.C. 851) of any sentence resulting from a guilty because Reeves had, in 2004, pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to possession and sale of cocaine. He was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 843. Reeves objected to the enhancement, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that the attorney representing him during his 2004 guilty plea did not inform him that a guilty plea could be used against him later to trigger a statutory sentencing enhancement in federal court. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Reeves to 25 years in prison to run concurrently with a separate, lesser sentence of 8 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not unreasonable for Reeves’ attorney in the 2004 proceedings to fail to advise his client that a guilty plea could result in a later sentencing enhancement for a future crime.

Lemke met a woman while working as a serviceman in her home, pursued her, and eventually left threatening telephone messages for her. He also left threatening messages with the woman’s attorney and with men who shared the same name as a man the woman had dated. He ignored warnings from the FBI and was seen at the woman’s place of employment. He resisted arrest and was found to have a gun and ammunition and maps of the woman’s home. Convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which prohibits transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce, Lemke was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the sentence was below-guidelines and that Lemke’s actions were “disturbing and frightening.”

Thompson was murdered in 2001. Carter was 16 years old and Thompson was 19. No fingerprint, DNA, or physical evidence connected the murder to Carter, or to anyone else. Detectives picked up Carter and took her to the police station. She was not given Miranda warnings; no one told her that she was free to leave. Carter was effectively without any legal guardian. She was allowed to speak to her father for a few minutes and was given food and drink and eventually released. A few hours after Carter’s release, her apartment building caught fire. The cause was arson, and the fire started in the apartment where Carter and Thompson lived. Police again took Carter to the station, with no adult, and without stating her rights. A third trip to the station resulted in a stay of 55 hours. Carter was allowed to move around freely and was provided with necessities; she changed her story several times. She eventually received Miranda warnings, spoke to her parents, and confessed to the murder. She was convicted and sentenced to 30 years. The district court denied her petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was adequate evidence to conclude that the confession was voluntary.

Castillon was indicted for fraudulently using credit and gift card accounts for purchases totaling $139,063.23: conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C.1029(a)(2) and (3), (intentionally using an unauthorized access device, and knowingly possessing 15 or more such devices with intent to defraud); fraudulent use and possession of unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2); and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). Castillon pled guilty to conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. His presentence report revealed that he was born in Cuba and fled to the U.S. at age 17 and calculated his offense level at 16 and his criminal history category at four. His recommended guideline range was 33 to 41 months for conspiracy plus a consecutive, mandatory 24-month term for aggravated identity theft. Based on Castillon’s admission that he viewed fraud differently than violent crimes, the government argued that “Maybe there is a different attitude toward private property in Cuba.” Defense counsel did not object, but responded that there is an “attitude” in Cuba that “you’re pulling a Robin Hood.” He suggested that Cuban immigrants have a hard time adjusting. The court imposed a sentence of 48 months plus 24 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated; there is support for Castillon’s argument that his national origin was considered in sentencing.

Laguna immigrated to the U.S. with his parents in 1967, and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he was convicted of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, with other related offenses. Because those felonies qualified as crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an immigration judge ordered Laguna removed and required Laguna to obtain a Polish passport. In 2004, after he finished serving his state sentences, Immigration and Custom Enforcement released Laguna on an order of supervision, which also required Laguna to obtain a passport. In 2010 Laguna finally completed the requisite application. The Polish consulate confirmed that his passport would be available on April 21, 2010. Laguna refused to pick up the passport and was detained and convicted of willfully interfering with a final deportation order (8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1)(B) and (C) and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s exclusion of evidence that ICE’s liberal treatment of Laguna during supervision negated the element of intent.

Thi and Danh operated a Wisconsin nail salon, encouraged customers to pay with debit cards, and used a hidden camera to record them typing personal identification numbers into a keypad. They stored the numbers in electronic files, one of which contained more than 800 entries and was found on a flash drive in Thi’s purse. They sent the information to coconspirators in California, and used it for unauthorized withdrawals, for a total loss of more than $77,000. Charged with bank fraud and access-device fraud, Thi pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. This count related to six transactions, captured on ATM surveillance footage, that she completed using cards “recoded” with customers’ information. A probation officer calculated a total offense level of 22 and a criminal-history category of I, for a Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The district court directed her to pay more than $77,000 in restitution and sentenced her to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to adequately consider her arguments in mitigation, addressing her minimal role in the offense, the effect of her sentence on her young daughter, and the possibility of home confinement.

Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts.