Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
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After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

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Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

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Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

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Davis and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute 280 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Later, Davis was charged in an information for conspiracy to distribute 28 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010. That same day, Davis entered into a written agreement, which stated that Davis would plead guilty to the information and waive prosecution by indictment; the government would dismiss the indictment and recommend: the relevant conduct attributable to Davis is at least 196 grams but less than 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine; an applicable base offense level of 30; a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and an additional one-level decrease for timely notice of his intention to plead guilty; and a sentencing recommendation at the low end of the applicable guideline range. The Presentence Report, incorporating the recommendations, assigned a total offense level of 27 (base level of 30 minus a three-level decrease) resulting in a range of 130–162 months. Davis made efforts to withdraw his plea, complicated by his switching lawyers, and repeated disputes about the facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 120- month sentence, rejecting claims that the statements made by the government ran counter to the agreed-to recommendations.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

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FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy. View "United States v. Cejas" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Maranda exposed himself to a six‐year‐old girl, then exposed himself to a drive-through window cashier and attempted to pull her into his car. He pleaded guilty to public indecency and was sentenced to home confinement. Months later, Maranda molested a six‐year‐old. He was released from state prison in 1998 and downloaded child pornography. He was arrested, and pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2002, Maranda was released and began serving of supervision. In 2005, he was arrested on an allegation that he molested a nine‐year‐old. He pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery. The court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to another 30 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Maranda’s sentence was to expire on March 16, 2008, but the government filed a petition under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248, which authorizes detention of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released. His release was automatically stayed. His hearing occurred more than four years later. The district court ruled that Maranda was not subject to commitment. He was released in 2012; days later, he began receiving phone calls from another convicted sex offender in violation of a release condition. His probation officer petitioned for a second revocation of supervised release. Maranda moved to dismiss, arguing that supervised release began on the day imprisonment ended. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Read together, the supervised‐release provision, 18 U.S.C. 3624(e), and the stay‐of‐release provision in the civil‐commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a), establish that he was not “released from imprisonment” while awaiting the outcome of his civil commitment proceedings. View "United States v. Maranda" on Justia Law

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In 2003 defendant, a member of the “Concord Affiliated” Gary street gang, was convicted of two counts of having distributed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Although the jury acquitted him of conspiracy, the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had been a member of the conspiracy and reasoned that the sales of crack by the other members, to the extent that those sales had been reasonably foreseeable, constituted “relevant conduct” and a correct basis for calculating the guidelines sentencing range. Determining that defendant had foreseen sales “way in excess of” 1.5 kilograms of crack (the then-threshold quantity for the highest base offense level (38)) sentenced defendant to 360 months. The judge also remarked that defendant was more likely than not involved in murders in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2005. Defendant later moved for a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive lowering of the base offense level for offenses involving crack. The district judge denied the motion, ruling that defendant had been responsible for the sale of at least 16.9 kilograms. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the lower court misunderstood the meaning of “relevant conduct.” The possible significance of the murders remains an unresolved issue. View "United States v. Davison" on Justia Law

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Based on a tip that Gutierrez was involved in drug trafficking, officers went to his home with a certified narcotics canine and knocked at the front door. They saw movement inside, but no one answered the door. The officers had the dog examine the door for the scent of narcotics, and he alerted. After knocking for 15 minutes, the officers forcibly entered and secured the home, but did not search. An officer swore out an affidavit, relying on the dog’s positive alert, and returned with a search warrant. The ensuing search revealed 11 pounds of methamphetamine in Gutierrez’s home. A few months later, the Supreme Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on an individual’s porch is a Fourth Amendment search. Gutierrez pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum, 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Davis v. United States, the evidence should not be suppressed if “binding appellate precedent specifically authorize[d]” the officers’ conduct at the time they acted. Seventh Circuit precedent did authorize the officers’ conduct. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

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In 2000, Marr’s father founded Equipment Source, which sold used forklifts. Marr managed sales and daily operations, advertising online and selling online or by phone. In 2002, his father opened a merchant account at Palos Bank, to process credit card transactions, with Marr as a signatory. Marr sold forklifts that he never owned or possessed. Customers would contact Marr to complain that they received an invoice and notice of shipment, and that Equipment Source charged the credit card, but that the forklift never arrived. While Marr gave varying explanations, he rarely refunded money or delivered the forklifts. Customers had to contact their credit card companies to dispute the charges. The credit card company would send notice of the dispute to Palos Bank, which noticed a high incidence of chargebacks on Equipment Source’s merchant account and eventually froze the company’s accounts. Its loss on Equipment Source’s merchant account was $328,881.89. In 2003, the FBI executed a search warrant at Equipment Source’s offices and Equipment Source ceased doing business. Eight years later, the government charged Marr with six counts of wire fraud. At trial, the government presented testimony from 14 customers who paid for forklifts but never received them; two bank employees who dealt with chargebacks, and a financial expert witness, who confirmed the $328,881.89 loss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Marr’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the government relied upon improper propensity evidence, that jury instructions incorrectly explained the law, and that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution. View "United States v. Marr" on Justia Law

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Charged with four counts of transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1); and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(5)(B)McLaughlin pled guilty to one count of transporting child pornography. His collection included photographs of adults sexually abusing pubescent and prepubescent minors, children engaged in sexual acts with animals, and children engaged in sexual acts with other children; he had more than 150 videos and more than 500 photographs of child pornography. He was sentenced to 130 months’ imprisonment, a fine of $50,000, and 20 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of the four-level sentencing enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(4) for “material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.” The court also rejected arguments that the sentence was based on speculation and unfounded allegations; that the district court failed to address his argument regarding his unusual susceptibility to abuse in prison; and that the court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing a $50,000 fine. View "Unted States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law