Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In a 1998 attempt to kill a member of a rival gang, gang members shot and killed Jacqueline Brenaugh, when she peered out of her apartment window After being arrested, Coleman admitted serving as an accomplice. The confession was recorded. He moved to suppress his confession, claiming that he had invoked his right to an attorney several times and that the police had proceeded in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The court denied Coleman’s motion, holding that “the credibility is resolved on behalf of the State.” Convicted of first-degree murder under an accomplice liability theory, Coleman was sentenced to 28 years. On appeal, he included an affidavit from his attorney, Wiener, stating that Wiener had called the police station during the interrogation and requested that police cease questioning his client. After exhausting state appeals and post-conviction remedies, Coleman filed a pro se habeas petition. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In 2006 Rann was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 years for each sexual assault conviction and 15 years on the child pornography conviction. Rann unsuccessfully pursued direct appeal in state court arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not seek to suppress incriminating evidence in the form of digital images obtained without a warrant from a zip drive and a camera memory card. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rann’s challenge to the warrantless search of digital media devices brought to police by his victim (his 15-year-old biological daughter) and his victim’s mother was without merit. Because he cannot prevail on his Fourth Amendment argument, Rann’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland fails.

Garvey and four coconspirators engaged in a scheme to steal lawnmowers, tractors, trucks, ATVs, snowmobiles, and trailers along the Minnesota-Wisconsin border and then transport and sell the stolen items. Thomas and Olson were responsible for stealing the items; Wyttenbach and Trejo assisted in storing and selling. At various times, Garvey was involved in all aspects of the scheme. Garvey was charged with conspiring to transport, possess, sell, and dispose of stolen vehicles and goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and eight counts of theft, transportation, or sale of specific stolen vehicles or goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2312-15. All four co-conspirators pled guilty and testified against Garvey. Over the course of the four-day trial, the government called 31 witnesses and presented phone records which demonstrated frequent interaction among Garvey, co-conspirators, and buyers. The jury convicted Garvey on six of the nine counts. Garvey was sentenced to 60 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that misstatement of the court’s subpoena power prevented Garvey from calling a witness to impeach one of the co-conspirators and that a mistrial should have been declared after the prosecutor’s questioning prompted a witness to declare that he smoked marijuana with Garvey.

West was convicted of second degree sexual assault of a child (Wis. Stat. 948.02(2)) and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment followed by six years’ extended supervision. He claimed that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a 14-month delay between the filing of charges against him and the scheduled start of his trial. This delay prejudiced him, he claims, because his allegedly key alibi witness, Robinson, died in the interim. The state court rejected his constitutional claim and summarily affirmed his conviction. West sought habeas corpus relief in the district court, which denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record contained ample evidence supporting the state court conclusion that West was not prejudiced by the delay. Robinson did not die anywhere close to the “presumptively prejudicial” 12-month mark; rather, he passed away six months after the state filed its complaint.

Guzman, seven-and-a-half months pregnant, home alone, in bed, heard the doorbell and knocking. She walked toward the door. Sergeant Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department burst through the door. Officers wearing body armor rushed in, many with guns drawn. Guzman, fearful and crying, was ordered to lie face down on the floor. When she tried to position herself more comfortably, Rojas forced her down, pressing her pregnant belly against the floor. The Joint Gang Task Force executed a warrant, searching the apartment for about an hour. Guzman sued. The district court entered summary judgment in her favor, finding Bonnstetter and Rojas liable. At a damages-only trial, Guzman proved medical expenses. The court allowed defendants to testify that the search was legal and reasonable and that others might have caused Guzman’s injuries. The court instructed the jury that Guzman had to prove that Bonnstetter and Rojas were “personally involved” and could not be held “liable” for the conduct of “other employees.” The court instructed the jury to award nominal damages if Guzman failed to prove that her damages were the direct result of defendants’ conduct. Guzman was awarded $1. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendants’ theory of the case and evidence and the instruction likely confused the jury.

A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison’s permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers’ “Ten-Point Program,” which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of “gang literature” in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he’d copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. “Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample.” The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff’s 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty.

After being rejected for a mortgage because Hall had a bankruptcy and their joint income was too low, Phillips and Hall applied with Bowling, a mortgage broker, under the “stated income loan program.” Bowling prepared an application that omitted Hall’s name, attributed their combined income to Phillips, doubled that income, and falsely claimed that Phillips was a manager. Phillips signed the application and employment verification form. Fremont extended credit. They could not make the payments; the lender foreclosed. Bowling repeated this process often. He pleaded guilty to bank fraud and, to lower his sentence, assisted in prosecution of his clients. Phillips and Hall were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1014. The district court prohibited them from eliciting testimony that Bowling assured them that the loan program was lawful and from arguing mistake of fact when in signing the application and employment verification. They argued that they were hindered in showing the lack of intent for a specific-intent crime. The district judge concluded that they sought to argue mistake of law. Jury instructions required acquittal absent a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants knew that the statements were false; genuine mistake of fact would have led to acquittal.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Rivas, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1970 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, DHS charged Rivas with removability because of a 1980 conviction for statutory rape. At his hearing Rivas argued that the conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony and that he was not removable. The IJ rejected the argument and a subsequent motion to reopen. In 2010 Rivas was removed to Mexico. Two months later Rivas filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim barred by 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), which prevents courts from hearing challenges to the execution of removal orders, and also that Rivas was not “in custody” as required under 28 U.S.C. 2241(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Rivas’s situation is sympathetic, but consideration was precluded by multiple jurisdictional bars.

While officers were following a vehicle in which Jones was riding as a passenger, Jones threw a handgun out the window. The driver pulled over and officers obtained consent to search from both Jones and the driver. Jones had an empty handgun holster around his waist and 18 grams of marijuana in his shoe. The officers then retraced their route and retrieved the handgun from a driveway a few blocks away. Jones admitted the gun was his. He was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and was sentenced as an armed career criminal based in part on a prior Illinois conviction for vehicular fleeing, which the judge counted as a third violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to life. The judge sentenced Jones to 184 months, just above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a vagueness challenge to the residual clause. The court noted that a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected the argument, albeit only in response to dissents, not in the more formal sense of deciding an explicit void-for-vagueness challenge.

An investigator downloaded child pornography videos from an internet protocol address registered to Miller and searched Miller’s home. Miller told agents that they might find child pornography. The search yielded computers and an unconnected hard drive containing multiple video files and images of child pornography. Miller’s wife stated that she had confronted Miller about the pornography on his computer, that his six-year-old granddaughter had alleged that Miller had watched her get undressed and inappropriately touched her, and that Miller’s teenage stepdaughter claimed that Miller “regularly” walked in on her while she showered. Miller voluntarily admitted that he had downloaded child pornography. Charged with distributing, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), (b)(1); 2252(a)(2); 2252(a)(4), Miller testified that he did not “seek out images of naked children.” The court allowed questions about allegations by his granddaughter and stepdaughter, but prohibited extrinsic evidence concerning the allegations and instructed the jury that the evidence was relevant only to questions of intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. While it was error for the court to admit the evidence without first weighing probative value against risk of unfair prejudice, the error was harmless because evidence of guilt was overwhelming.