Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1990, defendant, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered the US. Between 1994 and 2005, he was convicted of multiple crimes, including theft and drug offenses, and was deported twice. In 2009, he was convicted in state court of attempted aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to four years in prison. While serving that sentence, he was discovered by immigration authorities. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry without a plea agreement, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). At sentencing, after a 16-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), the district court determined an offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of IV. The corresponding range was 57-71 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: defendant was deprived of the opportunity to argue for a concurrent sentence and should therefore be given credit for time already served on his attempted aggravated kidnapping conviction; to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, a below-Guidelines sentence is appropriate to account for the lack of a fast-track program in the Northern District of Illinois; and that that the district court erred when it added a 16-level enhancement.

Defendant, a 27-year-old Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. after being deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and was sentenced to 71 months, the top of the 57-71 month guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should not have taken into account 41 arrests that had not resulted in convictions without determining that defendant had actually engaged in conduct for which he was arrested. A court may not rely on the prior arrest record itself in determining a sentence, but may consider underlying conduct detailed in arrest records where there is sufficient factual basis to conclude that the conduct actually occurred. For 15 arrests there was a summary either of a petition for adjudication of wardship or of the arrest report. The defendant did not question the accuracy of any of those and did not suggest that the other 26 arrests were ungrounded. The judge was entitled to assume that the arrests considered as a whole, coupled with five convictions, gave a more accurate picture of the likelihood of recidivism than the convictions and arrest summaries alone and justified the sentence. Given defendant’s criminal record, there was no basis for a cultural-assimilation adjustment.

Mortier was a major marijuana distributer with a network of street-level sellers around Madison, Wisconsin. He disappeared in 2004, and the District Attorney’s Office opened a John Doe proceeding to determine whether a crime had been committed. Prosecutors subpoenaed Mortier’s known drug associates, including Stadfeld. Rather than assert his right to remain silent and follow the steps necessary to obtain formal immunity, he talked to investigators informally in exchange for an oral nonprosecution agreement. Stadfeld’s counsel mistakenly advised him that this nonprosecution agreement immunized him against the use of his statements by state or federal prosecutors. Almost four years later, based in part on his statements to the investigators, Stadfeld was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Stadfeld was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stadfeld’s statements were not the product of law-enforcement coercion, and the erroneous advice from his lawyers did not make his statements involuntary or inadmissible based on ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent that Stadfeld thought he had a comprehensive immunity agreement, it was conditioned on his telling the truth and he breach it by lying to investigators.

Dooley lied about her marriage status and income to obtain Social Security benefits and food stamps. While employed at a hospital, she stole credit cards and identification documents from approximately 100 patients, then made purchases on the accounts of the vulnerable (often helpless) people and used the credentials to obtain additional credit cards and Social Security numbers in spurious names, to defraud additional persons. She pleaded guilty to nine counts including three counts charged aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C.1028A, which provides that every conviction is punished by two years in prison and that every sentence must run consecutively to every sentence for a different crime. Sentences for multiple aggravated-identity-theft convictions may run concurrently with each other. The district judge determined the sentences for the six convictions other than under 1028A, and had to add at least 24 months; he was entitled to add 48 or 72 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judge’s decision to add 48 months and remanded for sentencing in light of considerations set out in USSG 5G1.2 Application Note 2(B) for determining whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive.

Kirkland was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and based on a finding that he had five “violent felony” convictions, including two drunk driving offenses, the district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After the Supreme Court determined in 2008 that drunk driving is not a “violent felony” as the term is defined in the ACCA, Kirkland filed a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Following remand by the Seventh Circuit, the district court concluded that an enhancement of Kirkland’s sentence under the ACCA was still appropriate based on his three remaining convictions for violent felonies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sparse record shed little light on whether two 1985 offenses that occurred on the same day occurred “on the same occasion.” If the “Shepard-approved” documents before a district court are equivocal as to whether the offenses occurred on the same occasion, the ACCA does not apply

Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison’s medical provider, Wexford, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, 42 U.S.C.1983. More than 10 months later, the district judge had not screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A(a) and has denied three motions filed by Wheeler. Defendants have not been served; the litigation is stalled. The Seventh Circuit ordered the district court to proceed. Ten months exceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly alleges a serious ongoing injury. Prisoners are not invariably wrong. A district judge should be able to spot a complaint violating Rules 18 and 20 within days of its filing, and solve the problem by severance (creating multiple suits that can be separately screened) or dismissing excess defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. .

Plaintiffs Willis and Owens, 14 and 16 years old, respectively, were arrested outside of Willis’s home for allegedly dealing drugs. They claim that after being transported to the police station, they were subjected to a strip search before being confined for several hours. Willis and Owens were released to their families after being charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and were ordered to appear at juvenile court a few weeks later. The charges were eventually dropped. Willis and Owens filed suit against the two arresting officers, alleging false arrest and an illegal search under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and malicious prosecution under Illinois state law. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning plaintiffs’ knowledge of suspicious activity and of drug sales and drug-selling techniques on the block.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sought an order to prohibit brothers George and Robert Michael, former owners, directors, (Robert), officer of Citizens Bank, from participation in the affairs of any insured depository, 12 U.S.C. 1818(e)(7), and civil penalties, 12 U.S.C. 1818(i), for violations of Federal Reserve regulations, breaches of fiduciary duty, and unsafe and unsound practices. The ALJ issued a 142-page decision with detailed findings showing that the Michaels engaged in insider transactions and improper lending practices and recommending that the FDIC Board issue a prohibition order and civil penalties. The FDIC Board affirmed the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Michaels urged overturn of numerous adverse credibility determinations and proposed inferences from the record in a way that paints a picture of legitimacy despite the Board’s contrary determinations. The court noted the deference owed the agency determination and found substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision..

Tello and Hill, members of the Latin Kings street gang, pleaded guilty to a charge that they conspired to conduct the affairs of the Latin Kings through a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Tello appealed, contending that the acts of racketeering referenced in his plea agreement varied materially from those alleged in the indictment. Hill challenged his sentence following a prior, successful appeal challenging his treatment as a career offender, claiming that the district court on remand substantially enhanced his offense level based on a ground that the government had waived by not raising it sooner. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Tello’s conviction, but vacated Hill’s sentence. Both the indictment and plea agreement contained sufficient information for Tello to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, and the two documents were wholly consistent with respect to essential elements of racketeering conspiracy. Tello admitted to the elements of RICO conspiracy; any disparity between the predicate acts of racketeering attributed to him in the indictment and the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy that he acknowledged in the plea agreement did not impact the validity of the guilty plea and conviction. The district court erred in applying the accessory guideline on remand.

In 2001, Dixon pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, with an agreement that the sentence would be 15 to 20 years. The district court imposed a sentence of 15 years, 10 months. In 2011, the Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement that made retroactive the terms of Amendment 748, which had lowered the offense levels for most crack cocaine offenses. U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(c); U.S.S.G. Appx. C., Amend. 750 (Part A). Dixon then filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied his motion, concluding that Dixon’s sentence was based on his binding plea agreement rather than on a Guideline sentencing range that had been lowered. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The precise phrasing of the statutory exception to the general rule that sentencing courts are not authorized to modify sentences after they are imposed indicates that a district court may exercise this authority “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Dixon’s sentence was not based on one of the guidelines that has been lowered.