Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Banks, a construction worker, wanted to flip houses, but did not have capital. John, a mortgage broker, suggested that they purchase homes from distressed owners at inflated prices, with the sellers promising to return money above what they owed their own lenders. Owners cooperated rather than face foreclosure. Banks renovated the houses using funds received from sellers and resold them. Johns collected a broker’s fee. When they purchased a house from owners in bankruptcy, they wanted a mortgage to secure payment from the sellers and informed the trustee of the bankruptcy estate. Despite protestations by the trustee, the sale went through, and Banks used the rinsed equity to pay off sellers’ creditors through the trustee. The sellers’ lawyer discovered the scheme, which led to indictments. Johns was convicted of making false representations to the trustee regarding the second mortgage and for receiving property from a debtor with intent to defeat provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. With enhancements for financial loss and for targeting vulnerable victims, Johns was sentenced to 30 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions, but remanded for clarification of sentencing enhancements.

McKinney and his brother own a construction business. In 2003, the IRS filed notice of tax liens and pursued collection. McKinney avoided payment by transferring money from the business into accounts used for personal expenses. He made false statements about his ability to pay. He failed to pay taxes during 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Because of the tax liens, McKinney was unable to obtain a residential mortgage. His wife obtained a loan to purchase a home, falsely stating that she was a full-time manager of the construction business with a gross monthly income of $15,374.23. Her husband signed a false employment verification; he earned the income used to pay the mortgage. His brother and his brother’s wife acted similarly. McKinney entered a plea to charges of conspiracy to defraud, impede, impair, obstruct, and defeat functions of the IRS in collection of income taxes, 18 U.S.C. 371; tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201; and false statements to revenue agents, 26 U.S.C. 1001. He received a two-level enhancement to his base offense level for failing to report income exceeding $10,000 from criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 2T1.1(b)(1), and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder, Overstreet was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed and denied a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty proceedings. Counsel did not ask the judge to require spectators who wore buttons or ribbons with the victim’s picture to remove the displays of sympathy. He claimed that his lawyers failed to convey “effectively” or “meaningfully” the prosecutor’s offer of a plea bargain. A third argument was based on Overstreet’s mental problems. Psychiatric evidence indicated that on some occasions Overstreet would have lacked the ability to evaluate his legal situation rationally, but the district judge concluded that he understood the offer and discussed it intelligently with his sister.

A former bailiff-nightclub owner, then 70 years old, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of an unregistered firearm. 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and was sentenced to 78 months, the bottom of the guidelines range. Defendant’s lawyer sought to withdraw on the ground that he could not find colorable ground for appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that the sentence was reasonable and not a de facto life sentence. The Census Bureau indicates that life expectancy of a black male aged 70 is 12.4 years. Even without time off for good behavior, which could reduce the sentence to 5 years and 8 months, the sentence does not exceed life expectancy. Propensity to engage in criminal activity declines with age and “age may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration,” U.S.S.G. 5H1.1, but this defendant is devoted to guns and drugs. He is 6'7," weighs 230 pounds, is in good health, and physically capable of continuing indefinitely to engage in the illegal activities.

Mota was convicted of attempting to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and of possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846. At the start of his jury trial, Mota learned that a government agent had failed to record and relay exculpatory evidence regarding a conversation between the agent and co-defendant Ponce, during which conversation Ponce assumed complete responsibility for the crime and proclaimed Mota’s innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” argument. While the failure to transmit exculpatory evidence was inexcusable, Mota learned of this evidence at the start of his trial and thoroughly presented it to the jury. He had opportunity to cross-examine the negligent agent and Ponce testified on his behalf; he was not denied a fair trial. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony from the government informant who met Ponce and Mota in order to conduct a drug deal and the audio recording of this sting operation.

Defendants were convicted of conspiring to entice underage girls to engage in prostitution, to transport them (along with adult women) in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution, to use force and fraud to coerce adult women to engage in prostitution, and to commit related offenses and of the underlying offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1591, 2421, 2423. The judge sentenced ringleaders to life in prison and another to 324 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the indictment was “duplicitous." With respect to an argument based on the government’s frequently posing leading questions, the court stated that the judge was too hard on the prosecution. One defendant’s argument that his 324-month sentence is grossly disproportionate to his role was frivolous, but another defendant was entitled to remand because of an ambiguity in his sentence. At the sentencing hearing the judge imposed life sentences on him on seven counts for which the jury convicted him, and on the other seven counts of conviction imposed sentences ranging from 5 to 10 years. The judge added that the sentences are “all to be served consecutively to each other.” The written judgment, however, states that all the sentences are “to be served concurrently.”

Collins served as a city councilman and vice-mayor of East St. Louis. In 2002 he moved to the suburbs, but continued to use his previous address to vote East St. Louis and to establish residency for election to as precinct committeeman for the Democratic Party. Federal agents checked tax filings to verify his residency and discovered that Collins had not filed federal or state income tax returns for almost two decades. Convicted of multiple counts of tax evasion, willful failure to file tax returns, and voter fraud, he was given a within-guidelines sentence of 50 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court used pattern jury instructions for tax evasion, which properly define the required element of willfulness and need no clarification to distinguish tax evasion from negligent failure to file. It is not “remotely plausible” to attribute tax delinquency of almost two decades to negligence. The court properly stated Illinois law regarding requirements for establishing voting residency. The evidence was “easily sufficient” to support the verdict. Collins did not file tax returns, and to hide his income, commingled personal and business accounts, used a false Employer Identification Number, and misappropriated the Social Security Number of his deceased business partner.

Griffin was convicted of intentional possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Griffin was living with his parents and was, therefore, present in a home where firearms belonging to his father were present, but the government offered no evidence that would have allowed a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition by intending to exercise control over them. The weapons were found during a SWAT team search for Griffin’s brother.

Breshers entered a consumer installment loan business with a gun. Employees M and T told him they had no money. He directed them to leave their cell phones, lock the office, and get into T’s car. In the car, Breshers told them that he needed money. T suggested that they could get money from the business. He told her to drive back to the office and, once there, T wrote a check for $3,000. They unsuccessfully attempted to cash the check at a nearby bank. M and T then stated that they had about $1,000 at the business. , Breshers ordered them to return to the office, where they gave him $1,104. Breshers then instructed them to get back into the car. He released the two unharmed beside the highway. Convicted of kidnapping and interference with commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and 1951, Breshers was sentenced to 293 months of imprisonment and restitution of $44,618.50 (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A). The victims testified about emotional harm and expenses incurred as a result of the incident. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the restitution was unauthorized because his victims did not suffer physical injury.

A former inmate sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794–94e, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111–213, and the Eighth Amendment, claiming that prison officials ignored his need for placement in an ADA-compliant facility, and refused to consider him for a work-release program solely because he walks with a cane. Imprisoned for driving on a suspended license, the inmate had advanced osteoarthritis and vascular necrosis in his hip. The prison declined his request for installation of grab bars or for a transfer. The district court screened the complaint before service and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the court correctly dismissed the Eighth Amendment count, the inmate adequately alleged that refusal to accommodate his disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.