Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant supervised a "mule" who obtained heroin in Texas and transported it to Chicago as part of an enterprise with four confirmed participants. Following his conviction, the district court followed the recommendation of the probation service and imposed a two-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(c), applicable to "organizers, leaders, managers, and supervisors in an organization with fewer than five participants and not 'otherwise extensive.'" The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant was just a communication channel and characterizing him as a "middle manager in a drug enterprise" that was "otherwise extensive." Defendant "lucked out" to get only a 2-level enhancement; as a manager or supervisor in an "otherwise extensive" enterprise he should have received the 3-level enhancement in section 3B1.1(b).

Facing charges of conspiracy to kidnap, unlawful possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, defendant agreed to plead guilty solely to the marijuana-conspiracy charge. The district court sentenced him to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing. While acknowledging that the sentence may be substantively reasonable, the court stated that the sentencing court failed to adequately address whether the violent acts by co-conspirators were foreseeable. Defendant’s coercion argument was without merit.

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA.

Defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 240 months, in part because of previous convictions for the same crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding exclusion of a defense witness on the ground that he was an alibi witness and the defense had not given the prosecution the notice required before trial by FRCP 12.1(a). The proposed testimony, that defendant was calm at his employment as a personal trainer two hours after the robbery, would have no probative value. The court also rejected a challenge to the photo array shown the bank manager, whom the robber had confronted after forcing entry shortly after the bank had closed. The array was suggestive, but any error was harmless. There was no doubt that the dust mask found outside the bank was the robber’s, and DNA found on the dust mask matched defendant’s DNA; all of the bank employees gave a description that matched defendant.

Plaintiff owned a rental center and retained defendants, who provide investment banking services to the equipment rental industry, to help him obtain an investor or buyer. Defendants’ advice culminated in sale of a majority of plaintiff’s stock for about $30 million. Defendants billed plaintiff $758,675. Plaintiff paid without complaint but later sued for return of the entire fee on the ground that defendants lacked a brokerage license required by Wis. Stats. 452.01(2)(a), 452.03. The district court dismissed, finding the parties equally at fault. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to definitively answer whether a license was required under the circumstances that a negotiated sale of assets fell through in favor of a sale of stock. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief even if there was a violation. Referring to the classic Highwayman’s Case, the court rejected claims of in pari delicto and unclean hands; plaintiff was not equally at fault. To bar relief, however, is not punishing a victim. Plaintiff did not incur damages and is not entitled to restitution. Plaintiff sought compensation for spotting a violation and incurring expenses to punish the violator, a bounty-hunter or private attorney general theory, not recognized under Wisconsin law. The voluntary-payment doctrine is inapplicable.

During a narcotics investigation, an informant (Tucker's brother-in-law) told the Task Force that Tucker was in possession of a stolen backhoe. Investigator Williams went to Tucker’s house, observed a backhoe, and asked Tucker about it. Tucker said that in the summer of 2000 or 2001, he bought it through a friend without any documentation. Williams took the serial number, told Tucker that it was not reported stolen, but asked Tucker not to move the backhoe. When Williams returned weeks later, neither Tucker nor the backhoe was present. Tucker later explained that he loaned it to Krulac. After tracing ownership, but without a warrant, Williams seized the backhoe from Krulac. Tucker never contacted the Task Force to object to the seizure or demand the backhoe be returned. The backhoe was returned to the titleholder. Tucker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth Amendment and due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the initial seizure of the backhoe satisfied the Fourth Amendment and due process requirements; that the Task Force was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and that Williams was entitled to summary judgment on the post-seizure disposition due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Christmas and Banks were acquitted of drug charges. Banks, on behalf of herself and her infant daughter sued the city and police officers, asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state law claims for false arrest, unlawful search, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After seven days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. During trial, plaintiffs moved for a mistrial and, at the conclusion of the trial moved for a new trial. In both motions, plaintiffs argued that they were denied a fair trial due to defense counsel's repeated violations of evidentiary rulings and improper comments to the jury. The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it could not concluded that defense counsel's conduct had a substantial influence on the jury.

Sheneman and his son purchased distressed properties, then flipped the properties by operating an elaborate mortgage fraud scheme that convinced unwitting buyers to purchase properties they could neither afford nor rent out after purchasing. Mortgage lenders were duped into financing the purchases through misrepresentations about the buyers and their financial stability. Four buyers with few assets and no experience in the real estate market purchased 60 homes. Most of the homes were eventually foreclosed upon. The buyers and lenders each suffered significant losses. Sheneman was convicted of four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 97 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to application of sentencing enhancements for use of sophisticated means and for losses of more than one million dollars.

Six defendants moved to reduce their sentences for cocaine violations (21 U.S.C. 846; 18 U.S.C. 2) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on the retroactive crack cocaine amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. At the time defendants were sentenced, offenses involving 1.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine were assigned the highest possible base offense level of 38 (USSG 2D1.1(c)). After Amendment 706, only offenses involving 4.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine are assigned an offense level of 38; offenses involving 1.5 kilograms to 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine are assigned a base offense level of 36. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendants were responsible for distributing more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine and, therefore, not eligible for relief.

Gay is a deeply disturbed Illinois inmate with a history of self-mutilation, scheduled for parole in 2095. Between 1996 and 2011, he filed more than 30 federal civil cases. Gay lost two at trial, settled two, and lost or withdrew the remainder. At least four were dismissed as frivolous, leading Gay to strike out under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, Gay may not proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. He sued prison mental health professionals, alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required him to post a $1,000 bond, which it knew he could not afford, to cover costs if this suit proved unsuccessful. The court required the bond without evaluating the merit of Gay’s claims. When Gay did not post the bond, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit reversed. District courts have several tools for dealing with indigent litigants who abuse the court system. Requiring a party to post a cost bond that the court knows the party cannot afford, however, is not one of those available tools for dismissing or discouraging frivolous suits.