Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1986 two victims were found murdered in their home. They had been stabbed numerous times and their home had been set afire. Whitlock and Steidl were convicted in 1987. They spent the next 21 and 17 years in prison, respectively, before each obtained reversal on the basis of numerous Brady violations. Whitlock and Steidl brought suit against state officials for violations of their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss some of the defendants. Following discovery the district court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment and set a trial date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an interlocutory appeal. The prosecutor is not protected by immunity from liability for alleged fabrication of evidence; presentation of perjured testimony violates a clearly established right. The state police defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on a claim that they took affirmative steps to quash an investigation to further conceal the evidence. The court rejected claims of sovereign immunity.

While on probation for a state drug conviction, Defendant-Appellant Mashica Spann met Carlos Hoffman in court mandated group therapy and joined his heroin-distribution ring. She was indicted in federal court for her role in the operation and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin. After rejecting Defendant's argument that she was a minimal or minor participant in the crime, the district court calculated her guidelines imprisonment range as 57 to 71 months without the mandatory minimum, which made the applicable range 60 to 71 months. The government moved for a sentence below the mandatory minimum, citing Defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation of Hoffman and others. The court granted the motion and sentenced Spann to 24 months, less than half of the mandatory minimum and more than a year below the government's most favorable recommendation. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and sought permission to withdraw. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit found "no basis to assail the reasonableness of the sentence," and accordingly, granted counsel's motion to withdraw.

Defendant-Appellee Ingrel Estiel Ortega-Galvan appealed his 41-month sentence for entering the United States without authorization after having been removed. The issue before the Seventh Circuit concerned whether and when a district judge could reduce a defendant's sentence after discovering an error in an earlier conviction, which left undisturbed, would support a higher sentence. The probation service calculated the defendant's criminal history as a category IV. The combination of a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of IV yielded a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months of imprisonment. Had it not been for a sexual felony Defendant committed as a teenager, his criminal history category would have been only II (based on a burglary and marijuana possession conviction), and his guidelines range (given his total offense level of 21) would have been 41 to 51 months instead of 57 to 71. Defendant should have been convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony for the sex offense because he was 16. His lawyer asked the district judge to eliminate the 16-point felony enhancement from his total offense level and also eliminate the felony from his criminal history. These two adjustments would have brought his guidelines range from 57 to 71 months down to 0 to 6 months. The judge refused to make the first adjustment, but made the second, reducing the defendant's guidelines range to 41 to 51 months; and she sentenced him at the bottom of it. "Had the district judge in this case, in computing the defendant's total offense level, shaved points off because the felony conviction was erroneous, she would have been failing to treat the guidelines as 'the starting point and the initial benchmark,' because determining whether a conviction that affects the calculation of the total offense level is valid is not a permissible step in that computation." Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge erred in "tinkering" with the guidelines range, but that the error was harmless. "[The judge gave Defendant the sentence she wanted to give him irrespective of the guidelines, and the sentence [was] consistent with sections 3553(a) and 3661 of the Criminal Code." Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Plaintiff-Appellee Chaunte Ott was wrongly convicted and incarcerated for the 1995 murder of Jessica Payne. He brought a civil rights action against the City of Milwaukee and several police officers. This appeal was filed when Plaintiff served subpoenas on two non-party state agencies, the Wisconsin Crime Laboratory and the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Rather than comply, the state agencies filed motions to quash. The district court denied those motions, at which point the state agencies filed this appeal, invoking jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that this was not a proper case for that basis of jurisdiction, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.Carpenter," (130 S. Ct. 599 (2009)): "[the Court added] that even if [it] read "Mohawk Industries" too strictly and jurisdiction [was] proper, [the Court] would find that the state agencies' arguments lack[ed] merit."

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.

During his intake interview, King informed the jail’s nurse that he had asthma, diabetes, a heart problem, high blood pressure, seizures, and mental health problems. The jail contracted medical services from a private company. The doctor, 300 miles away, visited once a week. The doctor did not obtain details about King's existing prescriptions, but scheduled him to be quickly weaned off of a drug that was not on the company’s formulary. The drug that was substituted was not normally appropriate for King’s conditions. Although King suffered side effects and requested to see a doctor, he was not seen by the doctor for 10 days. Later, when he was convulsing on the floor, the nurse indicated that he was "faking" a seizure. He was left lying on the floor, then moved to a padded cell, where he later died. His widow brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was significant evidence that the jail’s policies violated King’s constitutional rights.

Defendant robbed a bank and pleaded guilty to bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He received consecutive sentences of 36 months and 84 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, during the sentencing hearing, the district court denied him his right of allocution under FRCP 32. The six-page transcript showed that defendant spoke at length on a variety of topics, including his troubled childhood, his relationships with various family members, and his time in the U.S. military, before the court interrupted in a way that was not intended to intimidate or terminate his allocution.

Siblings of decedent, a 22-year-old inmate who committed suicide while incarcerated, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that staff members acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and mental illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management level defendants, the Wisconsin Resource Center defendants, and the nurse who was called after the suicide, but denied qualified immunity to staff members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the different levels of knowledge available to the defendants and that there is a clearly established right to be free from deliberate indifference to suicide

Between 2004 and 2008, Brown ran an elaborate scheme that tricked lenders into issuing fraudulent mortgage loans in Chicago and Las Vegas. Brown recruited or directed dozens of individuals: lawyers, accountants, loan officers, bank employees, realtors, home builders, and nominee buyers. Of his accomplices, 32 people were criminally charged. The Chicago scheme resulted in about 150 fraudulent loans, totaling more than $95 million in proceeds from victim lenders. The Las Vegas scheme resulted in approximately 33 fraudulent loans totaling about $16 million. Brown entered guilty pleas and was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment for the Las Vegas scheme and 240 months’ imprisonment for the Chicago scheme, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a restitution amount of more than $32.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Brown’s sentence, rejecting a challenge to the loss calculation. The court remanded the 66-month sentence and $7.1 restitution order against another participant in the Chicago scheme because the court incorrectly determined the number of victims.

Defendant was arrested while officers executed a warrant at his apartment, and, based on items found and statements to officers, was charged with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, possession of Ecstasy with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After denial of a motion to suppress, the case was dismissed without prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The grand jury returned another indictment, based on the same circumstances. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced, as a "career offender" and applying an obstruction of justice enhancement, to 300 months' imprisonment. After granting a motion to expand the record, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.