Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1984 petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and attempted robbery. During six jury selection striking sessions, both sides used all 20 of their peremptory challenges; the state exercised 17 on African-Americans. Two African-Americans served on the jury and one was an alternate. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Following the decision Batson v. Kentucky, 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded. The trial court accepted the state’s race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and conditionally vacated the convictions, holding that petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination. On remand the trial court found no Batson violation, again imposing the death penalty. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court dismissed a postconviction petition, claiming ineffective-assistance-of-counsel in the Batson hearing and a Brady violation based on nondisclosure of medical records that would have impeached a witness. On remand from the supreme court, the trial court dismissed because Illinois Governor Ryan had commuted the death sentence. The appellate court affirmed; the supreme court denied review. The federal district court denied habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed. It was unreasonable for the state courts to credit the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for several peremptory challenges.

Aegis sold sham “trusts,” promising asset protection and reduced tax liability. Clients paid initially paid $20,000 to $40,000 and an annual fee of $3,000 to $7,000. Defendants continued the scheme, despite a 2000 search of their office, investigation by the IRS and FBI, and participants receiving audit requests. Defendants received over $350,000 in fees and caused tax loss of about $6 million. Wasson was charged in 2006 with aiding in filing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The grand jury twice superseded the indictment to add Starns and Wolgamot, add counts under 7206(2), and charge all defendants with conspiracy to defraud the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 371. The third indictment was returned May 2, 2007. The district court made an unopposed finding that the case was complex and warranted excluding time until May 1, 2007, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A). Additional delays were attributable to new defense counsel, Starns’s death, Wolgamot’s plea, and government counsel’s participation in Guatanamo litigation. The district court rejected Wasson’s motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-74, found him guilty in December 2009, calculated his advisory guideline range using the 2008 Guidelines, and sentenced Wasson to 180 months, (middle of the range). The Seventh Circuit affirmed on all issues.

Two officers stopped plaintiff’s adult son for a traffic violation and found crack cocaine in the car. Daniel attempted to flee, resulting in a physical altercation. Plaintiff, who lived close, was told by a neighbor, “you have to get down to the corner,” “they’re killing your son.” Plaintiff claims she was calmly asking about her son when she was accosted and arrested for no apparent reason. The officer testified that plaintiff was yelling, being aggressive, and leading the crowd in a charge, so they arrested her and placed her in the prisoner wagon for five to ten minutes before releasing her. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court declined to exclude evidence of events that preceded her arrival and testimony that the events took place in a “high-crime area” and entered judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the case boils down to a credibility contest that was properly reserved for resolution by the jury and upholding in the district court’s balancing of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.

Plaintiff, an inmate waiting to be keyed into his cell, was wounded by a pellet fired in an attempt to break up a fight. He showed his wound to an officer, who refused a medical technician's request to move plaintiff to the health care unit. The prison was on lockdown. The technician never returned with medical supplies. Plaintiff made additional requests, but claims that the technician stated that she was told by staff not to document any treatment for gunshot wounds and would not give her name. Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance to the warden. Four days later, he was treated in the health care unit. The doctor expressed concern that plaintiff was not brought in on the day of his injury to prevent infection. Plaintiff claims that an internal affairs investigator was sent intimidate him into dropping his grievance. Plaintiff was placed on transfer to a facility where he had known enemies. The warden, grievance officer, and administrative officer determined that there was no emergency and no justification for compensation. His court-appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw and the district court dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that his claim for retaliation was prematurely dismissed.

After observing defendant and another selling crack cocaine, officers recruited a customer as a confidential informant and executed three controlled buys with audio and video surveillance. At trial defendant challenged the officers’ searches of the informant before the buys and failure to fingerprint baggies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the sentence of 158 months of incarceration, eight months above the recommended guidelines. The court rejected an argument based on the disparity between his sentence and that of his partner, who received only 134 months.

Plaintiff, a self-described tax consultant, worked for the county board of review (property tax assessments) for 10 years, until 2002. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962c, he alleged that defendants, elected and appointed board employees, flagged his clients' files and ran the board as a "pay for play" racketeering enterprise to extort campaign donations and consulting work from him. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not identify any statute, regulation, or contract that suggests his work as a consultant for private clients might be a constitutionally protected property interest. His allegations of improper treatment were implausible, negating both constitutional and RICO claims.

Defendant owned tobacco stores. Currency sales accounted for roughly half of the revenue. He directed employees to separate currency from credit-card and check receipts. He used currency to pay employees and suppliers and failed to report currency receipts on federal and state tax forms from 2002 to 2009. He channeled much of the currency (more than $60 million) to bank accounts in Lebanon, his homeland. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and impeding administration of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). With an upward adjustment of 2 levels for using sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), 2T1.1(b)(2), he was sentenced to 76 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although defendant did not create phony corporations, use fake names to open accounts, or employ technology to conceal assets, his conduct was sophisticated because he directed employees to separate currency receipts, he withheld funds from corporate bank accounts, and concealed the magnitude of his sales. He secreted money into foreign accounts by carrying currency and cashier’s checks during his travels, avoided reporting by depositing currency in multiple transactions (structuring or smurfing) 31 U.S.C. 5324; and washed money through the accounts of relatives and associates.

Defendants operated auto dealerships, and from 1995 to 2005, more than half their sales were to drug traffickers, who preferred to deal with defendants because they were willing to accept large cash payments in small bills without question. They falsified sales contracts and liens, ignored federal tax-reporting requirements, and arranged bank deposits to avoid triggering federal bank-reporting requirements. Defendants were convicted of 97 counts of RICO conspiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, illegal transaction structuring, bank fraud, and aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to management of the trial and sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected an argument that conviction of money-laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a), required to proof that defendants engaged in specified financial transactions for the purpose of laundering the "proceeds" of an underlying crime, and that "proceeds" means net profit of the underlying crime, not gross receipts. They were convicted of concealment and transaction-avoidance forms of money-laundering. At the time of trial, it was unclear whether proof of “proceeds” in a concealment or avoidance prosecution required proof that defendant laundered net profits of the underlying criminal activity.

Petitioner was arrested after a traffic stop and vehicle search. Charges were dropped when lab results revealed that plant material found in the vehicle was not marijuana. Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the officers lacked probable cause. The officers claimed to be following up on an anonymous tip. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The judge granted petitioner's motion for a new trial, without giving the officers an opportunity to respond. He ruled that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reasoning that the officer had fabricated the tip and that other officers offered false testimony to support this fabrication. The judge then recused himself and the case was reassigned. The judge granted reconsideration and reinstated the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not abuse his discretion by reconsidering the new trial grant, a non-final order, and determining that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no direct evidence contradicting testimony about the tip; the jury was able to weigh inconsistencies and make credibility determinations.

After two days of trial, defendant, charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); and one kilogram or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, pled guilty to unlawful use of a communication facility to further a drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 843(b). He signed waivers of indictment and of appeal. During the plea colloquy, defendant stated that he had eight years of education, that he had never been declared mentally incompetent, and that he was not undergoing psychological or psychiatric care or using medications or any drug that would affect his comprehension. He stated that voluntarily accepted the plea and waivers. He later filed a letter with the court, ostensibly pro se, requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. His attorney moved to withdraw. The district court appointed new counsel, denied his motion to withdraw the plea and imposed a 34-month sentence, which amounted to time served, plus one year of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that the waiver was valid and encompassed his right to appeal denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.