Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The owner and a prospective tenant signed a residential lease at a home for which the owner had not yet obtained a certificate of occupancy. As the tenant began moving his belongings into the house, a building inspector reminded him that all rental property must have a certificate of occupancy before a tenant can live in the house. Visibly upset, the owner berated the inspector in the presence of a police officer, who arrested the owner for disorderly conduct. Following his conviction, the owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The district court dismissed the officer and later granted summary judgment to the inspector. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence supported that the owner was arrested for disorderly conduct and only later cited for failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy.

Defendants, charged with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by conspiring to conduct an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), appealed denial of motions to dismiss indictments, charging them, with other members of the "Chicago Outfit" with a pattern of racketeering activity, from the 1960s to 2005, including murders, extortion, obstruction of justice, and other crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that they failed to show sufficient overlap between the indictment and previous indictments to establish double jeopardy. All defendants were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a renewed claim of double jeopardy, claims based on the statute of limitations, challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, and challenges to handling of the jury. The court reversed the part of the sentencing assessing shares of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A.

Police, believing the car to be stolen and the driver intoxicated, stopped plaintiff's car and implemented high-risk procedures. Officers, equipped with body shields, identified themselves and loudly commanded the driver to show her hands and get out of the car. The driver did not comply, but reached for a compartment in the vehicle and lit a cigarette. She put her feet out of the driver-side window onto the door, while she leaned back toward the console. She picked up a water bottle and set it on the ground beside the car. Officers repeated the order for about 10 minutes before using an SL6 baton launcher to fire a warning shot that hit the vehicle. They continued to issue commands for five minutes, then fired four shots, hitting her legs. Plaintiff, who was highly intoxicated, required stitches and was unable to walk for a week. Her suit claiming excessive force resulted in a verdict in the officers' favor. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The officers had reason to know that they should mitigate the force being used in light of plaintiff’s lack of resistance and were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Campus police officers observed defendant using public computer terminals to download sexually explicit photos of young girls. He pleaded guilty to accessing an Internet website for the purpose of viewing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(b) and was sentenced to 45 months. He filed notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer sought to withdraw on the ground that all possible arguments are frivolous. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion, noting that the within-guidelines sentence is presumed valid.

Following criminal convictions involving controlled substances and a firearm, defendant, an illegal immigrant, was deported to Mexico in 2004. He unlawfully returned to the U.S. in 2008. Less than one year later, he was arrested for domestic violence and obstruction of justice and pled guilty in state court. He was charged with reentry by a previously deported alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court rejected an attempt to enter a conditional guilty plea, because he was unwilling to knowingly and voluntarily waive certain trial rights. Convicted, he was sentenced to 41 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed stating that the court did not coerce defendant into proceeding to trial. The plea colloquy transcript suggests that the court diligently and patiently questioned him about his willingness to waive his trial rights.

Defendant, convicted of several serious drug and firearm charges, received a mandatory life sentence. His counsel appealed on evidentiary grounds, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant then filed a habeas petition (18 U.S.C. 2255) asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The government admitted failure to timely file notice of enhanced penalty. The district court set aside the mandatory life sentence and held a hearing on other issues, then imposed a sentence of 480 months. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability with respect to the conviction, and affirmed the revised sentence. The district court reasonably considered defendant’s routine drug purchases.

Defendant disappeared while on release awaiting trial on a charge of possession of a gun by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was captured nearly three months later and pleaded guilty two weeks before his trial date. At sentencing, the district court granted him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a). In keeping with the plea agreement, the government moved for an additional one-level reduction, because it was satisfied that he had given timely notice of intent to plead guilty. The district court denied that motion, however, citing defendant's flight. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the additional one-level reduction is mandatory once the government determines that the U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) criteria are satisfied and makes the necessary motion. The court could have imposed a higher sentence by other means.

Cerna and Alexandru, Romanian nationals, resided in the U.S. illegally while participating in a scheme to defraud online auction bidders. Individuals posed as sellers on auction sites. A co-schemer would bid and "win." Another co-schemer would contact a legitimate bidder, state that the winner had backed out, and offer to sell the items. Victims were instructed to pay by wire transfer. Co-schemers, including Cerna and Alexandru, collected payments using false identification. The scheme had more than 2,000 victims suffering losses totaling over $6,000,000. Cerna directed co-schemers and received a larger share. Cerna and Alexandru have previously been deported for commission of crimes. Both pleaded guilty to wire fraud. The district court calculated Cerna’s guideline range as 168 to 210 months and imposed a 180-month sentence. The range for Alexandru was 70 to 87 months; he was sentenced to 87 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Cerna held a managerial role and rejecting claims that his sentence was unconstitutionally disparate from sentences of co-defendants and that the court misapplied USSG 3553(a) factors. Defendants forfeited an argument that their sentences should be reduced for delay—both have been in custody since September 2005 but were not indicted until 2007.

The prisoner's "skeletal" complaint alleged that, while escorting him down a hallway to segregation, guards instructed him to move against the wall. When he did not comply, a guard, “slammed” him against the wall, twisted his wrist, and caused pain that lasted for two months. The district court dismissed after preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for prisoner safety. Infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it appears, in retrospect, that the degree of force was unreasonable, and unnecessary in the strict sense. In tort law, any unconsented and offensive touching is a battery. Imprisonment strips a prisoner of that right to be let alone, and many other interests as well. In this case, action of the guards was in response to defiant behavior.

Defendant pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce to engage in sexual conduct with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423, and was first sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment with 10 years of supervised release, despite a guidelines range of 57-71 months. The court based the sentence on presumed prior acts by defendant and an unsupported assumption of recidivism. On remand, the district court again imposed a sentence of 240 months, despite the guidelines range and a government recommendation of 71 months, and added a lifetime term of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded. Although the district judge avoided the errors committed at the first sentencing, he did not give adequate reasons for the sentence.