Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002 Bell established mutual funds and raised about $2.5 billion for investment. Most of the firms to which the funds routed money were controlled by Petters. He was running a Ponzi scheme. There was no inventory. New investments paid older debts, with some money siphoned off for personal use. When Petters was caught in 2008, the funds collapsed; about 60% of the money was gone. The funds' bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the funds' auditor, alleging negligence. The district court dismissed without deciding whether the auditor had acted competently, invoking the doctrine of in pari delicto, based on Bell's knowledge of the scheme. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Bell was not stealing funds and that the extent of his knowledge cannot be determined at this stage. An allegation that Bell was negligent but not criminally culpable in 2006 and 2007 makes the claim against the auditor sufficient.

A friend of defendant told Sergeant Wilson that he had seen sexual images of young girls on defendant's cell phone, and that defendant, 21 years old, had bragged about having sex with them. The friend later texted Wilson that he and defendant were together in a car. Wilson stopped the car and seized defendant's phone, but did not immediately apply for a search warrant. He sent a report to Detective Krug, who worked with the FBI Cyber Crimes Task Force. Krug tried to contact Wilson for more details, but shift differences and other delays resulted in a six-day gap before Krug obtained a federal warrant, searched the phone, and found the images. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding the delay not unreasonable, and that, if were unreasonable, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the officers did not act with perfect diligence, the delay was not so egregious as to render the search and seizure unreasonable.

While on patrol, Officer Turner spoke to a man who reported that someone had just broken into his home and fondled his two daughters, who had been sleeping. A short time later, Turner interviewed the girls, who described the intruder as wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a dark baseball cap. Turner left the house and stopped a man walking a dog in an alleyway near the house (plaintiff). Plaintiff was wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a black baseball cap. No one else was in the area. Plaintiff agreed to stay in the police cruiser, Turner re-interviewed the girls, called the state's attorney's office for advice, arrested plaintiff, and conducted a "show-up," where the girls identified plaintiff as the intruder. The state court later dismissed charges for lack of evidence. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Illinois state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to a false arrest claim against Turner and an indemnification claim against the county (Local Governmental Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101).

In 1996 defendant and his cousin formed companies that bought, stored, and sold grain, and provided farming services. In 1999, the cousins obtained bank loan by falsely representing that valuable contracts existed for future grain deliveries from one company to the other and inflating balances of bank accounts by writing bad checks between accounts. Charged with loan fraud and check-kiting (18 U.S.C. 1344) that cost the bank more than $2.5 million, the cousin pled guilty. Defendant testified that the transactions were in good faith, but was convicted and sentenced to 70 months in prison and restitution in the amount of $1,967,055.30, the outstanding balance on the loans. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the indictment was multiplicitous; that there was insufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that sentencing under 2009 guidelines violated the ex post facto clause; that loss and restitution amounts were miscalculated; that an enhancement for obstruction of justice was improper; and that the disparity between defendant’s sentence and that of his cousin was improper.

Plaintiff is serving time in a state prison, but was transferred to county jail to attend court proceedings. During two stays, the jail applied a policy of making “nutriloaf” the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation at the time of transfer, regardless of behavior in the jail. After two days, plaintiff began vomiting and experiencing stomach pains and constipation. He stopped eating nutriloaf and subsisted for eight days on bread and water, losing 8.3 percent of his weight during two stays. A jail infirmary nurse gave him antacids and a stool softener. Upon return to prison he was diagnosed with an anal fissure. In response to his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, defendants submitted only a "preposterous affidavit from a sheriff's officer" indicating that nutriloaf is nutritious. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, noting that defendants' decision "to defy rather than to defend" make it impossible to know the part diet played in making plaintiff sick. It is possible that jail officials were aware that nutriloaf was sickening him yet decided to do nothing, showing deliberate indifference to a serious health problem in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court suggested sanctions against defendants.

Defendant discarded a loaded handgun during a foot chase with police and was arrested for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. He signed a Miranda waiver and began giving a statement, but soon invoked his right to counsel. Officers halted the interview and summoned a guard to take defendant to his cell. Defendant changed his mind and asked to speak without counsel present. The interview was recorded. After new Miranda warnings, officers asked if he wanted a lawyer. He replied, “Yeah, I do, but you ....” Officers reminded him that they could not talk if he was asking for counsel. After a long pause, defendant stated unambiguously that he wanted to continue without a lawyer and gave a statement. The district court denied a motion to suppress, defendant was convicted, and, based on designation as an armed career criminal because of three prior felony convictions, was sentenced to 252 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Officers did not violate the Miranda/Edwards rule. A conviction for the Illinois crime of making insulting or provoking physical contact with a peace officer is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

In 2008, defendant was in the U.S. illegally and, at the direction of another, purchased a house for the purpose of obtaining multiple home equity lines of credit. He submitted loan applications that contained false statements about citizenship, employment, and intent to reside in the house, and concealed other loan applications He pled guilty to engaging in a scheme to defraud financial institutions and to obtain monies and funds owned by and under the custody and control of the financial institutions by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, and omission, 18 U.S.C. 1344. He was sentenced to 51 months and ordered to pay $337,250 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order, rejecting an argument that he could not be ordered to pay restitution for conduct to which he did not plead guilty. The transactions to which he pled guilty resulted in no actual loss because he was arrested before the loans were funded. The court noted that his plea declaration described the scheme as a whole and the ultimate loss to the lender.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and attempt to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. Baker was also convicted of use of a telephone in commission of the conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion for disclosure of the identities of all confidential informers. The court also upheld a three-level sentence increase (U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b)), rejecting an argument that it was based on unreliable testimony.

Romasanta worked in Chicago as an expediter, helping developers obtain construction permits. In testifying against Curescu, a developer, she admitted bribing 25 to 30 city employees between 2004 and 2007. She paid an $8,000 bribe to a zoning inspector on behalf of Curescu. Convicted of bribery of an agency that receives federal assistance, 18 U.S.C. 666 and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, Curescu was sentenced to six months and the zoning inspector to 41 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges to testimony and to the court's refusal to severe the cases.

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.