Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Charged with committing four drug-related robberies of Milwaukee pharmacies; having used a firearm in connection with the robberies; and having possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, defendant was first represented by appointed counsel. He disagreed with how counsel proposed to handle the hearing on a motion to suppress and sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se. He did not seek a continuance; nor did he object to the hearing being conducted by a magistrate. The magistrate responded that “this hearing will proceed with the defendant … represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the court will address the defendant’s motion to remove counsel and proceed pro se.” The hearing lasted nine hours; 12 witnesses testified. After the hearing, the magistrate granted the motion to discharge counsel, then mooted it with respect to the suppression hearing, denying defendant’s motion to reopen the hearing to present additional evidence. The magistrate recommended that the original motion to suppress, be denied. The district judge agreed with both recommendations. Defendant represented himself at trial and on appeal. He was sentenced to 780 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered the court to hold a new hearing on the motion to suppress, allowing the defendant to represent himself. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to using the telephone to facilitate his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), and was sentenced to 24 months of probation. The sentencing judge imposed 18 conditions of probation and stated: “we’ll see what the next two years are going to bring in terms of your ability to conform …, because if you don’t, the 24 months of probation is going to be 24 months in prison,” meaning that if defendant violated any condition, he would be in prison for 24 months. Two months later, the probation service sought to revoke his probation. Defendant admitted: driving without a valid driver’s license; failing to attend a drug treatment program; and thrice submitting urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. Although the guidelines range for his probation violations was seven to 13 months, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the statutory maximum for his crime of conviction, the judge recalled the comments made at sentencing, and ordered 24 months’ custody. Defendant’s lawyer, stating that he had no non-frivolous ground for appealing the sentence, filed an Anders brief, to which defendant did not respond. The Seventh Circuit denied the Anders motion, stating that there is no authority indicating that a judge may treat a warning of consequences as creating a contract requiring him to impose those consequences should there be a violation. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990, Carter went to Stegemiller’s home because Stegemiller had filed a small claims case against his mother. Carter asked to discuss the case, then forced his way into Stegemiller’s home, started to strangle her, and struck her in the head with a tire iron. Carter held Stegemiller down and removed her jewelry while Carter’s accomplice, Mitchell, raped her. Before she lost consciousness, Stegemiller saw the men taking a stereo speaker from her home and heard one say “[M]ake sure she’s dead … she can identify us.” The two removed the telephones and locked and barricaded the doors so that Stegemiller could not leave or seek help. Stegemiller survived, with serious injuries. Convicted of felony burglary, robbery, rape, and attempted murder, Carter was sentenced to 90 years. A month later, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.” On direct appeal, Carter’s attorney failed to argue that the attempted murder jury instruction given at Carter’s trial constituted fundamental error. Carter lost his appeal. Rejecting a petition for post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Carter did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside the verdict. The district court rejected a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Butt" on Justia Law

A patrolman pulled over Mohamed for running a red light. Upon searching Mohamed’s van, he found 1,170 packs of Newport-brand cigarettes not bearing Indiana tax stamps. He was charged under the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, which makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly to ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase contraband cigarettes,” 18 U.S.C. 2342(a). During deliberations, the jury submitted three questions to the district court: whether “more than 10,000 cigarettes being transported into Indiana from another state without paying [Indiana’s cigarette] tax [is] enough to be called contraband?” “Is the question at hand just that [Mohamed] had 10,000+ [cigarettes] and crossed state lines, or do we need to consider intent of what he planned to do with them once he crossed the state line? Sell, distribute, etc.?” “In the definition of ‘handled,’ is ‘buying’ applicable even if [the cigarettes] are bought in Kentucky? Can we see the entire copy of [the statute]” The district judge responded that she could not provide the information they had requested. The jury found Mohamed guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Mohamed intended to sell the cigarettes in Indiana. View "United States v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

Locke and co‐conspirator engaged in real estate fraud. Locke’s presentence report recommended a 16-point addition to the offense level, calculating a loss of $2,360,914.51 based on all of the properties underlying 15 original counts, although 10 counts had been dismissed. She made a written objection. The probation office argued that relevant conduct could be considered in determining the loss amount, but that even if the loss amount was based solely on Locke’s convicted conduct, the loss amount would exceed $1 million. At sentencing, Locke’s lawyer stated that he was withdrawing the objection to the loss calculation. The district court sentenced Locke to 71 months and ordered her to pay $2,360,916.51 in restitution to 13 entities. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the district court did not make the findings necessary when using relevant conduct to increase the sentence and were insufficient under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. On remand, Locke successfully moved to bar any evidence regarding relevant conduct not already in the record at the first sentencing. The district court recalculated without the two‐level enhancement for offenses involving 10 or more victims. Locke admitted that she had withdrawn her objections to the amount of loss in the first sentencing, but asserted that her loss amount should not be greater than the restitution amount calculated without regard to relevant conduct. The district court sentenced Locke to 57 months of imprisonment and ordered her to pay $340,789 in restitution, reduced by the amount recovered from sales of the property. The Seventh Circuit discussed the factors that distinguish loss and restitution, but affirmed Locke’s sentence based on waiver.View "United States v. Locke" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

Late on a Sunday night, gunshots were fired in northwest Chicago neighborhood. Numerous 911 callers reported from 5 to 9 shots. A dispatcher told officers to check the intersections at Wabansia and Karlov and at Armitage and Kildare, roughly a half-mile apart. Less than two minutes later, based on additional calls, the dispatcher added that shots were fired from a black car traveling south on Karlov near Wabansia. Officers driving south on Kostner Avenue, parallel to and a few streets west of Karlov, passed a black car headed north, and stopped the car. Burgess was a passenger and the officers found a revolver on his seat, five of its six rounds spent. Just over four minutes had passed from the initial dispatch to the officers’ report that Burgess was in custody. Having a 2001 conviction for second-degree murder, Burgess was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing the gun as a convicted felon. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress on the theory that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the car. The court found that, based on what the officers observed regarding the light traffic at that hour and what they knew from the dispatches, and the seriousness of the reported crime, reasonable suspicion justified the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All told, the circumstances provided ample justification for stopping Burgess’s car.. Reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion is not a matter of certainty. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A tip identified Smith as a possible cocaine dealer. With a search warrant, agents arrived at his apartment to discover 806.5 grams of powder cocaine, 148.6 grams of crack cocaine, 603.4 grams of marijuana, and a loaded handgun. Smith admitted that the drugs were his and that he intended to distribute them. Smith agreed to plead guilty to the cocaine count, to cooperate, and to waive his appellate rights. The government agreed to dismiss two counts, not to pursue enhanced statutory penalties based on Smith’s prior narcotics conviction, to recommend that Smith receive maximum credit for acceptance of responsibility, to consider filing a motion to reduce the Sentencing Guidelines range in recognition of cooperation, and to recommend that the court impose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. The court overruled Smith’s objections to the sentencing report, which produced an advisory range of 188 to 235 months, but ultimately imposed a sentence of 168 months. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that a competent attorney would have recognized the problem with a reckless homicide conviction as a predicate for career offender status, and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting. On that basis, he asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. The court relied on Smith’s waiver of his appellate and the thorough colloquy before the court accepted the plea. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Baptist is a native of Belize who entered the U.S.as a lawful permanent resident in 1988.In 1992, Baptist pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation. In 1995, Baptist was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was again sentenced to probation. In 1996, Baptist was again convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the time, the offense was considered an aggravated felony and he was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Baptist signed a stipulated removal order in 1998. Afterwards, he illegally reentered the U.S. several times; each time he was discovered, he was again removed to Belize. In 2005, Baptist illegally entered once more and avoided detection until he was arrested in 2010. Charged with being illegally present in the U.S. after having been previously removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Baptist moved to dismiss the indictment, collaterally attacking his 1998 removal as violating his due process rights. The district court denied Baptist’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Baptist failed to establish that his removal proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” View "United States v. Baptist" on Justia Law