Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After Calabrese, a "made" man in the "Chicago Outfit" began cooperating with federal authorities, it became apparent that information about his cooperation was leaking to the mob. Defendant, a Deputy U.S. Marshal, was convicted of stealing government property and disclosing without authorization information regarding a witness protected in the WITSEC program, (18 U.S.C. 641; 18 U.S.C. 3521) and found not guilty of making false statements to law enforcement agents (18 U.S.C. 1001). He was sentenced to four years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly denied a motion to suppress defendant's incriminating statements; there was no evidence of coercion that would render the statements involuntary. Even if the court improperly admitted evidence in violation of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless. The court affirmed the sentence, noting that Chicago witnesses had declined WITSEC protection because of defendant's conduct.

Defendant, convicted of two counts of receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A); (b)(1)) and one count of possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B); (b)(2)), was sentenced to a prison term totaling 240 months. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because possession is a lesser-included offense of receipt. The evidence sufficiently showed that the receipt and possession convictions were based on different conduct. The court vacated the sentence as based on an improper assumption. The judge stated that defendant believed the crime was "victimless" and that defendant did not "believe any of this is criminal." Defendant did not make such assertions, but only claimed to be innocent and that his confession was coerced.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), contingent upon his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the images underlying the charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Evidence that defendant sexually assaulted his old niece supported probable cause that he possessed child pornography and justified a search of his personal residence. Officers acted in good faith.

Defendant's stepmother was killed while he and others robbed his father's house to steal guns. A state court sentenced him to 71 years' imprisonment for murder and armed robbery. His conviction was affirmed. State courts rejected collateral attack. The district court rejected a petition for habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the attorney's failure to object to defendant being required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court declined to address whether the prosecutor violated the due process clause by taking advantage of an error during defendant's testimony. The claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, whose decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court decisions.

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

As Graham entered a public library, her purse, containing $5,000 in cash, was grabbed. She struggled with the snatcher. The robber shot Graham in the head and her mother in the chest, before fleeing. Graham described the attacker to police officers, but did not say that she knew her assailant. A neighbor, visiting the women in the hospital, told police that he had heard a rumor that Phillips, who lived in Graham's neighborhood, had been watching currency exchanges and robbing people who cashed tax-refund checks (as Graham had done). Graham later identified Phillips from a photo array and a lineup. Phillips had a strong alibi and there was no other evidence against him. After his acquittal, he filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against the village and officers. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants, holding that the identification established probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mentioning Phillips' name to the victim, who claimed she did not know him, did not taint the identification.

Indiana State Prison maintains an inmates' recreation fund, required by Ind. Code 4-24-6-6(a), to accrue money from sources outside the state budget, such as profits from a prison commissary. Prison officials are to use this money for the inmates' benefit by purchasing recreational items or using funds for a purpose not covered under existing state appropriations. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claimed that for 10 years, prison officials have misappropriated proceeds by uses ranging from diverting money for personal uses, to using the fund for purposes already covered by existing allocations, such as purchase of devices enhancing security. The district court screened and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915A (b)(1), finding that petitioner did not have a statutorily protected property interest in the fund. Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes mandate that state penal facilities maintain a recreation fund or dictate how money in such funds be spent, The state statute did not give inmates a property interest in the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed

Based on his role in operating an online pharmacy that did not require prescriptions, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to import controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 963 and 18 U.S.C. 2, conspiracy to possess controlled substances with the intent to distribute 21 U.S.C. 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2, and conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. 2; 1956-1957 with intent to promote the importation of controlled substances. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of expert testimony by a pharmacologist who testified about the classification of various drugs, their side effects, and the medical supervision needed to prescribe them. Although the testimony had only minimal relevance, the threshold for relevance under Rule 401 is quite low. Parts of the testimony related to side effects and birth defects should have been excluded under Rule 403 because the probative value was negligible, but the error was harmless given the weight of the evidence.

Defendant was arrested while officers executed a warrant at his apartment, and, based on items found and statements to officers, was charged with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, possession of Ecstasy with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After denial of a motion to suppress, the case was dismissed without prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The grand jury returned another indictment, based on the same circumstances. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced, as a "career offender" and applying an obstruction of justice enhancement, to 300 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted a motion to expand the record. Defendant had good reason not to raise his suppression argument before the same judge in the second proceeding. The argument was not waived and consideration will require an expanded record.

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine and was sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2000. Defendant's collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 was unsuccessful. Almost a decade later, he filed a motion, asking the court to reopen the case. The judge treated it as a successive collateral attack, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant filed notice of appeal 186 days later, after the time allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2107 and Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the appeal is saved by Rule 4(a)(7). If Rule 4(a)(7) requires a separate document, in addition to entry of the order on the docket, the date of "entry" is postponed until the district court complies with Rule 58 (requiring entry of a separate judgment), or 150 days have passed, whichever happens first. The district judge did not enter a Rule 58 judgment. If one was required, the time for appeal started 150 days after March 14, 2011, and the appeal was timely. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. Disposition of a motion filed in a 2255 proceeding, long after final judgment, does not require a separate Rule 58 judgment.