Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of attempted murder, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and invasion of privacy, defendant was sentenced to 51 years in prison. He was unsuccessful at seeking post-conviction relief in Indiana state court and filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court looked at counsel's performance as a whole and deferred to the Indiana Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel's decisions to pursue alibi and misidentification defenses were strategic in nature and reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel's decision to lie, during opening statements about petitioner's whereabouts, was "troubling" but did not change the analysis. It is unlikely that a different result would be reached, absent counsel's errors.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court set a base offense level of 24, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), relying in part on a California first-degree residential burglary conviction as a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 93 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The burglary conviction qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B), as a crime that otherwise presents a serious potential risk of injury rather than under the enumerated crime of "burglary of a dwelling," but it nonetheless qualifies as a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2).

Plaintiff was arrested for drinking on a public way. A search incident to arrest turned up a heroin packet and a baggie of crack cocaine, so drug possession charges were added. He was jailed for 12 days before bonding out. The drinking charge was dismissed and, at a preliminary hearing, a state judge concluded there was no probable cause for the drug charges. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the officers. After the jury returned a verdict for defendants, plaintiff argued that the court erred in allowing an assistant prosecutor to testify that low-weight cases are routinely thrown out, as an expert, without proper disclosures and foundation. The district court rejected the argument, stating that the prosecutor never offered an opinion, but testified as to her experience on the narcotics call in the state court, offering factual statements based on her personal observations. The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. The prosecutor testified based on her specialized knowledge and non-disclosure of her planned testimony as an expert was not harmless.

Plaintiff alleged that while he was a pretrial detainee, asleep in his cell, a guard opened the door, allowing another inmate to enter and attack him. He sustained injuries to his head and eyes. He requested medical attention, but received none for five days. He was locked down for 72 hours following the attack. The district court screened the 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and held a brief telephonic merit-review hearing, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that even if plaintiff's condition did not worsen from the delay, deliberate indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Although the evidence may not ultimately substantiate plaintiff's allegations, if proven the conditions are severe enough to have required more prompt attention. On remand the district court should give plaintiff, who was acting pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the officers who ignored his injuries.

The Seventh Circuit previously affirmed the convictions of members of a Chicago operation that trafficked heavily in various controlled substances, but ordered a limited remand asking whether the district court wanted to resentence in light of the 2007 Supreme Court decision, Kimbrough v. United States. On remand the district court lowered one sentence from 456 to 360 months and the other from 300 to 240 months. With respect to one defendant, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err in calculating the drug quantity attributable to that defendant. The calculation was based on reliable evidence. The other defendant's appeal presented no nonfrivolous issues, so the court granted his counsel's Anders motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal.

A jury convicted the defendant of defrauding a large bank. The district judge sentenced him to 96 months in prison and ordered him to forfeit the money that he had obtained from the fraud, which the judge determined to be $16,241,202, plus property that he had bought with proceeds of the fraud, and to pay restitution to the bank also in the amount of $16,241,202. Defendant challenged the order of restitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Restitution, unlike forfeiture, is limited to the victim's loss, 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A); the court remanded for determination of that loss. The court noted that loss has been limited by the government's decision to convey forfeited assets to the victim up to the limit of the loss.

Defendant sold heroin to an informant and was indicted for distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 216 months. The government agreed to request a reduced sentence if he provided assistance and later filed a Rule 35(b) motion requesting sentence reduction. The court reduced the sentence to 168 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendant failed to request a reduced sentence at the hearing and therefore is unable to argue that the court erred by deviating from a requested reduction. Rule 35(b) hearings are not an opportunity for full resentencing, so the court cannot consider factors other than defendant's substantial assistance in deciding by how much to reduce the sentence if the reduction is less than the request, so the court properly declined to consider the 3553(a) factors.

A supervising building inspector was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery, 18 U.S.C. 371, and two counts of making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and was sentenced to a total of 60 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly allowed testimony about the 2005 gift list of a city businessman; the testimony was probative of intent and not so prejudicial as to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Although the court erred by admitting the list itself as a business record, the error was harmless. The court properly barred recordings between defendant and one of the witnesses who testified against him, which contained self-exculpatory statements. The court properly held defendant accountable for more than $112,500 in bribes, which resulted in an eight-level increase to the USSG offense level.

Defendant Avery pled guilty to crack cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); he appealed the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, calculation of the crack cocaine quantity attributed to him, and his 262-month sentence. Defendant Redmond pled guilty to crack cocaine distribution conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 846, and appealed only his 240-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the court to reconsider Redmond's sentence and determine whether it might be inclined to impose a different sentence, knowing the full extent of its discretion. Avery was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on the crack cocaine quantity attributable to him, which was reasonably calculated, or on the enhancement for career offender status.

Defendant pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), agreed to cooperate in exchange for a chance at a lower sentence, and waived the right to appeal "any and all issues." The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment, the statutory minimum given the amount of crack, prior convictions for felony drug offenses, and the government's decision not to move for a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding the plea agreement enforceable and rejecting an argument that the government breached that agreement by not moving under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) to reduce his sentence below the statutory minimum. There is nothing in the record indicating that the government harbored any improper motive or acted irrationally in declining to move for a sentence reduction. Although defendant had begun to cooperate, his efforts had not resulted in any charges or arrests.